which may or may not justly comprehend the rights of nature, and are, perhaps, never precisely the same in the conceptions of any two individuals,-can furnish no sufficient data for the apportionment of taxes. It is necessary to find something more fixed and certain, and to take real quantities, as well in the data as in the product.

The only plausible theory, and which is capable of being reduced to practice by the application of real quantities is, that every contributor, in any community, shall be taxed to its support in proportion to his enjoyments, as a member of that community. In this, however, no regard is to be had to mental, but to apparent and sensible enjoyments. Upon this principle, the possession and the use of property become the data for apportioning taxes upon the contributors. I have added the use, which will comprehend the consumption, at least, beyond what is common and necessary to every class; because some will place the enjoyment in the use of consumption, rather than of profit in the possession. They may choose while others hoard for use or profit-to spend their acquisitions in the gratification of their passions or appetites.

It has been held by some, that taxes ought to be assessed by a fixed and general valuation of property, and such has been the practice in some states. In favor of this mode it has been urged that though it may be subject to considerable inequalities, yet they will not be greater than in the case of particular assessments; and should it happen that taxes may fall more equally in the latter mode, yet in the former they would be more known and certain,-a very important consideration in the levying of taxes; that the contributor is thus enabled to foresee with a good degree of certainty, the amount of his taxes, and to take it into his calculation, both of economy and enterprize, which will rarely be disappointed through the intervention of an unexpected demand; that it is, perhaps, a consideration of nearly equal weight, that men are generally less dissatisfied with the inequalities of fortune, than those which are imposed by the ignorance, prejudice, or caprice of their fellow citizens.

Plausible as these reasons may appear, there are unanswerable objections to the mode. A general valuation must be an

average valuation ;—for instance, a certain sum for every acre of land, without regard to the quality; and so of a horse, or other personal property. The real value, or the income that may be derived from different kinds of land, often varies in the extreme. One acre may yield an income of twenty, or even an hundred dollars, while another hardly pays the labor of cultivation. There are, besides, many local and other causes, which are constantly producing a difference in the value of land. The difference in the actual value of personal property, may be as great. We know from observation and experience, that the most valuable property falls to the share of the more wealthy class. It is evident, therefore, where taxes are high, and assessed agreeable to such valuation, the poorer class of contributors must be ruined long before such taxes reach the amount which the whole might be able to pay, on a judicious assessment apportioned as near as may be agreeable to the income that the property may afford, to which it is believed some near approach might be made. To this end, it will be necessary that proper boards of assessors should be appointed to make, under proper regulations, a valuation annually, of the property of each individual liable to direct taxes; and provision may easily be made that their acts should be public and known to each contributor as far as concerns his interest.

Taxes ought not only to be equal, but, as far as the reasonable exigencies of the state require, and general rules can extend, to be apportioned to the visible means of the contributors, both collectively and individually. This, however; must be understood with some limitation. The apportionment ought not to be according to the means of living, but to the means of payment; or, what upon an ordinary calculation ought to be the means of payment. This object can be attained only by an extensive knowledge of the different interests, employments, modes, and necessary expense of living, of the different classes of citizens. With such knowledge, and with a particular attention to the subjects of taxation, the legislature may, in a great measure, if not altogether exempt from the burden of taxes, the necessary means of living, to the poorer classes of citizens, who, though they may contribute nothing directly to the sup

port of government, are far from being the least useful class to the state.

The exigencies of the state must limit the aggregate sum to be demanded in taxes. But the demand ought not, for any continuance, to equal the sum of private revenue, much less ought it to be suffered to diminish the capital stock. Were the government, by thus anticipating the revenue of its citizens, to deprive them of the comfortable prospect of a provision for the future, it would take away all incitement to enterprize, and even the spirit of private industry and economy. If, in addition to this, the enormity of the demand should constantly diminish the capital stock, nothing would be presented to the view but the gloomy prospect of inevitable poverty and distress. The same observations will apply to those burdens which, through the unequal mode of assessment, fall most severely on particular classes only.

The mode of apportionment ought not to be directed by the interests of any single classes of citizens, but by the interests of the whole, which consists in a certain ratio of the particular interests. If, in the political consideration of taxes, the interest of the state, by which nothing more is generally meant than the interest of the majority,-come in competition with the interest of a particular class of citizens in their lawful pursuits, their interests ought not to be wholly sacrificed to that of the state, much less to that of another class. Every affair of this nature ought to be conducted upon the principles of a compromise of interests. In adjusting the compromise, however, the magnitude of any interests in competition is not to be adopted as the only rule of preference. Such rule would frequently prove a total sacrifice of the minor interest. Where it is demanded of particular persons or particular classes, that they give up their interest for the public service, they are as fully as in cases that arise between individuals-entitled to a compensation for all that which exceeds their just proportion.

Second. Indirect taxes are such as are assessed upon subjects, not in regard to the revenue they may produce to individuals or their use in possession, but to their use in consumption. Such are duties on the importation and exportation of articles for a sale of consumption, whether the consumption intended be

foreign or domestic. So also an excise on domestic productions, as on beer brewed, or spirits distilled in the country, or on the sale of such articles as have been imported. In all these cases, such is the nature of the subjects, that they sooner or later perish in the use. Under the same head of indirect taxes, comes duties on sales and transfers on registration, on certificates, and licences; and duties on stamps made necessary for the authentication of written instruments.

I do not here pretend to enumerate all the subjects of taxation in this mode; such taxes have been almost infinitely extended by the ingenuity of financiers. They have been extended, not only to all the productions of human industry, and the enjoyments of domestic comfort, but to the common gifts of nature,-to light and genial heat. Such is the window tax, and hearth tax in England, and other countries. Taxes of this kind, unless laid on the absolute necessaries of life, which ought always to be avoided if possible, are never compulsory on the contributor, the consumer. He is left to his own option whether he will purchase for his use, the article taxed or not. It is true, that in general, it is the safest, cheapest, and least onorous mode of collecting and realizing a tax by government. It is advanced by the exporter, importer, and producer of the articles taxed, wherever that mode can be adopted, who recompense themselves by adding the amount of tax, with reasonable profits, to the price of the article sold; so that the consumer, becomes the ultimate contributor, by paying his proportion of the tax in the price of the article he chooses to purchase. It is true, the ultimate inequality on the contributors may be as great in the payment of indirect as of direct taxes; but in the latter, the inequality is compulsory; in the former, voluntary. The contributor may, at his election, pay either more or less than would be his proportion according to his actual income.

It has another advantage over direct taxation; that when once in steady operation, the contributor can never be surprised, or his plans of economy or enterprize be deranged by an unexpected demand on his finances. Uncalled for and unnoticed by itself, it necessarily, and if I may use the word, spontaneously unites itself in all the data from which he makes his calculations. Indirect taxes will therefore be preferred in a

good degree to direct, taxes, by every government which has a due regard to the ease and happiness of the people.

In modern times, besides financial purposes, indirect taxes have been employed as a principal engine of a state, for regulating commerce, foreign and domestic, and for directing the industry of the citizens into those particular channels of arts, manufactures, and commerce which are deemed most to conduce to the present interest of the community. A British writer observes—" taxes may be so contrived as to rival bounties in promoting industry, manufactures, and commerce.” The policy, expedience, and justice of such application of taxes by which a preference may be given of one branch of industry over another, and to domestic over foreign manufactures, has been called in question. It has been said to be an interference of goveroment, with the affairs and pursuits of individuals, by an attempt to direct the employment of their stock and industry into certain channels;-that individuals are the best judges in what mode and in what channels they can employ their stock and their industry to the most profit, much better than the community at large, or than any legislative body; therefore, not only a true regard to the rights of the citizens, but the true interest of the community requires that every one should be left free to employ his stock and his industry as he shall please;in a word, to manage his own concerns in his own way. All this may be, and indeed, is very true; and yet it does not effect the question arising on this subject.

The principal question is, whether the community, or rather the legislature may not, from their general information, be more capable of judging whether the employment of part of the stock and industry of the country, in some branches of arts and manufactures, not at present occupied by their citizens, or not sufficiently cultivated to produce a domestic supply, may be, I do not say more profitable to individuals in the present situation, but more advantageous to the community at large, if it can be made profitable to individuals.

The only specious answer to this question has been, that the whole stock or capital of a nation is made up of the capitals of individuals, that the increase of the national capital depends on the increase of individual capitals; and this increase of individu