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influence of this principle, this benevolence of disposition, united with honor, and without which, honor is but a dazzling meteor, oft blazing to destroy, the true patriot has at all times dedicated his services, and on great occasions, even his life to his country, with a self devotion that has embalmed his name in the memory of all generations. Thus it is sufficiently explained how the general rule, superinduced upon the specific and immediate rules of conduct, by affecting the disposition of the agent, qualifies his actions, and unites private with the general interest. In the same manner the universal rule, that we are bound in all things to obey the will of God superinduced upon both the general and the specific rules, brings home to the mind and enforces the obligation in all cases. Such are the principles and obligation of the law of nature, considered as the internal law, which comprehends all the duties of man, and for the performance of which he is holden accountable to the Omniscient Lawgiver and Judge.

The external law considers those duties, only as man is accountable to his fellow men for their performance. In this view, duties are distinguished into two classes,-perfect duties, or duties of perfect obligation, and imperfect duties. To every duty there is a corresponding right, that is, if one person owes a duty to another, that other has a corresponding right to demand the performance. In all cases of perfect duties, he, to whom the duty is owing, has a perfect right, a right to constrain him who owes the duty, to perform it. This class comprehends all the duties and rights of justice, which are the great objects of all civil institutions and laws. If one owes to another an imperfect duty, that other may ask as a favor, but has no right to compel the performance. This class comprehends all the duties of benevolence. The rules of the external law exempt this class of duties from the jurisdiction of all civil laws and human tribunals. No man is holden accountable in the sense of being amenable to any of his fellow men or to society, for their neglect or performance. This distinction is founded in the highest reason and utility. It was before observed to be a general rule of natural law, "that each should do for others what their necessities require, and they are capable of doing, without neglecting what he owes to himself,"

which includes his natural and necessary connexions in society. As far as relates to his fellow men, each is by the law of nature constituted on this subject the sole judge; he is amenable only to God and his own conscience. It is a case, in which from the very nature of the thing, others are incompetent to judge. The law of nature has therefore denied to man the right of enforcing these duties by constraint. Were it otherwise, natural liberty would no where be found among men. Indeed it would change the nature of the duties, and reduce acts of benevolence, from the rank which they now hold among the highest virtues, to the grade of necessary actions. This we constantly see exemplified in those laws, by which the community make provision for the necessitous and the relief of the unfortunate. The individuals who are called to contribute to the relief, act under the constraint of law, and however cheerfully they may contribute, it is a necessary act of obedience to the law. The benevolent act is the act of the community, which being composed of moral beings, sustains the character of a moral person, and is a subject of moral obligation.

When it is said that man is not accountable to his fellow men for the performance or neglect of these duties, it is meant only he is not amenable to them or to any human tribunal; yet from the deep interest which every one feels in his own character, from the irrepressible desire of the approbation and dread of the censure of his fellow men, which nature has implanted in the breast of every human being, there still remains a strong sense of accountability; but it is a moral, not a legal accountability. From this view of the subject it will be readily perceived that the rules of the external, do not in any way operate as an exception to the obligation of the internal law, or in any way to diminish its force. The laws of nature and the obligations which they impose, are as immutable as the Supreme Being by whom they are ordained. When we say the laws of nature are immutable, it must be understood of the laws themselves; not of their application. The subject to which any rule of the law of nature is to be applied may be

changed, in which case the same laws of nature

direct, a

correspondent change in the application of the rule. Of this,

we have innumerable instances under human institutions and their various changes. Human institutions, as we have formerly seen, are indicated and rendered necessary by the laws of nature, but the model of these institutions is ever left to the will and the wisdom of man. All political and civil rights and duties, have their foundation in the law of nature; but they are permitted by the same law to be modified and varied, to the nature and end of those institutions. Thus the subjects to which the rules of that law are to be applied, are varied, and this renders it necessary, that there should be a correspondent variation in the application of the rules. Civil institutions left to the discretion of man, may be as different as the manners, habits, and opinions of the different people, by whom, or for whom they are formed, and yet all be within the limits, and receive the approbation of the laws of nature, the great end and design of which is, through individuals, societies, and nations, to promote under human institutions, the happiness of the human race. It will be sufficient, here, to mention one instance, which was noticed on a former occasion, of a total variation in the manner of applying the rules of natural law, rendered necessary by a variation of the subject in the progress of human institutions. In a simple state of society, short of that imaginary independence, which has been called a state of nature, before the improvement of civil institutions, every man is, by the law of nature, as it operates in such society, in most cases, a judge in his own cause, and the avenger of his own injuries. If another violate the laws of nature to his injury, he for himself applies the rule, judges of the injury, the measure of satisfaction due, and is empowered to carry that judgment into execution. In an improved state of society, and a more ample provision of civil institutions and laws, this manner of applying the rule is no longer tolerated. Every man, in cases of injury, is required to submit to the decision of others, to the civil tribunal, whose duty it is made to judge of the injury, apply the rule, and determine what measure of satisfaction is due; and that judgment must be executed by an appointed civil officer. The same thing is to be observed of all the rights of justice; of all claims of right, natural, civil, and political. They are to be submitted

to the appointed tribunals, and the rules applied in a manner agreeable to the modification of those rights by the civil institution and laws.

I will here conclude this brief sketch of the law of nature, its principles and obligation, by repeating that it is the ordination of God in the constitution of human nature. It is his will manifested to men in his works." It is a law," as it has been forcibly observed, “binding over all the globe, and at all times. No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid, derive all their force, all their authority from this original." *

*1. Bl. Comm. 41.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Law of Nations.

Dispersed over the earth, it is impossible that mankind should have continued united in one society. Local, and other circircumstances have occasioned a division into states and nations, independent of each other, without that common interest and united councils" necessary to the individuality of the whole as one people. When thus separated and formed into states, each assuming a national character, they sustain various relations towards each other according to their various situations, contiguity, reciprocal wants, and mutual or opposing interests. Between independent states, various circumstances of necessity or convenience, induce an intercourse more or less frequent and intimate; but such intercourse could not subsist at all, or certainly with any degree of security, without certain rules, which each should be bound to observe toward the other. Nations are, in regard to each other, in a situation similar to that of individuals, in the state of nature supposed to have existed previous to any social compact. Each nation becomes such by the social or civil compact of its individuals, which, whether ever formally made, or only implied from a customary association long continued, is always held to be binding on every person belonging to the same community. As nations are constituted of beings social by the laws of their nature, nations necessarily assume, in respect to each other, a social character. Hence, they are capable of sustaining social and moral relations, from which result reciprocal moral duties, and through which they are mutually holden amenable to the laws of nature; but in a manner different from individuals in a state of society, and

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