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necessities, convenience, or pleasure of the possessor.-No, it comprehends equally in itself, the right equally natural, of a disposition of the property by sale, gift, or exchange, to take ⚫ effect immediately or at any future time, or upon contingency either in possession or reversion, in his life time, or at his death, which may lawfully be the contingency. Nor can it be justly subject to any other limitations, than such as the public good requires, a limitation to which every right of man is subject by the laws of social nature. But as we have seen, so far is the public good from opposing this claim of right, that it imperiously requires its allowance.

The natural right of the children and kindred, especially of the children, to succeed to the inheritance of the deceased, is, if possible, still more clear. The union of parents and children forms a society the most intimate and the most purely natural. The reciprocal right and duties, parental and filial, are derived solely from the relations of nature, and are in their origin independent of the modifications of art or of civil institutions. Not only the members of the several families, but others forcibly feel what I have ventured to call the individuality of these little communities of nature. The perception may be resembled to that of the members to form the body. All the members of a family, one of these little communities, feel the tenderest interest in the good or evil, moral or natural, that befalls each other;-no one hesitates when he observes an instance of a contrary disposition, to pronounce it unnatural. When a child is arrived at maturity ready to branch into a new family, it is perceived, from the natural connexion, to be the duty of the parent, according to his ability, and with a due regard to the subsisting or growing relations of the family, to contribute to the advancement of such child. If a parent, in common cases, neglect to contribute, every one conceives him to be guilty, though not of a civil, yet of a moral crime ;-He is at once believed to be under the dominion of avarice, or some other vicious passion, that has stifled the voice of nature. On the whole we may with propriety adopt the elegant and forcible language of Mr. Christian upon the subject. "The affection of parents toward their children is the most powerful and universal principle, which nature has implanted

in the human breast, and it cannot be conceived, even in the most savage state, that any one is so destitute of that affection and of reason, who would not revolt at the position, that a stranger has as good a right as his children to the property of a deceased parent.

When there are no children, the same natural relations, differing in degree, extend to the next of kin, whether ascending, descending, or collateral, who on the same natural principles have a right to succeed as heirs to the possessions of the deceased. In proportion to the distance the relations are less strongly marked; and although the inconvenience arising from the numerous claimants that may appear in the more remote degrees, has sometimes been thought a good reason for a limitation; yet it has generally been agreed to allow the claim as far as the relations can be traced. The relations, however remote, clearly carry a right preferable to that of a total stranger. If then, the right of property be a natural right; if those are natural rights, that commence in natural principles, then the right of making a testamentary disposition, and the right of the children and next of kin, according to their several degrees, to succeed to their parent and kinsman, are natural rights; they have their inception in natural principles, are admitted and approved by the universal sentiments of mankind, and they abide the sure test of all the laws of nature, their general tendency to promote the peace and happiness of human society.

It may be suggested, however, by some, that if the right of the children be founded in the laws of nature, those laws are immutable, and, consequently, the right; which must necessarily abridge, or wholly supersede the parent's right of disposal in this case. The laws of nature are determined in their application by the existing relations. The relations remaining under the same combinations and modifications, the result will be the same, and, consequently, the same law will invariably apply. The relations are subject to different arrangements. They may be enlarged, diminished, or wholly cease. In all these cases the result will vary, and, consequently, the law will vary in application precisely as the relations themselves; or we may say, the cases vary, and therefore come under different rules of the same general law.

The parent, during his life, has a full-right to direct the use and disposal of his property. That he is under a natural, or moral obligation to provide for his household and to advance his children with his property as his occasions admit, and their circumstances require, no more effects his rights than any moral obligation affects the freedom of moral action. The right of the children, during the life of the parent, constitute claims of a moral nature only, of the admission of which, he is by nature made the sole judge. There are other claims on his property beside those of his children. His property is subject civilly, to all claims of right both of the public and individuals—it is subject to other claims of a moral nature, of which he is also the sole judge. He may think it his duty to give some of his property for the public use, for the relief of distress, for the encouragement of learning and virtue, the reward of humanity or exemplary instances of filial piety. It is subject during his life to all his occasions, natural, civil, and moral, and a disposition to take effect after his death is no more inconsistent with the rights of the children than a disposition for the same purposes, while living. In such cases a parent may misjudge, he may do wrong, but it is generally an affair of too much delicacy to endure the divisions of the civil law.

On the death of the parent, the relation in which he stood while living, being determined, the right of the children, as far as respects the property of which no disposition has been made remains, and that right, which before was only contingent and of a moral nature, is now perfected and realized; and when the just demands of others are satisfied, all the children have an equal claim and an equal right to the remaining property of their common parent. If nature dictates any preference, it is generally in favor of the younger, and not of the elder, branch. It appears not unreasonable, that when any of the younger children are left in a state of helpless infancy, the common property left by the parent, should assist in some degree in making the provision for their support and education, which, were he living, he would consider not as an advancement, but an indispensable obligation of nature.

Thus, upon a careful examination of the right of descent,

upon natural principles, we find no intimation of the right of primogeniture, no preference in succession, but what tends to an equal enjoyment of the goods of fortune. We may repeat that the equal laws of nature, if rightly understood and practised in government, tend to prevent every dangerous excess. The more we examine these laws, the more will appear their coincidence with the best feelings of the human heart, and the genuine principles of equal law and government.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the extension of the right of property and its abuse.

It should seem at first view, that the right of property could attach on no subject, which is not an object of sense; no subject of a mere incorporeal nature, and that man, the only being in whom nature has vested a right of property, could not himself become the subject of that right; and yet the right has prevailed in both kinds.-There are many instances of the right of property recognized in the laws of civilized countries, in which the subjects of that right exist only in the contemplation of the mind. They are not objects of sense; and such right is called an incorporeal right. The right may be temporary or perpetual. If perpetual, it is called an incorporeal hereditament; which has been defined by Judge Blackstone, to be "a right issuing out of a thing corporeal, whether real or personal, or concerning, or annexed to, or exercisable within the same. It is not the thing corporate itself, which may consist in lands, houses, jewels or the like; but something collateral thereto, and issuing out of those lands or houses, or

an office relating to those jewels ;"*—and farther on he says— An annuity, for instance, is an incorporeal hereditament; for though the money, that is, the fruit of that annuity, is doubtless of a corporeal nature, yet the annuity itself, which produces that money, is a thing invisible, has only a mental existence, and cannot be delivered over from hand to hand.”

However abstract the notion, yet I think the conception of it very easy; and although it cannot be supposed to exist in the very early stages of society, or until the right of property has become general and permanent, yet when it comes into existence, so far as it is connected with, or issues out of a thing corporeal, a natural subject of property, it will readily be perceived to be comprehended in the natural right of property. But no grant of an annuity merely personal and not issuing out of something corporeal, comes within the natural right, of which it partakes no more than the right acquired by one man to a sum of money, which another has by contract promised to pay him. There is the same distinction, as to the nature of the right, where it issues not out of the thing corporeal, but is annexed to some office or trust concerning it. The right is to a reward for care and pains, whether it be in the shape of a pension, or salary, or of perquisites, as fees for services to be performed in the exercise of the office. The reward issues not out of a thing corporate-for the jewel, mentioned as an instance, yields nothing,—nothing issues out of it. The reward, or wages if in the shape of a salary, is paid by the owner or employer; it is a personal concern between the employer and the person employed, and that, whether the employment be of a public or a private nature. If the reward of an office be in the shape of perquisites as fees, it is then paid by those for whom the official services are performed. There is no differencein the nature of the thing from the right of a laborer in agriculture, or an artificer hired for certain wages, or as it sometimes happens, for a certain share of the profits, by the day, month, or year. If the office be for life, it has an analogy to a freehold, a life estate. If it be granted to one and his

*2 Comm. 20.

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