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their full exercise, whenever they find themselves able to resist the force of the oppressor.

Political rights have been very generally confounded with civil rights; although they clearly are, and from their importance ought to be considered, a distinct class. They consist of the rights and powers retained by the people in the fundamental law, the constitution of the state-as in a democracy, the power of making all laws as well of the constitution as of the municipal code, and the appointment and control of all the officers and ministers of the government,-in a mixed monarchy the right of electing a co-ordinate branch of the government,and in a representative government, the right and power of electing directly or indirectly the public functionaries, through which they are all, in a good degree, held accountable to the people for their conduct in the administration, and also the power of changing, altering, and amending the constitution itself, agreeably to the regulations prescribed in the original compact.

Civil rights are those that are guarantied to the citizens by civil institutions and are contained in the class of natural rights above mentioned; the right of personal liberty, of personal security, and of private property, and the rights derived from, and subordinate to these, which are very numerous. They are called natural rights as they have their foundation in the laws of social nature; but as practical rights they may well be denominated conventional, because for their secure enjoyment, they depend on the social or civil compact; whether established by usage or by express stipulation.

Judge Blackstone tells us, that "the rights of persons considered in their natural capacities, are of two sorts, absolute and relative,-Absolute, which are such as appertain and belong to particular men merely as individuals or single persons.Relative, which are incident to them as members of society and standing in various relations to each other." He farther says, "by the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it." This distinction is, I think, in some degree, incorrect.-There cannot, strictly speaking, be any such thing as absolute rights, as the

author has here explained them.—What are the rights of man, if we suppose one excluded from all society, from all relation to any other human being? In such a situation, a man may have and exercise his natural powers.-He may take and use for his support any of the productions of nature, for food, for covering, or for any other purpose; but this power to use is very different from the notion of right in the appropriate sense intended. With a man in the situation we have supposed, the right of personal liberty, so important in a state of society, must sink into the mere power of locomotion, limited only by the laws of his nature. The notion of right, in the sense of the author, vanishes with the notion of relation.

There is, certainly, a distinction between the rights here denominated absolute, and relative. The former, such as the rights of personal liberty, personal security, and of private property, universally result from the social relations, are recognized by the primary laws of our nature, and continue through every stage of society, although subject to certain modifications. The latter are not permanent nor universal. They result from those relations in which a man is placed in a state of society ;-such as the right to obtain a legal redress for the violation or neglect, by others, of those rights which are recognized by the laws and constitution of the state; or from those relations, which he has the liberty and capacity of forming; such is the married state and the relations thence resulting. Beside, the former are not absolute in any sense for although they cannot be alienated by a voluntary transfer, yet they may, agreeably to just and necessary laws of the community, be forfeited and lost, by the criminal act of the individual. On the whole, therefore, these two classes of rights are not properly distinguished, by calling one absolute and the other relative. The one arising from the primary, universal, and permanent relations of social nature; the other from those relations that are subsequent, limited, and fluctuating, they will, with much greater propriety, be denominated primary and secondary rights, by which the nature of the several classes will be more clearly distinguished. Of the origin of rights on natural principles, we shall have occasion to treat more particularly in the next chapter on the inception and progress of the right of property.

Liberty, applicable to man, in the general sense of the term, consists in the free exercise and enjoyment of his rights, and is natural, civil, or political liberty, according as reference is had to one or the other of those rights. Of natural liberty Judge Blackstone says. "The absolute rights of man considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil and with the power of choosing those measures, which appear to him most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists, properly, in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any constraint or control, unless by the laws of nature, being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free will." Notwithstanding the little inaccuracy to be found in this passage, in making liberty to consist in the rights themselves, instead of the exercise and enjoyment of those rights, it might have been admitted as a just exposition of natural liberty had he said, "without any restraint or control, unless by the laws of social nature." It would then have been liable to no misconception; but instead of including, the author has, perhaps inadvertantly, excluded the notion of social from his law of nature; for he immediately adds. "But every man, on entering into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase, and in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws which the community have thought proper to establish." The author, here, has evidently confounded the natural liberty of man, with that range of action permitted to all animals of the brute creation, even the most ferocious; a range of action, for it cannot claim the appellation of liberty, not permitted to man by the laws of his nature. On this subject, Mr. Christian has very justly observed that "the libertas quidlibet faciendi, or the liberty of doing every thing which a man's passions urge him to attempt, or his strength enables him to effect, is savage liberty, the liberty of a tiger and not of a man."

Burlamaqui has given us a definition of natural liberty, which is free from this objection. " Moral or natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their

persons, and property, after the manner they shall judge most consonant to their happiness; on condition of their acting within the limits of the laws of nature, and that they do not any way abuse it to the prejudice of other men." The author of this definition has, with the utmost propriety, considered natural liberty as of the moral, that is, of the social kind. Such are the rights of man, and such to him are the laws of nature. These laws not only prohibit the doing of what is prejudicial, but enjoin many things to be done, that are beneficial to individuals, as well as to society; they enjoin positive acts as well as restraints. The definition, therefore, leaving out all the active moral duties, appears to me to be materially deficient. To correct this, and a small inaccuracy in the forepart, I would express it thus. Moral or natural liberty consists in the free exercise and enjoyment of that right which nature gives all mankind, of disposing of their persons and property in the manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their getting within the limits of the laws of nature, and that they observe towards others, all the moral duties enjoined by that law. Such limitation is necessary, unless we admit that the natural liberty of a moral and social being may dispense with moral obligation.

Civil liberty consists in the secure exercise and enjoyment of all civil rights, which comprehend the natural rights, and the subordinate rights which in the civil state flow from these, and in a strict sense, limited only by the necessary, equal, and expedient laws of the community; but in a more general sense, limited also, by moral obligation. This definition agrees very nearly with the concise definition of Judge Blackstone. "Civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained--and no farther—as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public," and with that of Mr. Paley which is, "civil liberty is the not being restrained by any law, but what contributes in a greater degree to the public advantage,"—and we may here add, that civil liberty can be enjoyed only under an upright and impartial administration of just, equal, and expedient laws.

Political liberty consists in the exercise and enjoyment of those rights which we have distinguished by the denomination

of political rights, rights reserved to the people, by the fundamental laws, the constitution of the state, in such manner and under such regulations only, as are provided and authorized by those laws. Mr. Christian, who has observed, that, “no ideas or definitions are more distinguishable than those of civil and political liberty, yet they are generally confounded," tells us, that "political liberty may be defined to be the security, with which, from the constitution and form of the established government, the subject enjoys civil liberty." But this is a definition of the end and intended effect of political liberty, not of the liberty itself.

The important end of political liberty, and for which alone it is valuable, is to secure the permanent enjoyment of civil liberty. It is the only security the wisdom of man has been able to devise against civil and political slavery. It may be laid down as an unfailing maxim that the extinction of political liberty is the establishment of slavery. From its importance in this view, it is not to be wondered, that where any idea of a free government has existed, this species of liberty has been always the idol of mankind. The writer last mentioned, indeed, asserts, that civil liberty may exist in perfection under an absolute monarch, and to this purpose cites a passage from Claudian, who wrote under a Roman Emperor.

Fallitur egregie, quisquis sub principe credit
Servitium ;-nunquam libertas gratior exit,
Quam sub rege pio-

"But

and then in favor of political liberty asks the questionwhat security can the subjects, have for the virtues of his successor? With the same propriety, and the same emphasis, it might be asked-What security can the subjects have for the virtues of the present possessor, placed as he is supposed to be, beyond the reach of accountability? It is true, they may enjoy the semblance of liberty, such as the veriest slave may enjoy under an indulgent master; both may, from ignorance of a better state, and a comparison with others, be contented, and even feel a happiness in their condition; but both are nevertheless slaves; this, under a private-those, under a public absolute master.

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