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CHAPTER IV.

Of the necessity of civil laws and government.

Having in the preceding chapters shown, that men, by the constitution of their common nature, are fitted and designed for civil government, we shall conclude this part of the subject, by an inquiry into the nature and origin of the necessity by which they are compelled to enter into that state.

As was formerly observed, some have thought, the necessity arises, solely, from the perverseness of human nature. They assert, that men have, inherent in their nature, a relish for vice, an original propensity to evil, to restrain the malignity of which, they were laid under the necessity of civil government and laws; that true virtue, genuine benevolence, would have carried them happily through the most complicated scenes, that could have fallen to their lot in society. How the account stands between them and their Maker, it is not my present purpose to inquire. I shall observe only, that their civil and political conduct does not avow a consciousness of such depravity of nature. They appear, in all cases, where no particular bias of passion or interest is discoverable, to have full reliance on the justice, integrity, and veracity of each

other.

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Some, who have entertained less gloomy views of human nature, have holden, that the necessity arises from the weakness only of individuals, requiring mutual aid for the supplying of their mutual wants, and protection against physical evils. This, however, would lead no farther than the social state. It would not, alone, induce the necessity of civil government. We have seen that man was, by nature, intended for the latter state; and we shall now find, arising from his nature, a necessity for adopting it; but, a necessity different from what has been

suggested. Although men have a relish for society; although it is the scene of their improvements, and the great source of their happiness; yet no goodness of heart can enable them to enjoy its benefits, without an establishment of laws. Perception, consciousness, and volition, or those powers which originate and direct external action in men, belong to them individually. A society consisting of a number of individuals, can have no common, united perception, consciousness, or volition. Could this be the case, a society might will, and, by the single act of volition, direct and control the actions of all and every member, with the same ease and regularity, with which an individual directs and controls the motions of his body and its members. But this is denied to man in the aggregate, and in every combination of society. The will of a society is made up of the wills of the individual members, collected. Had man been formed with faculties enabling him, with an intuitive glance, to penetrate and comprehend the individual wills of all the members of the society, and of all whose conduct might, in any way, affect it; to penetrate and comprehend the passions, appetites, and pursuits of every individual; in a word to comprehend all the causes, by which God governs the actions of moral agents; were he endued with reason sufficient to arrange the whole, so as to prevent every interference in human pursuit; goodness of heart and firmness of mind, to enable him to pursue the arrangement; in such a state both of knowledge and disposition, he would stand in no need of civil laws, or rules prescribed by common consent, for the regulation of social conduct. But such a state falls not to the lot of any finite being.

Our positive knowledge, both of the present and past, is partial and depends on actual and accurate observation. There is, however, given us some clue to the future. We are able to perceive certain relations of cause and effect; and as far as experience leads, we find a uniformity in the course of nature. We discover some of the causes and some of the laws, by which physical effects are produced in a chain; while of others we are wholly ignorant, or can at best, obtain but an imperfect glimpse. Much more imperfect is our knowledge of the causes that produce and vary human actions, subject to

the influence of motives, to the choice of the agent and to those causes that govern and connect the chain of human events. In an extensive society, individuals can have but a limited knowledge of the present actions of the whole. Their knowledge of the intentions and causes, upon which future actions depend, is much more limited; or rather is reduced to conjecture. We are able to gain some knowledge of the leading principles of action, of the motives, which generally prevail, and of the species of action, which they will produce, in certain characters and in certain situations. To descend to every situation, to every character, and thence to learn, fully, the particular influence of motives, and the individual actions that will follow in each, is far beyond the reach of human sagacity.

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In a society composed of any considerable number of individuals, and of any considerable activity, there will be many and very different situations. The influence of nature with different persons will be very different. They will have a variety of distinct interests and pursuits, and those not at all, or very imperfectly, known to each other, in their origin. However innocent and right those interests and pursuits may be, when considered separately, they will by frequent, though unintentional, interferences and oppositions, form a scene too intricate for the powers of the human mind to evolve. Could we suppose every person in the society to be actuated by principles of the most disinterested benevolence, and the most accommodating spirit, the whole time must be consumed in compromise; none would be left for action. Without a social perception, consciousness, and volition, with any goodness, and with any wisdom, short of infinite, the state of society would, at best, be a scene of inextricable confusion. To remedy this confusion, nature has pointed out to man the necessity of civil establishments, and the promulgation of laws. Here is a provision analogous to his nature. By the establishment of laws, which all the individuals of the community have become bound to observe, as the rules of their future conduct, each is enabled to foresee, with a sufficient degree of certainty, the future interests and pursuits of others. By following the line prescribed, all may avoid any considerable inconvenience, or

by applying the general rule, may remedy the evil. In no other way, is it possible to connect a community, either in sentiments, or interests, to unite the public force to direct it to the attainment of any common good, or to the avoiding or repelling of any common evil; in no other way is it possible to obtain any security of public or private rights.

Still men are imperfect. They will be guilty of deviations from the rule, transgressions of the law, and infringements of each other's rights. This will happen, sometimes, through ignorance of the law or the right; sometimes through weakness in judging, or inattention in examining; sometimes it will happen through the prevalence of interest, the violence of passion, or from a disposition habitually profligate and vicious. Therefore to provide to the laws a compulsory force, they must be so calculated, that every member of the community shall find a convenience in the observance, and a certain inconvenience in the neglect or violation. Hence, arises the necessity of penalties. These penalties are, from the weakness of men, in discerning tendencies, and their consequent liability to vice, necessarily enhanced. Hence also arises the necessity of subordination, and of civil rulers, to give activity and efficiency to the laws. In a state of greater perfection, than is to be found in the present state of society, a greater perfection in knowledge and virtue, penalties may make a less formidable appearance; but in every state, the necessity of penalties will equally exist.

In a community, composed of a few individuals, in a simple state of manners and of property, the motives to action are few; consequently, there is but little activity of the members, little eagerness of pursuit. A few simple rules, mostly adopted and supported by custom, supply the place of a more regular polity. They are the first rude essays in civil institutions. Still in every state of morals and of manners, the necessity of civil government, the necessity of laws, of known and established rules, equally exists. On the whole, we may safely conclude, that no order of beings, short of infinite perfection, in wisdom as well as goodness, can subsist in society without an establishment of government and laws.

BOOK IV.

OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTY.

CHAPTER I.

Of natural, political, and civil rights and liberty.

The first great object of all civil institutions is, or ought to be, the security of those personal rights, in the full and free enjoyment of which true liberty consists.

The word right, when applied to action, signifies what is fit and proper to be done, as opposed to wrong.-As a substantive, it is used to express the just title or claim which a person has to any thing; and signifies that the thing belongs to him, who is said to have the right. There are several classes of rights distinguished by some law, custom, or institution, in which they are supposed to originate, or by which they are sanctioned, and are accordingly denominated, Fist, natural rights-Secondly, political rights, and Thirdly, civil rights.

Natural rights are generally said to consist in the right of personal liberty, personal security, and of private property. These rights originate in the laws of our nature and are as universal as the social nature of man; they cannot be justly forfeited unless by the commission of some crime against the good and wholesome laws of the community. They may be violated, and their exercise by the subjects suspended, by the will of a tyrant, aided by superior force; but are never extinguished. The subjects always retain the right to reassume

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