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and of censure for the other. In viewing his own conduct he is conscious of the same sentiment of approbation and disapprobation accordingly, and the same sense of desert; but in the latter case, the sentiment is more vivid, more pointed as being brought home to the mind by its own consciousness. Thus a provision is made by nature for the reward and punishment of moral actions. On the same principle every man is led to seek the approbation and to dread the censure of his fellow men, which he considers in the one case, the reward due to his good conduct, and in the other, the punishment due to his crimes. On the same principle, but by a stronger motive, he is led to seek the approbation and to dread the censure of that Omniscient Being, who is the Author of nature, and nature's laws; from whom he received his own existence, and to whose goodness he is indebted for all his enjoyments, for all his prospects of happiness. Under these inducements, to seek the approbation of his own conscience, of his fellow men, and of his God, he finds himself bound by a three-fold cord of accountability-in other words under a moral obligation to do what is good and right,—to practice virtue.

Thus we find that moral obligation, of which I have here given an account, without attempting to force it into a definition, is an important part, or rather is the result, of the moral constitution, and is indissolubly connected with the same univerzal principle in the nature of man, which is the source of all our moral sentiments, of all the social affections. It will perhaps be remarked, that in explaining the origin and progress of this moral faculty, I have scarcely more than alluded to what is, or ought to be, the great end of all moral actions,-general utility, or the general interest of society; but the subject, so far as it was here found necessary to pursue it, did not require its discussion. It was sufficient to consider it so far as the individual is affected; and besides, the laws of nature, rightly understood, are found to aim, as well at the promotion of the individual as the general interests-or rather the promotion of the general interest of the community, through the private interests of the individual members;-for the general interest consists of an aggregate of the individual interests, properly estimated. If ever they clash or run in opposite directions, it

is owing so some error in the estimate; and indeed, with man there can never be a perfect estimate; it will at best, be but a near approximation.

Let us now see how far man, provided with such moral constitution, is, notwithstanding some seeming incongruities, fitted to become the subject of civil government and laws. The moral sense, (for I will now venture to use that term to express the perception of moral right and wrong, including a sense of moral obligation,) is to man the final arbiter of justice, veracity, and of all the moral virtues, of all his moral actions. When he perceives his actions to be right, or productive of good, agreeable to the laws of his nature, he is conscious of pleasurable emotion of approbation; when wrong, of a painful emotion of disapprobation. Hence his love of justice, veracity, and all the moral virtues. What he is conscious of in himself, he expects to find in others. This is the foundation of his confidence in the justice of others, and his reliance on human testimony. That he sometimes violates these virtues, is not sufficient proof that he does not admire and even love them. Justice, for instance, is the result of certain reciprocal relations, subsisting between the agent and the object; it is often therefore not a little complex. A little more or less comprehension of the relations may wholly vary the result, as to the moral quality of the action.

Viewing things through the medium of prejudice, or some present passion, man is liable to err in his estimate of those relations, and while he loves virtue in general, to admit vice in particulars. Considered as to his mind, man has not only active powers, but susceptibilities, in regard to which, the mind appears to be merely passive. He is capable of deliberation and choice. He is likewise susceptible of various impressions, from objects both external and internal; for the affections and operations of the mind, by reflection become objects, and have their impressions. The impressions made, produce a change in the mind, which is the subject; a difference in the subject causes a difference in the effect. Hence it is, that, not only different men, but the same man at different times, may be differently affected by the same object, and the same apparent motive have a different influence. And hence comes a fluctuation

of choice. This fluctuation is corrected by the moral sense, and by the force of reason and of habit, which places the choice of objects, or the admission of the causes of such impressions, in the power of the mind.

Were man unassailable by external impulses, were the influence of motives excluded, he would be wholly unaccommodating, wholly unaccountable. Law might as well be promulgated to a machine-rewards and punishments could add no inducement to obedience. However such a state may be suitable or necessary to any other order of beings, it is very ill suited to man, intended as he is for a state of government and laws. The sense of accountability, arising more immediately from the deep interest which we feel in the approbation of others, as above explained, is a principal ingredient in the moral constitution of man. When he has done well, he is conscious that he is deserving of the approbation of others; when ill, of their censure. Judging in the same manner of others, he is made to perceive the necessity of government, and the necessity and propriety of submitting his conduct in society to the regulation of laws, as well civil as moral.

CHAPTER II.

Idea of a community-Of Patriotism.

Man, by the force and habit of association and abstraction, acquires the conception of an aggregate of individuals, as forming a distinct entity,-a moral person, capable of rights and duties. Such is the idea of a community, of a society.

When a man considers himself as connected with any society, he is, if I may use the expression, conscious of a kind of individuality of himself with the aggregate. The conception of this individuality is more or less distinct and forcible, as the connexion is more or less intimate, and if it be not the germ of every attachment to the community, certainly gives strength to the attachment and vigor to patriotism itself. It is essential to the social nature of man, and of great importance to government. It is not only the soul of individuality to the whole government; but as there will always be numerous subordinate connexions forming smaller societies in the same government, it makes all the members of the same connexion, in some degree, responsible for the actions of each. They enjoy the virtues and the advantages both of the individuals and of the community, and each in the same degree, the reproach of the other's crimes, and the justice of their punishment.

This sentiment has, however, given rise to a principle, which has been grossly abused to the oppression of mankind. In many governments, the practice has prevailed of involving in the same punishment of offenders, all of the same family and connexion, the innocent with the guilty. It has prevailed most generally in despotic states, where it coincides with the principles of the government, which makes it a crime for a

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man to be placed even by nature herself, in a situation in which he might dare to think himself injured by the act of the prince. Although this conception of the unity of a connection is no justification of the practice, yet it fully accounts for its origin. In this also has originated the practice of retaliation, reprisals, and many things of a similar nature, permitted by the laws of nations ;—and here humanity may vindicate her rights, and assert that the practice is too often carried farther than the principle will in justice warrant.

Patriotism or love of country, is a noble passion, and illustrates the character of every people, who enjoy any just portion of liberty under civil institutions. It is indispensably necessary to any good degree of security or prosperity, in a nation. The whole community is the object of this passion ;in its effects, it unites the individual members in the pursuit of public measures, and on necessary occasions, gives a preference of the publie to private good. To the common interest in the defence and prosperity of the nation, it adds an affection great as the object, on which it is exerted.

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It has been made a question whether the passion may be reckoned among the natural passions of man. The Abbé Raynal has asserted that it cannot. Speaking of the aboriginal inhabitants of Brazil-he says, attachment to their native place. is a ruling passion in the civil state, which in a good government rises to enthusiasm, and in bad ones becomes habitual-this love of country is but a factitious sentiment arising from society, but unknown in a state of nature."

Let us examine this opinion.-At this day, facts and not names give to opinions their just weight and currency. Although in speaking of the aborigines of Brazil, he mentions only their want of attachment to their native soil; yet in his general position, he comprehends all the distinctive properties of that love of country which is generally denominated patriotism. In this sense love of country is a love of the community. An attachment to the soil collects, limits, and confines the passion, and gives a locality to its objects; but does not of itself constitute the passion. Take from the country the community, take from it the inhabitants, and the object ceases.

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