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sympathy are not the effect of reasoning from the object to our own situation; they rather resemble instinctive impulses. Sympathy, without the intervention of words, blends the thoughts, sentiments, and the virtuous disposition of individuals; it diffuses joys of the heart from countenance to countenance, commands relief in distress, and consolation in affliction. Montesquieu alludes to this principle in human nature when he says, "Parents are generally able to communicate their ideas to their children; but are still better able to transmit their passions." This disposition to sympathy helps to account for all that similarity of sentiments, character, and even of features, which is observable in families, societies and nations; less perfect, indeed, the more extensive the connexion.

CHAPTER III.

Of hatred and revenge-Envy and some other dissocial passions.

Hatred and revenge are not, in their nature, opposed to society, although, from their abuse they become at times very pernicious. On a candid inquiry it will be found, that those passions do not arise from any malignity in the nature of man; but are given for good and wise purposes. They are necessary to a being capable of injuring as well as benefiting others, and liable to be himself the subject of injuries from those of his own species. Men are conscious of a freedom of action, of a choice in what they do—we know at the same time, that man is not a perfect being, that he has many weaknesses, that there fall in his way motives to action infinitely various. Sometimes his choice is influenced by ignorance, by error, by the prevalence of particular passions or appetites, a present desire of gratification.

Sometimes he is confounded by a combination of circumstances, the result of which, he wants the power, or the patience, to evolve. He is frequently tempted to a deviation from right, by an opposition of interests, originating, not in a direct intention of the parties, but the want of an early foresight in each, of the other's intended pursuits. To a being thus circumstanced, powerful moral restraints are necessary. Such restraints are provided for man, and come in aid of his moral perceptions of right, and are made to arise from the consequence of his actions. It is evidently a general constitution of providence, that the general tendency of vice is to produce misery to the agent, of virtue, to produce happiness, connected in both by the relation of cause and effect. The passions of hatred and revenge will be found to accord with this constitution.

The more fully to investigate this subject, it will be necessary to take a nearer view of human nature. Man, in an unimproved state, is very little acquainted with the operations of his own mind, the extent of his powers and faculties and the result of their various combinations. For their development, he is furnished with internal perceptions and external senses, accompanied with the powers of reason and investigation. As in physics, no reliance can be had on reasonings a priori; experience alone can decide. Man, therefore, fully to discover the extent of his powers and faculties, and the right tendency of his whole nature, must with sufficient attention and presence of mind to mark the result, pass through such a variety of situations as will bring all into exercise, and put all to the test, in every variety of combination. It is a matter of great difficulty for a man to make just and accurate observations on a subject so evanescent, as are the operation of his own mind, and always in transitu. They are past ere there is time for reflection: on the most important occasions, the whole mind is wrapped in attention to some external objects. Add to this, subjected as man is, though for wise purposes, to the influence of habit, his observations will be frequently partial, and his conclusions warped by some present prevailing bias.-It is evident, therefore, that the progress of moral and social combinations beyond those that are the most simple and obvious, will be slow; how slow a slight attention to the history of the human mind will evince.

We are taught by reason and experience, that the less a man is able to discern agreements and tendencies, the moral relations of things, the more liable he is to do wrong; the more liable from partial views, instead of seeking a compromise, to sacrifice to his own the interest of others; at the same time he is the less able to devise and enforce those social rules, which might remedy the evil. In the first rude stages of society, men have no notion of general laws or of public punishments, for the prevention of private injuries; they are unable to connect private injuries with the public concerns of the nation or tribe. The redress or prevention of these, are left to each individual. In such a situation hatred and revenge are the only practical checks. Hatred is a fixed aversion of one man to another, on account of a real or supposed intentional opposition to his interest or happiness.-Revenge is a desire in one person to inflict an evil on another for a real or supposed injury received. -Hatred alone dictates the avoidance of its object as disagreeable or noxious: revenge pursues its object, and is gratified only with retaliating the injury; such conduct is dictated by the law of self preservation, and is necessary, in that state, as there is no other external restraint, no other means of escaping, or preventing future injuries. Thus limited and directed, they are necessary for the prevention of a licentiousness in injuries unrestrained by any fear of the consequences.

In the progress of improvement an extension of social intercourse, useful discoveries, the invention of arts, the separation of property, a gradual change of manners, the multiplication of desires and objects of gratification, form a scene too intricate, a combination of interests too complicated, for the former simple mode of society; liability to injuries is increased in proportion. The passion of revenge, almost constantly called into exercise would, in this state of society, if laid under no restraint, become the most cruel scourge and render society a curse instead of a blessing. Nature is always equal to her occasions. Active enterprise and more extensive pursuits invigorate and enlarge the powers of the mind, and render men equal to the task of a more extensive legislation. They are led by degrees, in some measure, to comprehend their situation; to evolve the combinations of their various

interests; to form those laws, which may have a tendency to prevent a direct opposition; to provide for a reparation of injuries, and punishments for the restraint of wanton violence. Still the progress is slow; it is long before men can be persuaded to accept merely a reparation for injuries, and submit to society the sole right of punishing for prevention which comes in the place of revenge. The right to revenge private injuries, in the most improved state of society, in the highest refinement of manners, never wholly ceases; nor is it demanded. There will exist many little oppositions, many little injuries, to which the law cannot descend, and which if neglected, become the source of greater violence. The exercise of hatred and revenge, by the party injured, is still the only restraint in these cases. In a state of improvement, however, in a well regulated civil society, these passions stripped of their violence, and under the restraint of laws and moral discipline, are hardly known for the same passions. Still they are the same, only chastised and accommodated to a more improved state of society. Before, justified by the law of self preservation, they acted a primary part as sovereign in the distribution of punishments. Now they act a subordinate part in coming in aid of the law, in matters of smaller moment. They are however, under every guard of law and of morals, liable at times to great abuses; and what, when left to the direction of a fallible being, is not liable to abuse? We should be ill fitted for society, without them. In an improved and well regulated society, the abuse can never be very extensive in its consequences. Let us not rashly attempt to correct the wisdom of Deity, much better is it for us that we should suffer the abuse of them than the total extinction.

Envy, malice, and avarice have been accounted instances of natural passions which are dissocial, and tend to prove, that man is little fitted for happiness in society. I will not here contend about the term natural. It is true that man is capable of these passions, and of many other vicious passions and habits; a little reflection, however, will discover that these are not original in his nature; but have their origin in the abuse of those natural passions, which are necessary to his happiness, both as a social being and as an individual. Envy is generally said to be

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emulation carried to excess. This is undoubtedly correct; but in the exercise it certainly partakes of the passion of revenge. Emulation is a desire to excel others, in the public estimation. While a person strives by the acquisition of superior excellence, to deserve a preference in the public opinion, it may emphatically be called the strife of virtue.The happiness of society is interested in the contest. When a person deserts the prime object, the acquisition of real excellence, and strives, by the depression of a competitor, to enjoy the public estimation unrivalled, it has degenerated into envy, and is now the contest of vice. A person under the dominion of this passion is prone to exaggerate every little fault in a competitor, and to convert even his virtuous actions into vices by attributing them to corrupt motives. Every excellence in a rival is viewed as hostile, every advance as a personal injury. To complete the turpitude of the passion, and fill up the measure of vice, the passion of revenge is called into its aid.

Malice is a disposition to inflict evil on others without just cause. This disposition, by indulgence, is inflamed into a permanent passion, the most detestable, as well as pernicious in its effects. It may be called a perpetual anger, and is equally irrational with that passion in the extreme. Some persons appear to derive from their organization, an irritability of mind, which easily admits this disposition. In general, malice prevails most among a people of fierce and rough manners, where the common tone of the mind borders upon anger. It is more rare in an improved state of society and manners, and where it is discovered, may generally be traced to its source, in disappointments, insults, and hard usage, which have habituated the mind to a state of irritation. In all these cases it is easily perceived, that a malicious disposition is, originally, no part of the common nature of man, but is wholly adventitious. It is a vicious habit of mind admitted and confirmed by a too ready indulgence of the irritable feelings. Avarice is the excess of that passion which accompanies the hoarding appetite; the passion which prompts man to provide for his future necessities or convenience. It is the foundation of all his providence. Like other passions it is liable to abuse, to be

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