or the general state of property, for limiting the right of suffrage, I am persuaded they do not exist with us, or certainly not to the same extent. In a representative government, where every thing ought to tend, in a good degree, to a general equality, property seems not alone, or even principally, to be a just criterion of the right of suffrage. The natural, civil, and political rights of man, in society, are the subjects of legislative discussion, and provision, and their security,-the great end of all the apparatus of government in every department. The right of property is one of these rights and gives rise to a very extensive influence in society. It is, however, a right which, if it meets a too partial indulgence, if suffered to engross all political rights, will unavoidably suggest to the proprietor the idea, as it furnishes the means of infringing the rights of others with impunity. The interests of industry, of science, and the mechanic arts, have an equal claim on society.. The protection and encouragement of these, tends to a more equal distribution of the goods of fortune, and to correct the unequal influence of wealth. In a state, where, from the prevalence of corrupt principles, or from any other source, all property with its concomitant power, is accumulated in the hands of a few; where the great mass of the people are reduced to dependence, servility, and meanness, from which they can never hope to rise, but on the ruin of their oppressors, a general right of suffrage would be dangerous to the few, and at least for a time, to the people themselves, and might render impracticable the best institutions of which they are in such situation capable. But in the government of these United States, where the law equally regards the rights of the rich and the poor; where few are to be found wholly destitute of property, and fewer still without a well grounded hope of obtaining it; where industry and economy rarely fail to produce a competence, and often lead to wealth; no ill consequences are to be feared from a general right of suffrage. By general, however, is not to be understood a universal and indiscriminate right; but so far general as to include all who are by law called upon to pay to the support of government, or for the performance of public duties or services. Still, in every well regulated government, necessity and propriety will require exclusions. All females, from the delicate and dependent nature of their sex, and to preserve that purity and simplicity of character, on which the domestic as well as public happiness of mankind so much depends, have, generally, if not universally, been excluded from any share in political transactions. It will also be necessary and proper to exclude from the right of suffrage all those, who, from want of age, are supposed to be wanting in discretion-all who, from any legal disability are not sui juris-at their own disposal. Those whom the law deems incapable of governing themselves, can claim no voice in governing the state-and certainly the interests of virtue require, that those should be wholly excluded, who, by their crimes, have manifested a disposition totally corrupt, and by their conduct declared to the world, that they are no longer to be trusted. Indeed all who are, from situation in life, under the control of others so that they cannot be capable of acting their own opinion, ought to be excluded from the right of suffrage. But it is difficult to distinguish in this case. The control is an influence. If, from the nature of their situation, any class of citizens are placed under a sinister influence, not ordinarily to be resisted by persons in that situation, the class ought to be excluded the right. All act under some kind of influence, who act from motives; but all influence is not inconsistent with the freedom of action. Some are capable of resisting an undue influence arising from almost any situation; others not, and far the greater number in any particular situation are found incapable of resisting, and if the good of the community so require, the whole class ought to be excluded. If it be said, that the right of suffrage is founded in the natural right of self-government, and is therefore not to be violated, the answer is, that if a society be founded in natural principles, the great end is the general utility, the greatest good of that society; and for attaining that end, there is not a right, natural, civil, or political, abstractly considered as belonging to individuals, which is not subject to limitation. No one can justly insist on the exercise of that as a right, which evidently tends to the general injury of the com munity. But we must be careful not to mistake a partial for a general interest, the interest of a particular class or classes, for the interest of the whole. I am unable to persuade myself, that any distinction ought, in general, to be made between the right of suffrage and eligibility. I say, in general; for a man may have placed himself in a situation, in which he owes a duty to society, incompatible with certain civil functions, and which the public good requires should not be suspended. A distinction of age also, which to abilities adds experience and maturity of judgment, may well be admitted. It is an honorary distinction, in which there is nothing invidious, and is yielded by mankind, in a certain degree, with general approbation. A distinction of other qualifications is mostly invidious. It tends to introduce a distinction of classes, and to excite a degree of haughtiness in the candidates. The electors, in such a case, feel themselves degraded, and that their class, notwithstanding their right of suffrage, is unrepresented. If a character for abilities and integrity is to be considered the only qualifications for office, they will be more assiduously cultivated. These are all-important to the people, and 'of these, in relation to the principal functionaries of the legislative and executive departments, the people are competent judges. The choice of a worthy character reflects honor upon themselves, which they enjoy with the more satisfaction, as they are sensible of no restraint in the choice. From these considerations, I conclude, that the right of suffrage and of eligibility ought to be the same, or, distinguished by no qualifications but that of age, just mentioned. If in any state, different qualifications are found to be necessary, the necessity must have arisen from the different nature of the government and the condition of the people. It has been the opinion of some, that all the officers and functionaries of the government may, with the greatest safety, and therefore on principle, ought to be elected by the people. This appears to have been the opinion of Mr. Jefferson. In a letter written by him in the year 1816, to a friend, on the subject of a revision of the constitution of Virginia, he says,-"The true foundation of a republican government is the equal right of every citizen in his person and property, and their management. Try by this, as a tally, every provision of the constitution, and see if it hangs directly on the will of the people; reduce the legislature to a sufficient number for free but orderly discussion; let every man who fights or pays, exercise his just and equal right in their election-submit them to approbation or rejection at short intervals; let the executive be chosen in the same way, and for the same term, by those whose agent he is to be, and leave no screen of a council behind which to skulk from responsibility. It has been thought that the people are not competent electors of judges learned in the law, but I do not know that this is true; and if doubtful, we should follow principle in this, as in other cases. In one state of the union, at least, it has long been tried, and with the most satisfactory success. The judges of Connecticut have been chosen by the people every six months, for nearly two centuries, and I believe there has hardly ever been an instance of a change, so powerful is the curb of incessant responsibility." The judges of the superior courts in Virginia are chosen by the legislature, and removeable by their own body only, for misconduct in office. If prejudice should prevail against the mode of electing judges by the people, he would then, give the appointment to the executive alone. Upon this subject he says,- "Nomination to office is an executive function. To give to the legislature as we do, is a violation of the principle of the separation of the powers. It swerves the members from correctness, by temptations to intrigue for office themselves, and to a corrupt barter of votes, and destroys responsibility, by dividing it among a multitude. By leaving nomination in its proper place among executive functions, the principle of the separation of powers is preserved, and responsibility weighs with its heaviest force on a single hand. After the members of the legislature and chief of the executive, the writer mentions by way of example, the election of the judges only by the people; but the view clearly is to extend the same principle to the election of all the civil officers of the state of every grade; and in pursuance of this view, he afterwards proposes that all county officers should be elected by the people of the several counties. The principle he would pursue is "the equal right of every citizen in his person and property and their management." This is no other than the right of self-government, which has been shewn to be the foundation of all political rights. It is certain that in all political establishments, we ought to follow principles; but we must always remember, that they are the principles of social nature, of social man-that one principle is not to be pursued to the exclusion of others. They are all to be limited and mutually modified and adjusted, as the best interests of the community shall require. In all political institutions, the right of self-government is limited, in some more, in others less. In a democracy, where it is carried the farthest, the minority are governed by the majority; and in a representative government, the majority of the electors choose the representatives to the legislature against the will of the minority; and a majority of these representatives make laws to govern the whole state. If the people, by the constitution empower the President to make appointments to office, it is no more a departure from the principle of self-government, than it is to empower their representatives to make laws for them. There is indeed this difference,the representatives who make the laws, are directly accountable to the people, and so is the President making appointments; the officers, however, whom he appoints, are not so accountable, but to such tribunal as the constitution provides. So far as relates to this principle, then, the questions are, whether a better selection for certain offices is to be expected from an executive appointment, or from popular elections? and whether a sufficient provision is made to hold the officers accountable? If these questions be answered in the affirmative, then the public good, which ought to be an overruling principle in all political institutions, decides in favor of an executive appoint ment. As to the precedent cited of the judges in the state of Connecticut, being elected by the people semi-annually, Mr. Jefferson must have been egregiously misinformed. The people of that state elected their representatives semi-annually. They also elected annually the treasurer and secretary of the state, the governor, lieutenant governor, and assistants or councillors, that with the governor who presided and the lieutenant |