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CHAPTER II.

Of the appetite or propensity for society-the appetite which leads to the propagation of the species-ambition-sympathy.

We will now, briefly, inquire how far man, without a consideration of mutual wants, or a necessity for mutual defence, arising merely from a sense of weakness or wickedness, is by nature fitted for society. That, surely, is to him a natural state, to which the laws of his nature, general and particular, all tend. Here let me premise, that, with man, a state of improvement is not opposed to a state of nature. Perhaps as good a definition as any which has been given of man is, that he is a being capable of improvement, in a progression, of which he knows not the limits. Deity has implanted in his nature the seeds of improvement, furnished him with powers and faculties for the cultivation, and to these superadded a sense that the cultivation is a duty. The first thing which strikes the mind, in the course of our inquiry is an appetite for society. Man desires to associate with man, and feels a pleasure at the approach of his kind.

The appetite is so universally prevalent, it cannot be denied, that it originates in his nature. The same appetite, under the name of instinct, produces all those associations which are found to prevail among all gregarious animals of the brute creation and with them, it is allowed to be natural. Why not allow it to be so with man, to whom it isso much more extensively useful? This appetite, which may with equal, or perhaps, more propriety be denominated a propensity to society, is common to all men ;-and although I have compared it to

instinct, in the lower order of animals it is I conceive, in its origin a susceptibility merely of certain mental impressions, that is, such as excite feelings in the mind, either agreeable or disagreeable, according to the constitution of nature. The infant receives its first impressions from its mother or nurse; these are effected by soothing attentions to the wants of the infant, in its helpless state; exciting pleasurable sensations: until the presence of the soothing object constantly suggests, or is accompanied with those pleasurable sensations agreeable to the laws of association, by which the pleasure excited in the mind, by any object, is transferred to that object and considered as an inherent quality. These feelings are soon extended from the mother or nurse to all whose presence has become familiar; until it embraces every acquaintance. The pleasurable sensation is frequently counteracted by another, that of fear excited by some new and unusual object; which, however, is removed by familiarity, and gives place to the former agreeable impressions. This appears to be the origin of the social affections. The susceptibility, only, is innate and is common to all; and as the very life of every infant, that comes into the world, necessarily depends on the kind attention of others, every one, that lives, must necessarily experience the impressions, and the social affections become as common as the susceptibility. They vary, indeed, in degree and extent, from circumstances; from constitution, which renders one less susceptible than another; but more frequently from education and habit, which are, principally, effected through a propensity to imitation. If there be any thing instinctive in man, it is this propensity to imitation. It was long ago observed by Aristotle, that man is an imitative being. In the early stages of life, this propensity to imitation opens the only avenue to improvement. Infants, children, and youth take, by imitation, not only their actions, but their feelings, sentiments, and opinions, from others, particularly from those to whom they are most attached, and for whom they have the greatest respect.

It has been made a question whether the propensity to society be limited in the number of its objects? This question, I think, will admit, though not a precise, yet a satisfactory answer. It is adapted to the occasions, the powers and faculties of men,

and admits of equal extension by improvement; accordingly, in the early stages of society, while the powers and faculties of men were in their infancy, men have every where been found associated in families and small independent tribes. at any time, larger associations were formed, like some of the great empires of antiquity, they were not the effect of choice, but of superior force. Agreeable to this opinion, we find the parts were but loosely connected, and every where crumbled in pieces, as soon as that force was removed. As mankind increase in knowledge, as their powers and faculties extend, and the comprehension of the mind is enlarged, they voluntarily extend their associations; to determine therefore the limits of the social propensity, or the social affections, we must determine the limits of social improvements. This appetite is accompanied with other appetites, propensities, and passions, that nature has made essential parts of the constitution of man, which have no use, no gratification but in society. Hardly can we find one which terminates wholly in self, not one that stands opposed to society. Of compassion, sympathy, and the train of benevolent passions and emotions, society is clearly the ultimate object. The principal end of some is the preservation of the individual; of others, the continuation of the species-such is the hoarding appetite, and the passion for riches to which it gives rise; the appetite which leads to the propagation of the species and its consequent passions ;-even these are not solitary;—they do not terminate wholly in self-no, not the hoarding appetite, which, if any, might be thought an exception. Here, self often predominates; but in general the passion for riches, stript of every view to society, becomes very faint, if not totally extinct. The man, who is intent upon gain, has some connexion, some friend, whom he wishes to benefit, by his acquisition. He views the acquisition of riches as a mean, not an end; a mean of future support and personal indulgence, it is true; but at the same time, as a mean of benefiting some, and of acquiring esteem, confidence, and influence among all. Some instances have, indeed, been known of solitary misers, who have made the amassing of riches the sole end of their pursuits: some individuals have, likewise, conceived an aversion for man, and secluded themselves from society. These are considered as

deviating from the common sense of their species, the common standard of man; they are instances of the abuse of natural passions, or are the anomalies of the race. There are other anomalies; but from such we do not take the common nature of man. The appetite which leads to the propagation of the species is, perhaps, in its origin, a vague indeterminate impulse to gratification. The principal end of this appetite, doubtless, is the continuation of the species by a perpetual re-production, in which view it is the constant revivifying principle of society; but the Author of our being, whose all comprehensive plan is adjusted, in the most perfect harmony, has made it farther subservient to social happiness. Nature, by making it the source of a specific passion, corrects the vagueness of the appetite; and thus it becomes the fountain of domestic felicity and one of the strongest bonds of society.

Ambition, when in balance with the other passions and appetites, is not opposed to the general good of society.-Far from being detrimental, it is highly useful to man. By this passion, many actions, the noblest and most beneficial in society, are produced. It is only in the extreme, that the passion becomes hurtful; when the acquisition of power or influence is no longer considered as a mean of doing good; when the passion aims solely or principally at its own gratification. But this is doing violence to the laws of nature, which result from the whole nature of man. The passions of hatred, revenge, and some other passions and emotions, not unfrequently very pernicious in society, are reserved for the next chapter. In the remainder of this, we will attend to some emotions purely of a social tendency. Sympathy is an ingredient in the social nature of man, deserving of very particular attention. The modus agendi, or how the emotion of sympathy is produced; whether it be wholly mental, the reflection of a sentiment, or whether it be partly organical, partly mental, is perhaps, one of the secrets of nature; but the effect is evident and the final cause illustrious. It is one of those nice adjustments in the nature of man, which give us the most exalted idea of the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. In the smaller circles of life, its influence is more immediate, more direct, but its influence extends to whole nations and empires. Sympathy

is generally produced through the medium of an organic impression. We see something in the countenance, the movement, the whole figure of the person, which we take for the expression of a sentiment, or a particular state of mind in that person. We instantaneously, seemingly by a direct impression, without time for reflection, find excited in ourselves a corresponding tone of mind, corresponding sentiments, producing similar expressions. The emotion, though we may have a sense of pain and distress in the object, is not repulsive. On the contrary we feel a powerful attraction to objects of distress. Thus man is sweetly prepared to mourn with those who mourn and to rejoice with those who rejoice. The emotion of sympathy not only prevents a thousand discords, but produces in society a kind of instinctive harmony. There is one impression of sympathy, which seems to be mostly organic, or an effect on the nerves only. A yawn from one person in company, will produce a spontaneous yawn in all present, at least all who see the act. When we see a person suddenly hurt, or hear of one being wounded in a particular part, we feel a particular affection of the nerves in that part, which thence thrills through the whole frame, conveying at once to the heart a sense of the pain supposed to be felt by the patient. This may be one reason why, when we hear of a person being wounded, we are anxious to learn the manner and particular place of the wound. Where our information is general the effect on us is general; we endure something like a state of suspense. This is a situation apparently of greater uneasiness, than when the sensation is reduced to a corresponding part. Lord Kaims has beautifully unfolded what he calls the sympathetic emotion of virtue and which ought not to be omitted here. When we are witnesses, or hear of the performance of any great, noble, and benevolent action, we find excited in ourselves a strong desire to perform the same kind of action. The mind swells with an ardent desire to find a proper opportunity, or a proper object. Notwithstanding some opinions to the contrary, I am persuaded these emotions of

*Elements of Criticism. Vol. I. Chapter II. p. 1. Sec. 4.

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