smaller districts intended to represent the local and more partial interests of the community; the former, fewer in number, to be elected from larger districts and intended to represent the more general interests. This division of the legislature into two coordinate branches is a very important and necessary provision of the constitution. Public discussion and mature deliberation in the enacting of laws is indispensably necessary. To this end the senate and house of representatives must have equal powers; and no law be suffered to pass without the concurrence of both. Should one body, through the prevalence of some secret influence or particular prejudice, pass too hastily upon measures, the other may calmly arrest the decision, and prevent the danger arising from too transient or too partial a view of the subject.

There is another advantage accruing from this division of the legislature, in some degree independent of the above consideration. That man or body of men, who have formed any plan, are in some measure incapable of discovering the errors and mistakes that may have intervened. Their ideas when arranged, flow almost unavoidably in the same channel. Those errors and mistakes will be much more readily discovered by others. This is apprehended to be an important consideration in the legislative institution.

The general qualifications, which may be required for members of the legislature, we shall defer until we come to treat of the qualifications of electors, and shall mention but one here, which relates to the senators. It is a good idea that the senate should be considered as a national council, and it may be thought a necessary provision in the constitution, that certain executive measures should receive the approbation of that body. This suggests a distinction of age, to add to the respectability of the body, and give maturity to their deliberations. Public measures, before they are adopted, ought to be considered in every light in which they may affect the passions, the morals, sentiments, and interests of the people, both general and particular. While they provide for present accommodation, they ought not to lose sight of future improvements,-to secure a more deliberate discussion and a more calm investigation, not only ought the warmth and inexperience of youth to be excluded from the senate, but it is a reason why the members

should be fewer in number than those of the other branch,and thus while the house of representatives, actuated by all the passions and sentiments of the community, in turn give a vigor and national spirit to the measures of government, any precipitation, into which they may be hurried, will be prevented by the calm composure of the senate.

The number of representatives seems not to be capable of any precise limitation. The extremes are very discernible, but they are very distant. Too numerous a representation verges on the inconveniences of an assembly of the people. It encumbers discussion, and gives ascendancy to particular passions, which, in a numerous assembly, often with a sympathetic effect pervade the whole body, and irresistibly influence the decisions of the moment. On the other hand, if the representative body are too few in number, their measures are liable to be dictated by limited views and private interests. Possibly we can go no farther than to say, that it ought to be so numerous, as probably to comprehend all the sentiments and interests that have a national influence. The better to effect this comprehension, and to equalize the representation, the state ought to be divided into as many districts as there shall be representatives to be elected, and the districts should, as near as circumstances will permit, be apportioned by the number of inhabitants. This will in general, secure the most equal representation, and the electors will act more understandingly, and with a personal knowledge of the candidates. Where a number of representatives are assigned to a larger district, and especially, as in that case, a plurality of the votes, not a majority, generally determines the choice, every engine of intrigue is commonly put in motion, and the representatives are chosen by some prevailing interest of the district, in exelusion of every other; and thus it may happen that the interests of the state are but partially represented. There may, however, be found reasons for adopting this mode of electing representatives, that will out-weigh the inconveniences, but they ought to be very powerful.

The senators, who though not in name, yet in fact are no less representatives of the people than the members of the other branch, ought also to be elected by districts, apportioned

in the same manner by the number of inhabitants. And let it be indispensable, that the senators, as well as the representatives, shall be fixed inhabitants of the district for which they are respectfully chosen. As the senate is to be considered in some respects as a national council, and may by the executive, be called to meet at times when the legislature is not in session, it is proper that they always continue an organized body, retaining a portion of that experience which is acquired by the long service of its members. With this view it is a good provision, that the members shall be distributed equally into three or four classes and numbered accordingly; the time of service for each class to expire successively at the periods for the eletion of representatives, and their places to be supplied by new elections in their respective districts.

It is the province as it is the duty of the legislature to frame such laws and adopt such measures as will in a due proportion, direct the actions of all the citizens to the promotion of the public interest, will unite the forces of the whole and direct them to the attainment of those important objects of public utility, or public necessity, to which the united forces of all are alone adequate. To the legislature it belongs to enact such laws for the regulation of individual conduct as will, as far as possible, prevent clashing interests and secure right and justice to the citizens in their private intercourse. Under the same head comes a provision for the ascertainment and reparation of injuries, both public and private, and for securing a general observation of the laws by adequate sanctions, by penalties to be inflicted for every violation. It is also the business and duty of the legislature, to devise ways and means of supplying funds for the support of government, for the protection and defence of the state, and the promotion of the common interest and welfare; to determine the amount of contributions necessary to be raised for those ends, to apportion them on the citizens with a due regard to their means of contributing, and to order the collection in a manner the least burdensome; and further to make by law a specific appropriation of the national funds for all the objects required, without which no expenditures can be allowed, no monies drawn from the public treasury.

There is still another duty of the legislature, which ought

to be enjoined by the constitution, which indeed is not the first in order, but among the first in importance under this form of government, and that is to make an effectual provision for the diffusion of common and useful learning through every class of the community, by an establishment of common schools every where in convenient districts, that they may be accessible to all, with funds or means suitable to the importance of the object; and to establish seminaries suitably endowed for instruction in the higher walks of literature and science. The power of making war, or of placing the nation in a state of hostility with other nations has in most governments, and particularly in those of the monarchical form, been considered as pertaining to the excutive power, the prerogative of the monarch; but in a government depending on the will of the people, it is a concern too general and too important to be intrusted to the caprice, or even the wisdom of one man in whatever station he may be placed. If the power be not precisely of a legislative character, it may, nevertheless, be best exercised by the legislative body, as representing the interests and sentiments of the nation. To that body therefore ought to be intrusted the sole power of placing the nation in a state of war. The making of peace belonging to the treaty-making power, should be left to the proper organ.

From a view of their duties it will be seen that the powers entrusted to the legislature ought to be very ample, or-if any. one so pleases-sovereign within their proper sphere, which however can never nothing more than that they be fully competent to the objects of their institution. Powers so ample will, indeed, be liable to abuse, either through inattention or from design. It is, however, a great security, that the members of the legislature are subject to their own laws, and amenable for a violation equally with all others; but this is not sufficient. It is necessary that the constitution contain a declaration of those rights, which the legislature shall have no power to infringe; and although it is often necessary to make special provisions by law, and to grant relief in particular cases, by which justice may be done to any party without injury to the rights of others; yet, in whatever may affect the common rights, the legislature ought by express pro

vision, to be confined to the passage of general and prospective laws, and prohibited the enactment of personal penalties, ex post facto laws, and the granting of privileges to individuals or associated bodies. Such partial laws are the commencement of an attack on equal rights, and a violation of natural principles. This provision, however, ought not to extend to prevent the establishment of subordinate political institutions for local purposes, nor for the purpose of transacting certain business, or of prosecuting certain enterprises, to which the powers of individuals, are from the nature of the subjects incompetent.

By the establishment of companies for such purposes, new powers are created, but the right of no individual is infringed. Nor should the provision extend to a prohibition of laws for the encouragement of useful knowledge. Authors of books by which useful knowledge is disseminated, and of those inventions, by which the labors of life are facilitated, are equally with other citizens entitled to the fruits of their industry, and the application of their powers; but such is the nature of their productions, that without a legislative provision in their favor, they must remain wholly at the mercy of others. The power of each house of the legislature, to organize itself, to judge of the qualifications and election of its own members, to appoint its own officers, to make all rules necessary to an orderly proceeding, to repress disturbances, and punish contempts seems to be necessarily incident to their institution. There are other powers and duties, which may be entrusted to them, either to both houses jointly, or to one separately; less in their legislative character than that of general representation of the people, or as bodies already organized to whom such powers and duties may with convenience and safety be committed.

It is requisite that there should be an enquiry into the conduct of public officers; that prosecutions should be commenced against the guilty, for the purpose of removal, and that there should somewhere exist a constitutional court for their trial. The enquiry, prosecution, and trial, from the importance to the community, the character and situation of the parties, ought to be more public and solemn than those which are appointed for common offenders.-And to this we may add, that