among the nations of the world, been actually and deliberately employed in political systems, or constitutions of government. Few governments, ancient, or modern, have been constituted by an express compact made by the people, a constitution deliberately formed. The powers of government have, in most instances, been on emergencies blindly conferred on one, or a few individuals; have been assumed by fraud or violence; or through a succession of ages, been suffered to accumulate in one or more families and to become sacred in their hands. Thus the powers of government came to be considered as the right and privilege of the ruler, distinct from, and paramount to the rights of the people. Men have conducted as though whatever of good was enjoyed by the people was to be derived from the condescension of the rulers, a mere concession of clemency. Doctrines like these have in all ages, by the ambitious few, been but too successfully inculcated on the minds of the people. From this source has been derived the doctrine of the present perfection of government, the infallibility of rulers, and the divine right of kings; and hence a total annihilation of all the political rights and power of the people.

On the other hand, the people, from a sense of the horrid oppressions which universally accompany such absurd conceptions of power, have at times plunged into the extremes of anarchy and popular violence. They have been driven to a feeling, rather than a rational investigation of their rights. They have been unable to distinguish between a personal right in the ruler, and a mere trust of power; still less have they been able to establish any laws of accountability, which might operate to prevent the abuse, without a constant resort to violent measures. Thus embarrassed, they have frequently balanced between the horrors of tyranny and the violence of faction.

Neither the Greeks nor the Romans had any correct or definite notions of political and civil liberty and the natural rights of man; of those relations from which result the sacred laws of his nature. From the ignorance of their lawgivers on these points, which was indeed the ignorance of the age, there were always radical defects in their constitutions of government. In all their systems they made little or no distinction between

the political and civil laws; between the laws of the constitution by which the state is organized, and its efficient powers directed and limited, and the laws of property and personal rights; and yet without a careful attention to this distinction, personal rights can never be permanently secured. The laws of the constitution, the political laws, are to those entrusted with the powers of government, what the laws made by the government, are to a court of judicature. Those courts are bound by the laws, but have no power to make or alter them. In like manner the government, that is, those organized bodies who are entrusted with its powers, are bound by the constitution as the supreme law, but should have no power to alter or add to any of its provisions.

Hence it is evident, that in an absolute or despotic government, there can be no political laws, laws of the constitution, binding on those who exercise the powers of government. The prince, arrogating to himself all powers, political and civil, can be bound by none of his laws as they relate to his own conduct. All such laws and regulations, although in the form of royal ordinances, and promulgated with all possible solemnity, are nothing more than present resolutions subject to the caprice and momentary fluctuations of the tyrant's will. In such governments, however, there will always be found some custom or ancient usage, from whatever source derived, that is by the people held more sacred than the authority or person of the prince ;—and which, he cannot with impunity, and dares not violate.

Such is said to be a customary law among the Turks, derived from some passage in the Koran, that the sultan shall levy no new tax on his subjects. The sultan knows that an attempt to enforce such a measure would excite the unrestrained indignation of every class of his enslaved people, and that his head or at least that of his favorite minister must be the forfeiture. In a more polished state of society, the absolute monarch, not only feels himself limited by some custom, some mode of thinking, which time, or perhaps religious opinion has rendered sacred among the people, but he is, in a degree, restrained by that respect, which he finds it necessary to pay to the manners of the age, and of his own country, and to the general

sentiments of his own subjects. Still he can be subjected to no positive laws or regulations in the exercise of authority. Under such a government there can be no political laws, or political rights. Different is the case of all governments founded in legitimate civil compact. They are capable of positive regulations, of constitutional laws limiting with a good degree of precision the powers of government in their exercise, and directing them to the great end of political and civil institutions, the secure enjoyment by the people, of their rights natural, civil, and political, and the promotion of the general interest and happiness of the community.

Of the three forms of government founded in the civil compact, a democracy is the most liable to fluctuation in its political and civil institutions; because in that government, the citizens, who are in possession of unrestrained political liberty, constitute their legislative assemblies, each citizen having an equal voice in passing all laws whether of a civil or political nature, as well as in appointing those who administer the laws; and although every law, while remaining in force, is binding on the whole community as well as on each individual; yet from the nature of the government, they are at all times liable to be altered, changed, and repealed at the will of a majority, subject to all the fluctuations of popular passions, and prejudice: And further, as all laws are enacted and are under the control of the same body, there can be no distinction of constitutional and unconstitutional law;-the last law passed on every subject is always constitutional, must be so considered by every one in the civil administration. Although it has been often asserted by the advocates for this form of government, that no people will oppress themselves, yet the majority often adopt measures very oppressive to their opponents, the minority, and in the violence of party spirit, not unfrequently with that view —a situation to which all are in turn exposed. The people have also at times, under some powerful excitement, or sinister influence, been induced to adopt those measues that led to the inevitable ruin of their liberties. So true is it that the extreme of liberty verges on the extreme of tyranny,-a situation into which it finally, and often suddenly degenerates.

In a mixed government, of which we have already given a

sketch, political rights are more limited. Yet here the people enjoy an important portion of those rights, derived from the natural right of self government, which they exercise in the periodical election of a co-ordinate branch of the legislature, through which they, as before shown, hold a check over the two other branches consisting of the king and the nobility. Although the exercise of this right may here, on comparison, appear very much restricted, yet it is all that can be exercised by the people with safety to this form of government. the right of suffrage be properly secured and guarded, and the representation be apportioned through the whole, as nearly equal as local circumstances will admit, so as to give all the voters a fair and equal chance of exercising their right, at periods not too remote from each other, and it will prove a check no less salutary than efficient.

Let

In this form of government as well as in a democracy, the legislative body necessarily possesses the ordinary as well as the extraordinary as well the civil as political-powers of legislation. They have the same power to make, repeal, alter, and change any law relating to the constitution, as one relating merely to the civil state; nor can one be made more binding on the legislature than the other. None of their laws can be adjudged to be unconstitutional, however inexpedient they may be, or however they may disturb the symmetry of that constitution. On a first view of this government, consisting of three branches claiming distinct powers and those often conflicting, few improvements of the constitution were to be expected, particularly in favor of the rights of the people, an extension of which must be a diminution of those claimed by one or both of the higher orders, as they are called, the monarch or the nobles; and yet on an attentive consideration of the English constitution, the only government from which any example can at present be adduced, we find that great improvements have from time to time been made, and that by acts of their parliament so constructed. The march of improvement has indeed been slow, often encountering violent opposition, and sometimes its footsteps drenched in the best blood of the nation.

The first act passed upon this subject and which has justly been considered the foundation of English liberty was the

act of Magna Charta, or the grand charter, passed in the reign of King John. For notwithstanding its form as a charter or grant, and the force put upon the king, it was an act of parliament, agreeable to the parliamentary mode of proceeding at that time, especially in passing all acts which might in any way affect the royal prerogatives. Since that time five centuries have elapsed,—during the three first, improvements made in the constitution accompanying the progress of manners and knowledge, were few, moderate, and far between; but they were such as prepared the way, and prepared the nation for those that have followed. During the two last centuries, improvements of the constitution have been very numerous and important. I will barely mention some of the principal acts, relating to that subject, passed during the latter period. The act abolishing the court of starchamber and the high commission court, and the act called the petition of rights, passed during the reign of Charles the first. The act abolishing the feudal tenures and their appendages and the habeas corpus act which is considered the palladium, as Magna Charta was the foundation, of English liberty, passed in the reign of Charles the second.-Under William and Mary at the revolution, the bill of rights, the act of settlement, and the acts fixing the duration of parliament, and an act of the 13 William III. changing the tenure of the office of the judges, before, during the pleasure of the king, to be in future held during good behavior, thereby rendering them independent of the crown :-this act was passed on the recommendation of the king from the throne, as was the act of the 1 George III. for continuing the commissions of the judges, notwithstanding the demise of the crown. We might mention the acts uniting Scotland and Ireland with England as political acts, not as improvements of the constitution.

Those who are conversant in the history of the English laws, will find in addition to the acts here mentioned, many others, more or less relating to the same subject, all of which taken together, clearly prove that this form of government has in it a capacity of improvement, which, if with a tardy, yet with a sure pace will follow the improvements of the age. The people under it enjoy less political liberty, than under a