to final independence. All this is, in the argument, taken for granted.

First then, suppose a number of men, in what is called a state of nature, collected together, and a large majority of them agreeing to unite in a civil society, a few dissent, and retain each his independent state. What will be the situation of such dissenting individuals in relation to that society? Certainly the society and the dissenting individuals are to each other in a state of nature, a state of independence, the same as independent nations, each party is the judge in its own cause, and the avenger of its own wrongs. Suppose any dissentient to remain in the midst of the society and to commit an act of violence on the person or property of one of the members. Considered as independent, he has committed an act of hostility against the society, which is bound to protect its members; the society have, therefore, against the aggressor a right of war, the same as though the aggression had been made by an independent nation; but instead of treating him as a public enemy, they adopt a milder course,—give him the chance of a trial as though he were a member of the community, and sentence him according to their own laws to make reparation. No one will say, this is a usurpation, but a mitigation of the right; and such is indeed the law practised among all civilized nations.

Again, suppose a society formed, and about to decide on a measure, but no rule has been adopted or suggested, what number or proportion of voices should constitute a binding vote, whether a majority; or whether a unanimity should be required; what would be the decision of natural justice, of the law of nature, in the case? This at once involves the question, what is expedient? what will best promote the general interest of the community? As a general rule, the major interest of the community must be supposed to be contained in that of a majority of its members. Now if a greater proportion, as two thirds, or three fourths, or even unanimity, be required, it will often be in the power of a small minority, representing a minor and sometimes, insignificant interest, down to a single voter, to prevent the adoption of measures necessary to promote and secure the general interest;

and to hold the society in a state of inaction frequently no less ruinous than a course of the most pernicious action. It is, therefore, a general rule, agreeable to the law of nature, founded in general utility, that a majority of votes shall be binding on the whole community. I say, as a general rule, for there may be cases in which the necessity or expediency of a greater unanimity outweighs the inconvenience of a different rule.

But there is still a further view of this subject. An association was formed in the colonies, by an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants, to oppose the measures of the British government. Of the right of this association there is now no question. The British government sent an armed force to put down that resistance, which they considered a rebellion, and which produced a civil war between that government and the associated colonies, who assumed and maintained a state of independence. What was then the situation of the dissentients in relation to the colonies, now states, engaged in war? The dissentients did not claim the situation of independent individuals. They claimed to continue subjects of Great Britain, to owe allegiance to that government, and thus identified themselves with the enemy actually at war. They considered themselves, by their allegiance, bound in conscience to aid that government by all means in their power, to crush the rebellion, as they deemed the war on the part of the colonies. Their situation was, therefore, very peculiar; if suffered to depart, they might add to the force,—if suffered to depart with their property, they would add to the means-of the enemy.-If suffered to remain they might serve as spies and join the hostile forces, in incursions into their country. Under these circumstances, some were suffered to depart; others fled to the enemy, and their estates were confiscated; some, who were considered too dangerous to be permitted their liberty, were imprisoned ;-some few, for unequivocal acts of hostility, while remaining in the country, suffered death as traitors :some were confined to certain limits under strict surveillance ;others, on assurance given, or from the confidence which their neighbors reposed in them, that they would do nothing to the injury of the country, were suffered to remain at large. Most

of those who were suffered to remain in the country till the peace, cordially united themselves to the new government, proved valuable citizens and in not a few instances,-eminent statesmen. In this line of conduct the states were justified by the laws of necessity, the laws of war, the laws of nature, and the usages of all civilized nations.

To the argument that has been commonly urged in support of the civil compact, that "as the first members were bound, by express stipulation, to obey the government which they had erected, so the succeeding inhabitants of the same country are understood to promise allegiance to the constitution and government, they find established, by accepting its protection, claiming its privileges, and acquiescing in its laws; more especially by the purchase and inheritance of lands, to the possession of which allegiance is annexed as the very service and condition of the tenure," he says,-" Smooth as this train of argument proceeds, little will it endure examination. The native subjects of modern states are not conscious of any stipulations with the sovereigns, of ever exercising an election whether they will be bound or not by the acts of the legislature, of any alternative being proposed to their choice, of a promise ever required or given; nor do they apprehend that the authority of the laws, depends at all upon their recognition or consent. In all stipulations, whether they be express or implied, public or private, formal or constructive, the parties stipulating must both possess the liberty of assent and refusal, and also be conscious of this liberty, which cannot with truth be affirmed of the subjects of civil government, as government now is or ever was actually administered. This is a defect which no argument can excuse or supply; all presumptions of consent, without this consciousness or in oppression to it, are vain or erroneous. Still less is it possible to reconcile with any idea of stipulation, the practice in which all European nations agree of founding allegiance on the circumstances of nativity, that is, of claiming and treating as subjects all those who are born within the limits. of their dominions, although removed to another country in their youth or infancy."

I am not concerned to prove, that there exists any election under a government of force, a despotic government, where

It

the subject is allowed to have no will, all is absorbed in the will of the prince, whose maxim, as well expressed by the Roman satirist, is "Hoc volo; sic jubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas." Nor can I allow that the practice of the modern governments of Europe, or any opinion derived from that practice, does in reality affect the question,-such opinion is the mere echo of the divine, hereditary, and indefeasible right of sovereigns, connected with the ancient state of vassalage ;— it is the legitimate offspring of that government, and of that state, and has in many instances survived its parents. was unknown to the ancient commonwealths of Greece,-it was unknown to the Roman republic;-nor do we find any vestige of it among the ancient Gauls or Germans. All that is necessary to prove is, that in every state, in which the constitution, however established, is sufficient in its provisions to secure the enjoyment of civil liberty, of civil rights, the acession of the citizens as they succeed in civil life, is a voluntary act to lay them under both a civil and moral obligation to obey all the laws and regulations of the government, made agreeable to that constitution. I know, it has often been asserted that no generation can, by any law or compact, bind the succeeding generation. It is true, that the succeeding generation cannot be bound by any act of their predecessors, by the direct force of that act. Each individual is bound by his own voluntary act as he succeeds on the political stage. In civil life men do not succeed by generations-one generation passing off the stage, to make room for another. Nor do individuals become members, in any proper sense, by succession, but by accession ;-they accede to the compact, and this I will show, is a voluntary act binding them to obedience.

The accession is of citizens born in the state, and under the protection of its laws. The progress of children in the acquisition of knowledge, is not made at first, by the exertion of intellect, but by imitation. They imitate the actions of those whom they most love, their parents and tutors. They imitate, or what to them is the same thing, learn their opinions; these they adopt without examination, of which they are incapable in early youth; and often retain them through life without attempting to examine, whether they are well founded

or not.

It is hardly possible to conceive, that the opinions they imbibe under such circumstances and under such a government, should not be highly in favor of the country of their birth and education, and of its institutions. The youth come forward with an ardent desire of becoming members of the state, ofenjoying the rights and privileges it secures, of fulfilling the duties it requires, and of meriting its honors; and besides, they have been taught that they have a right to all this; that they derive that right from their birth and parentage, and that the country requires these things of them. And so is the truth; for one great end of the institution which the framers had constantly in view, was to secure its rights and privileges to their children, and children's children, if possible, through all generations; and these rights and privileges, civil and political, are capable of communication and transmission no less than other rights, and hereditaments corporeal and incorporeal. The children come forward conscious of their rights and their duties; they are conscious of a desire to be admitted to the exercise of those rights, and the performance of those duties; nor does the idea of compulsion enter their minds; so far from it, that to be deprived of what they esteem so great a privilege, would be felt as a grievous act of oppression.

Under such circumstances, are they not conscious that their accession, or if that term displease, their adhesion to the compact, the constitution of the state is a free and voluntary act? It is if any can be such, where predilections are formed, a voluntary, a moral act, sufficient to bind the party. The author himself, would admit it to be a binding act, in any government founded on compact, and actually existing on that foundation. Such, clearly is the government of these United States, and of all the republican governments, lately established throughout almost the whole of that vast region extending from the confines of the United States to the southern extremity of the American continent, notwithstanding the author, from a predilection for what he deems a new principle, but which in fact is little other than the divine right of sovereigns, in a new and more fashionable dress, has been induced to deny the validity and even possible existence of such compact.

So far, I have followed the author on his own statement;