mendation of the meeting at, in
September, 1786, i. 264.

Anne, Queen: Extracts from her letter
to the Scotch Parliament, i. 30.
Appeals to the People: dangers and in-
conveniences attending them, i. 345.
Objections to their being periodically
made, i. 347.

Articles of Confederation (appendix ),
ii. 175-184.
Assemblies, objections to numerous,

i. 378, 381, 383 (see "House of Rep-
resentatives."). After a number of
Representatives sufficient for the
purposes of safety, of local informa-
tion, and of diffusive sympathy with
the whole society, is secured, any
addition to them is injurious, i. 401.
Athens, Archons of, ii. 6.
Attainder, Bills of: Provision of the
Constitution concerning them, i. 307.
Bankruptcy (see « Constitution"): Pro-
vision of the Constitution concerning
it, i. 292.

Bills of Credit: Provision of the Consti-
tution concerning them, i. 306.
Bills of Rights: Objection that the Con-
stitution does not contain, answered,
ii. 152.

Cambray, League of, i. 39.
Carthage, Senate of, ii. 4.

Cato: An opponent of the Constitution,

cited, ii. 31.

A source of contention between the
separate States, and would be
among separate confederacies of
them, i. 45.

Policy of prohibitory regulations in
regard to it, on the part of the
United States, i. 71.

Power under the Constitution of regu-
lating it, i. 288.

Confederacies: Inexpediency of divid-
ing the Union into three or four
separate confederacies, i. 28, 34, 41,
48.

Probable number of separate confed-
eracies, in the event of disunion,
i. 86.
Tendency of confederacies rather to
anarchy among the members than
to tyranny in the head, i. 111, 133.
Confederacy of the States: Alleged
characteristic distinction between it
and consolidation, i. 60.

Confederate Republic: Defined, i. 61.
Tendency of the federal principle to
moderation in government, i. 120
(see "Montesquieu," "Constitu-

tion, Republic »).

Confederation, The: Its insufficiency to
the preservation of the Union, i. 96.
Picture of the public distress under it,

i. 97.

Its great and radical vice, legislation
for communities instead of persons,
i. 99 (see 153).

Difference between a league and a gov-
ernment, i. 100.

Want of a sanction to its laws, i. 135.
State contributions by quotas, a funda-
mental error in it, i. 137.

Want of a power to regulate commerce,
another defect in it, i. 141.

The nugatory power of raising armies,
another, i. 143.

The right of equal suffrage among the
States, another, i. 144.

Anti-republican character of the requi-
sition, in certain cases, of a vote
exceeding a majority, i. 145.

Want of a judiciary power, a crowning
defect of the Confederation, i. 148.

14

(209)

The organization of Congress, another;
perilous tendency of a single legis-
lative house, i. 149.

Want of popular consent to it, another
defect in it, i. 150.

Impracticable character of certain pro-
visions under it, i. 253.
Necessary usurpations of Congress un-
der it, i. 253.

Answer to the question, on what princi-
ple is it to be superseded, without
the unanimous consent of the

parties to it, i, 302.

Articles of (appendix ), ii. 175-184.
Congress (see Constitution," States,"

Public Debt"): Extracts from the
recommendatory act of Congress, in
February, 1787, i. 264.
Power of, under the federal Constitu-

tion, over a district of territory not
exceeding ten miles square, i. 294.
Its power concerning territory, etc., be-
longing to the United States, i. 297.
Connecticut: Provision in her Constitu-
tion concerning elections, i. 365.
One branch of her legislature so consti-
tuted that each member of it is
elected by the whole State, i. 395.
Has no constitutional provision for
jury trial, in either criminal or
civil cases, ii. 143.

Consolidation: The plan of the Union
aims only at a partial consolidation,
i. 206.
Desire of the States to guard against

improper consolidation of them-
selves into one simple republic,

i. 423.
Constitution of the United States (see

*Union," "Confederation," "Standing
Armies," "States," « House of Rep-
resentatives," "Slaves"): Its
economy, i. 86.

Answer to an objection drawn from the
extent of the country, i. 89.

Its guaranty to the States of a republi-
can form of government, i. 297.
Necessity for strength in the federal
government, i. 152.

Wisdom of the provision in the Consti-
tution concerning the military
force, i. 155, 158, 167, 173, 218, 276.
Answer to the objection, that it cannot
operate without the aid of a military
force to execute its laws, i. 177, 187.
Reason why the execution of it will
probably be popular, i 182.
Laws under it, as to the enumerated

and legitimate objects of its juris-
diction, will be the supreme law of
the land, i. 214.
Number and inconsistency of the
objections to it, i. 249, 250, 251.
Most of the capital objections to it lie
with tenfold weight against the
Confederation, i. 252.

Its conformity to republican principles,
i. 256.
Analogy between the mode of appoint-

ments under it, and under the State
governments, i. 257.

Neither a national nor a federal consti-
tution, but a composition of both,
i. 260, 262.

General view of the powers which it

proposes to vest in the Union, i. 274.
The power of declaring war, i. 275.
The power of providing a navy, i. 280.
The power of making treaties, etc.,
i. 285.

The power of defining and punishing
offenses on the high seas, i. 286.
Prohibition of the importation of slaves
after 1808, i. 287.

Power of regulating commerce, i. 288.
Powers to coin money, to punish coun-

terfeiters, and to regulate weights
and measures, i. 290, 291.
Power to establish a uniform mode of
naturalization, i. 291.

Power to establish uniform laws of
bankruptcy, i. 292.

Power concerning public acts, records,
etc., i. 292.

Power of establishing post-roads, i. 293.
Power of granting copyrights, i. 294.
Power to exercise exclusive legislation

over a district not exceeding ten
miles square, if ceded to the United
States, i. 294.

Power concerning treason, i. 296.
Power of admitting new States, i. 296.
Power concerning territory, etc., be-

longing to the United States, i. 297
Obligation to guarantee a republican

form of government to every State
of the Union, i. 297.

Obligation concerning public debts
prior to the adoption of the Consti-
tution, i. 301.

Provision concerning amendments,
i. 301.

Provision concerning the ratification by
nine States, i. 302.

Question, what relation is to exist be-
tween the nine or more ratifying
States, and the non-ratifying
States, i. 302.

Disabilities of the States created by the
Constitution, 305.

Power given by it to Congress, to make
all laws necessary and proper for
executing its enumerated powers,
i. 308.

Four other possible alternatives, which
the Constitution might have adopt-
ed, i. 308.

Provision that the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States
shall be the supreme law of the
land, i. 311.

Oath, etc., of officers, etc., to support

the constitution, i. 312.

Consists much less in the addition of
new powers to the Union than in
the invigoration of its original
powers, i. 319.

Its provisions concerning the proper
degree of separation between the
legislative, executive, and judiciary
powers, i. 329.

Peculiar division under it, of the power
surrendered by the people, i. 338,
345, 353.

Its mode of protecting the minority
from usurpations by the majority,
i. 355.
Three characteristics of the federal

legislature, i. 363.

Answer to the objection that it contains
no bill of rights, ii. 152 et seq.

In the sense, and to the extent con-
tended for, bills of rights are un-
necessary and would be dangerous
to the Constitution, ii. 156.
Omission of a provision concerning the
liberty of the press defended, ii. 156.
The Constitution itself is a bill of
rights, ii. 157.

Answer to an objection to the Consti-

tution, founded on the remoteness
of the seat of government from
many of the States, ii. 158, 159.
Answer to the objection that it wants a

provision concerning debts due to
the United States, ii. 159, 160.
Answer to the objection as to expense,
ii. 160.

Federal Constitution as agreed upon

by the Convention

ii. 185 et seq.

Signers, ii. 198, 199.

Amendments, ii. 201 et seq.

(appendix),

Its authority to propose a mixed Con-
stitution, i. 264.

Its duties under existing circumstances,
i. 269.

Its plan only recommendatory, i. 271.
One particular in which it has departed
from the tenor of its commission,
i. 269.

Conventions for correcting breaches of a
constitution, i. 349.

Dangers and inconveniences of fre-
quent appeals to the people, i. 350,

351.
Copyrights: Power of the Constitution
concerning them, i. 294.

Crete, Cosmi of, ii. 6.

Delaware (see "States "): Provision in
her constitution concerning the sepa-
ration of the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, i. 335.

Number of representatives in the more
numerous branch of her legislature,
i. 379.

Democracy: A pure one defined, i. 67.
Its disadvantages, i. 67.
Departments of Power (see " States " un-
der their several titles): Meaning of
the maxim which requires a separa-
tion of them, i. 329, 330.

Principles of the British Constitution
on this subject, i. 330, 331.
Provisions of the State constitutions
concerning it, i. 332–337.

The partition among them to be main-
tained, not by exterior provisions,
but by the interior structure of the
government, i. 353.

District: Exclusive legislation of Con-
gress over one not exceeding ten
miles square, 294.

Economy: "The money saved from one
object may be usefully applied to
another, i. 86.

England (see "Great Britain »).
Europe: Her arrogant pretensions, i. 77.

Faction: Defined, i. 62.

Its latent cause inherent in human
nature, i. 63.

The various and unequal distribution
of property the most common and
durable source of it, i. 64.
Federal Farmer: An opponent of the
Constitution, ii. 35.

Federal Constitution (appendix) ii. 185

et seq.

Feudal System: Account of it, i. 114, 316.
Fisheries, The, i. 75.

Fox, Charles James: His India bill, ii. 63.

Geometry: Why its principles are re-
ceived without difficulty, i. 200.
Incomprehensibility of one of them,
i. 201.

Georgia: Provision in her constitution,
concerning the separation of the
legislative, executive, and judiciary
powers, i. 336.

Number of representatives in the more
numerous branch of her legisla-
ture, i. 379.

Germanic Empire: Its origin, constitu-
tion, and disadvantages, i. 124.
Gold and Silver: Principle on which the
States are inhibited to make any-
thing else a tender in payment of
debts, i. 305.
Government (see

"Minorities):

A

of

government, the constitution
which renders it unfit to be intrusted
with all the powers which a free
people ought to delegate to any
government, would be an unsafe and
improper depositary of the national
interests, i. 156.

The danger of fettering it with re-
strictions which cannot be ob-
served, i. 169.

Examples among the States of imprac-
ticable restrictions, i. 170.
Remarkable feature of every govern-

ment reported by ancient history
which was established by delibera-
tion and consent, i. 246.

The reason of it, i. 247.

Ought to control the passions, and to

be controlled by the reason of the
public, i. 339, 354.

The greatest of all reflections on hu-
man nature, i. 354.

Wise kings will always be served by
able ministers, ii. 11.

The true test of a good government is
its aptitude and tendency to pro-
duce a good administration, ii. 38.
Definition of a limited constitution,
ii. 100.

The general genius of a government is
all that can be substantially relied
on for permanent effects, ii. 150.
Great Britain (see " Standing Armies"):
Her government, i. 256.

The House of Commons, i. 361, 387,
393.

The House of Lords, ii. 18.

Why the king's power of an absolute
negative on bills has been long dis-
used, ii. 41.

Constitution of Great Britain, concern-
ing a separation of the departments
of power, i. 330.

Grotius: Cited, i. 132; ii. 160.

High Seas: The power under the Con-
stitution of defining and punishing
offenses on them, i. 286.

Holland: Not a republic, i. 256.
House of Representatives (see "Consti-
tution," Treaties"): Qualifications
of the electors and the elected, i. 359.

Term of a member's service, i. 360, 365,

371.

Biennial elections defended, i. 367, 370.
Argument in their favor derived from
the time they afford a representa-
tive for acquiring the requisite in-
formation, i. 367, 369, 378.
The ratio of representation, i. 372, 377.
Its proposed number of members de-
fended, i. 378, 388.

Provision of the Constitution concern-
ing the ineligibility of its members
under certain circumstances, to civil
offices, i. 383.
Imputed tendency of the plan for the
House of Representatives, to ele-
vate the few above the many, i. 389.
Provision for the future augmentation
of its members considered, i. 396.
Economy consulted by the provision

for its temporary number, i. 400.
Maxim as to the proper number of
representatives, i. 401.

Why more than a majority ought not
to be required for a quorum, i. 401.
Provision for regulating elections to it,
i. 403.

Less likely than local legislatures to be
partial to particular interests, i. 410.
Advantage of uniformity in the time
of elections, i. 419.

Why it ought to have no power in the
formation of treaties, ii. 83.

Why it ought to have no power in the
appointment of federal officers, ii.

96.

Human Nature: Its fair side, i. 383.

A power over a man's support is a
power over his will, ii. 70, 107.
Hume. David: Citation from his essays,
ii. 171.

Impeachments (see Senate," "Judi-
ciary," "States," under their several
titles).

Indians: Difficulties concerning them
when residing within a State, i. 288.
Innovation: Its dangers exaggerated,
some of its beneficial results, i. 94.
Ireland, Elections in, i. 362.

Jefferson, Thomas: Cited to show the

evils in the constitution of Virginia,
arising from the want of a barrier
between the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, i. 340.

His draft of a Constitution cited, i. 344.
His idea of a convention for correcting
breaches of it, i. 344.

Defects of this plan, i. 344-348.
Jenkinson, Charles: His remarks in-
troductory to his bill for regulating
the commerce between Great Britain
and the United States, i. 141.
Judiciary (see "Jury Trial"): Want of,
i. 148.