places for one year, others for three, and others for five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant and frequent change of members, but there will be some whose office is near the point of expiration, and who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of their dependence. The biennial change of members is an excellent invention for increasing the difficulty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advocates, and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating and virtuous men. When two principles are equally important, we ought if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither. We think that safety and permanency in this government are completely reconcileable. The state governments will have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence over the senate, without the check for which the gentlemen contend. It has been remarked, that there is an inconsistency in our admitting, that the equal votes in the senate were given to secure the rights of the states; and, at the same time, holding up the idea, that their interests should be sacrificed to those of the union. But the committee certainly perceive the distinction between the rights of the state and its interests. The rights of a state are defined by the constitution, and cannot be invaded without a violation of it; but the interests of a state have no connexion with the constitution, and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally sacrificed. An uniform tax is perfectly constitutional; and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain members of the union. The gentlemen are afraid that the state governments will be abolished. But, sir, their existence does not depend upon the laws of the United States. Congress can no more abolish the state governments, than they can dissolve the union. The whole constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentlemen would introduce an additional, useless provision against it. It is proper that the influence of the But shall states should prevail to a certain extent. the individual states be the judges how far? unlimited power be left them to determine in their own favor? The gentlemen go into the extreme: instead of a wise government, they would form a fantastical Utopia. But, sir, while they give it a plausible, popular shape, they would render it impracticable. Much has been said about factions. As far as my observation has extended, factions in Congress have arisen from attachment to state prejudices. We are attempting by this constitution to abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare. That a man should have the power in private life, of recalling his agent, is proper; because in the business in which he is engaged, he has no other object but to gain the approbation of his principal. Is this the case with the senator? Is he simply the agent of the state? No-he is an agent for the union, and he is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the whole, though his state should condemn them. Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe also, that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other states have; and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the states to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the sel fish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good. It has been observed, that it is not possible there should be, in a state, only two men qualified for senators. But, sir, the question is not, whether there may be no more than two men; but whether, in certain emergencies, you could find two equal to those whom the amendment would discard. Important negotiations, or other business to which they shall be most competent, may employ them, at the moment of their removal. These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men, capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine. As to corruption, sir, admitting in the president a disposition to corrupt, what are the instruments of bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a great number of offices. But how many offices are there, for which a man would relinquish the senatorial dignity? There may be some in the judicial, and some in other principal departments. But there are few, whose respectability can in any measure balance that of the office of senator. Men who have been in the senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of a re-election, will not be easily bought by offices. This reasoning shows that a rotation would be productive of many disadvantages-under particular circumstances, it might be extremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our country. SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 27, 1788. A proposition to amend the constitution was brought before the convention, the object of which was, to materially abridge the power proposed to be conferred upon Congress, relative to imposing excise and laying direct taxes, in opposition to which, Mr. Hamilton delivered the following speech. THIS is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise, and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its first impressions create a prejudice, before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils, than the advantages of a measure; and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger, than to see the necessity, of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may justly expect, that those who hear me, will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in those which favor, their prepossessions. After all our doubts, our suspicions and speculations, on the subject of government, we must return, at last, to this important truth-that when we have formed a constitution upon free principles; when we have given a proper balance to the different branches of administration, and fixed representation upon pure and equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish it with all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample manner, the purposes of government.. The great desiderata are a free representation, and mutual checks. When these are obtained, all our apprehensions of the extent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What then is the structure of this constitution? One branch of the legislature is to be elected by the people-by the same people, who choose your state representatives. Its members are to hold their office two years, and then return to their constituents. Here, sir, the people govern: here they act by their immediate representatives. You have also a senate, constituted by your state legislatures-by men, in whom you place the highest confidence, and forming another representative branch. Then, again, you have an executive magistrate, created by a form of election, which merits universal admiration. In the form of this government, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the best writers, have ever conceived. What more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one branch, in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced: the executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their offices during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the great scrutiny with success. Now, what do gentlemen mean, by coming forward and declaiming against this government? Why do they say we ought to limit its powers, to disable it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing the people? Has philosophy suggested-has experience taught, that such a government ought not to be trusted with every thing necessary for the good of society? Sir, when you have divided and nicely balanced the departments of government; when you have strongly |