France? I answer, that it appears, in the first place, by the instructions to Genet. These instructions have been given to the public by M. Genet himself, in order to justify his conduct in this country. They must still be fresh in the recollection of most persons; but as there may be some, who have not particularly attended to them, or have forgotten their tenor, it will not be improper to cite some of the most remarkable passages. "The executive council, (says M. Genet,) are disposed to set on foot a negociation on these foundations, (the overtures made by general Washington and Mr. Jefferson for a new treaty,) and they do not know but that such a treaty admits a latitude still more extensive, in becoming a national agreement, in which two great nations shall suspend" (this, sir, should have been translated unite,)" their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding, to befriend the empire of liberty wherever it can be embraced, and punish those powers who still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring, that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties." Thus it appears, that this treaty is not only to be a commercial, but also a political union that we are to assist in extending French principles and French influence, under the name of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people, and befriending the empire of liberty; and that, in order to accomplish this end, we are to shut our ports against all the powers who maintain an exclusive commercial and colonial system; that is, against the English, Spaniards, Danes and Dutch. This amounts in substance, and almost in name, to an alliance offensive and defensive with France.

Lest, however, her views should be misunderstood, she has gone on, in the instructions, to explain them in a manner still more clear and explicit. "As it is possible, however, (continues M. Genet,) that the false representations, which have been made to Congress of the state of our internal affairs, of the situation of

our maritime force, of our finances, and especially of. the storms with which we are threatened, may make her ministers, in the negociations which citizen Genet is instructed to open, adopt a timid and wavering conduct, the executive council charges him, in expectation that the American government will finally determine to make a common cause with us, to take such steps as it will appear to him exigencies may require, to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the people." This passage, sir, assuredly can require no comment. In the supplementary instructions, the system is more fully developed. And indeed, the passage relative to the point under consideration is so conclusive, that I will cite it entire. These are the words: "The reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the two nations, stipulated in the eleventh article of the treaty of 1778, can be established upon generous principles, which have been already pointed out, and shall equally be an essential clause in the new treaty, which is to be proposed." In order to understand this, it will be necessary to recollect, that the treaty of 1778, was purely defensive; so that France could not claim the guarantee in a war, in which she should be the aggressor. As she was then preparing to attack England, against which she declared war within less than a month after these instructions were signed, this defensive guarantee would not answer her purpose. She therefore evidently wished to make it offensive and defensive. For had she meant to remain on the defensive herself, the defensive guarantee would have been sufficient, and she would have wanted no other. instructions then proceed thus: "The executive council, in consequence, recommend it especially to citizen Genet, to sound early the disposition of the American government, and to make it, (the guarantee,) a condition sine qua non of their commerce with the West Indies, so essential to the United States. It nearly concerns the peace and prosperity of the French nation, that a people, whose resources increase beyond all 62

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calculation, and whom nature has placed so near our rich colonies, should become interested by their own engagements, in the preservation of these islands. Citizen Genet will find the less difficulty in making the proposition relished in the United States, as the great trade which will be the reward of it will indemnify them in the end for the sacrifices which they may make in the outset; and the Americans cannot be ignorant of the great disproportion between their resources and those of the French republic, and that for a long period the guarantee asked from them will be little more than nominal for them, while on our part it will be real, and we shall immediately put ourselves in a condition to fulfil it, by sending to the American ports a sufficient force to put them beyond insult, and to facilitate their communication with the islands and with France." Thus it manifestly appears, that an alliance, offensive and defensive in the war, which she meditated against England, was to be formed with France; that the object of this alliance was to be the preservation of her islands, and commercial privileges its reward; that we were to make sacrifices in the outset, and be reimbursed by these privileges; and that a French fleet was to be sent to our coast, for our protection. In other words, we were to become the carriers and servants of France, and she was to defend us against England.

This point indeed is so clear, that it has been admitted by the greater part of those, who possess any information on the subject. Many gentlemen, however, are of opinion, that when Genet was recalled, this system was given up by France. But I ask these gentlemen, what was the real motive of Genet's recal? Was it to disavow his plans, or to satisfy our complaints? Certainly not. His violent and foolish proceedings, which counteracted the plan instead of promoting it, were no doubt intended to be censured, and there probably was a disposition to coax and flatter our government, by the recal of this minister, in order

to prepare it better for that insidious policy, which was to be adopted by his successors. The true cause, however, of Genet's removal was the fall of the Brissotine party, to which he had belonged; and every person connected with or employed by which, Robespierre had removed. Hence the consuls in America, against whom we never had complained, were removed, as well as the minister. But did the French government disavow the instructions or the proceedings of M. Genet? Did his successors relinquish his claims and pretensions? Certainly not. On the contrary, they were all renewed and perpetually urged by those gentlemen, who never ceased to talk to us about efficacious measures against England, about a vigorous reaction. And in the manifesto published by one of them (M. Adet,) the whole of Genet's measures were expressly revived, and all his complaints renewed and enforced. Even that appeal to the people, which he was disgraced for threatening, was actually made by this manifesto.

The policy of France to draw this country into the war, appears also, from the clamor, raised by her and her partizans against the proclamation of neutrality. This clamor is fresh in the recollection of us all. Genet cried out against this proclamation; Fouchet indirectly complained of it, and Adet stigmatized it as insidious, perfidious and "a cloak under which this country presented England with a poniard, to cut the throat of our ally." Societies passed resolutions against it; orators declaimed, and newspapers teemed with abuse. Whence all this, if the object had not been to engage us in the war? Had France, as she pretended, been desirous of our remaining in peace, whence all this rage at the measure, the only possible object of which was to preserve peace? That such was her object is moreover manifest from the measures themselves which she wished us to adopt; for it is impossible to suppose her government ignorant of the direct and necessary tendency of these measures to bring us into a quarrel with England.

In the first place, she wished us to resist and repel the right, claimed and exercised by the British government under the law of nations, of taking the property of their enemies, on board of our ships. She constantly urged us, not only to deny this right, but to resist its exercise in an efficacious manner. But could she have imagined that England would yield this right to us? She knew that the English, when France, Spain, Holland and the United States, were in arms against them alone, had refused to yield it, though pressed by the formidable combination of all the neutral powers, with the empress of Russia at their head: a combination, supported too by the united maritime strength of Prussia, Sweden and Denmark. She knew that after the American war, Russia, whose treaty with England expired in 1786, and who, as a power desirous of extending its navigation, was extremely desirous of this concession, had never been able to obtain it from England.

Sir, England has constantly refused it to the formidable fleet, the immense strength, the overbearing influence, and the wise and vigorous government of the empress of Russia. She has constantly refused it to the united solicitations of Sweden and Denmark and the Hanse towns; though she has carried on a very extensive and important commerce with all these nations. She has constantly refused it, in time of peace, to all of them. To France, indeed, she conceded it in 1780, because she gained great equivalents, and had no interest in withholding it from her; as she could never expect to be engaged in a war without having France for her enemy; and in that case the stipulation could not operate. But what did she say to those nations who might remain at peace, while she and France should be at war-such as the Russians, Swedes, Danes, and Hanse towns? She said, "I will never relinquish this right to you; because it would enable you to become the carriers of France, whenever she is at war with me; and she will thereby be ena