as if the House were to join in it: the claims of justice can be as completely satisfied in one case as in the other; the ends of policy as completely attained. Though I myself have very little reliance on the usefulness of the measure, and no conviction of its necessity, still I, for one, am perfectly willing that it should be tried by the executive, and perfectly willing that it should be effected, if the executive think fit. Neither have I any doubt that it will be tried. The very debate in this House will inform the executive of the propriety of trying it; and I have no doubt, moreover, that the executive is disposed to make the attempt, to offer these advantages to France. I know nothing directly of the opinion of the executive, but I know, that those who are about the executive have this opinion, and are disposed to make this offer to France, not perhaps in the unqualified and unconditional manner recommended by some gentlemen, but on terms consistent with the honor and interests of this country, and with which the public, when it comes to be informed of them, will be satisfied. I, therefore, even if I thought this measure not only useful but necessary, should still leave it most willingly to the President. But as there are gentlemen in the House, who may be inclined to favor the recommendation from an opinion, that the measure recommended is necessary or useful, I will address some considerations to them, by which they may, perhaps, be induced to doubt whether it is

either the one or the other.

First, I ask them, how this measure, this concession to France, can be necessary? Do gentlemen contend, that this country is too weak to defend her rights; that it must yield to the demands of a foreign power, merely because those demands are made? I have not so understood them. Supple as their language has been, and submissive as their course of policy seems calculated to become, they have not yet bent thus low. But they have contended, that this concession is necessary, because it is right; because justice

requires it. And how does justice require it? Because, according to them, having yielded these rights to England by our treaty with her, impartial justice requires, that we should yield them also to France.

This argument rests on the ground that Britain does not possess these rights by the law of nations, which point gentlemen have taken much pains, and made many elaborate dissertations, to establish. I shall not follow them through this long diplomatic discussion, which is much better suited to the department of state, and has there been handled in a very masterly and satisfactory manner. I believe, that when the official paper on this subject, lately published from the department of state, shall be read and compared with the speeches of gentlemen, very little doubt will remain on the point. I have another reason too for avoiding a dispute on the law of nations. Gentlemen seem disposed to treat the law, and the writers on it, with as little respect as the one and the other have received from the nation whose cause they advocate. One minister of that nation, in this country, has declared those writers to be no better than worm-eaten volumes, whose contents he was happy to have forgotten. Another, at Genoa, declared, that the French had taken up arms for the express purpose of subverting the law of nations. After this I should be almost afraid to cite writers on the law of nations, lest I should be told, "that they are worm-eaten volumes." There is, however, one authority on this point, which perhaps may be acknowledged, and which I will therefore adduce. It is the marine code of France herself; from which it appears, that by the law of nations, and her own laws founded upon it, enemies' goods are liable to capture, in neutral ships.

Sir, it appears from Valin, vol. ii. page 250, that, on the 21st of October, 1744, the king of France published a regulation, "concerning prizes made at sea, and the navigation of neutral vessels in time of war." The

first, second, third and fourth articles specify all the cases in which neutral ships in time of war may sail, free from molestation. Then comes the fifth article, which is in these words: "If in any of the cases specified in the first, second, third and fourth articles of this regulation, there shall be found on board of the said neutral ships, to whatsoever nation they may belong, merchandizes or effects, the property of his majesty's enemies, such merchandize or effects shall be good prize, even though they be not the production of the enemies' country but the ships shall be released." This regulation continued in force till the 26th of July, 1778, when the king of France, having engaged in the American war, (for the treaty of alliance was early in February, 1778,) found it his interest to relax from the principle in hopes of prevailing on England to do so too. Accordingly on that day he published a regulation, by the first article of which, enemies' property, on board of neutral ships, is declared to be safe from capture by French armed vessels. The article, however, contains the following clause: "But his majesty retains to himself a right to revoke the permission contained in the present article, should the enemy powers fail to grant a similar permission within six months from the date hereof."

Hence it is clear, that France not only has asserted and long exercised this right, which she charges us with having conceded to England, but even possesses it at the present moment, and may exercise it, if she thinks fit, without violating the law of nations; she being only restrained in those cases, in which, as in ours, she has renounced it by treaties. All this appears from her own laws and public acts; for her reJinquishment of this right in July, 1778, having been merely conditional and dependent on a similar relinquishment by England, which has never taken place, may be at any moment revoked, and indeed has been; for, notwithstanding all her clamors against the English for exercising this right, it is very well known, that

she has constantly exercised it herself from the beginning of the present war.

It may therefore be expected, that we shall not hereafter be told by either France or her advocates, that the right to take enemies' goods in neutral vessels, is not a right given by the law of nations.

It has, however, been contended, that the law of nations in this respect has been altered by the convention of the armed neutrality. I will not stop to refute this position, which has been so often and so completely exposed; still less will I undertake to prove what is in itself so perfectly obvious, that the convention of the armed neutrality, being no more than a treaty, is confined, like all other treaties, to the parties who agree to it, and can in no manner affect the general rights of other states, under the general law of nations: but I will remark, that this objection about the armed neutrality, comes with a very bad grace from France; because France, when requested to accede to this convention of the armed neutrality, expressly declined it. She declined it indeed under pretence, that its principles were already established by her regulation of July, 1778. This regulation, however, as has been seen, was temporary and conditional, and left France at full liberty to adhere to the law of nations, or adopt the principles of the armed neutrality, as she might afterwards find convenient. She afterwards did refuse to accede, as appears by the authority of Mr. Gibbon; in one of whose letters to lord Sheffield, dated September 11th, 1785, and published in the first volume of his miscellaneous works, page 06, there is found this passage: "The other day the French ambassador mentioned, that the empress of Russia had proposed to ratify the principles of the armed neutrality by a definitive treaty; but that the French had declared, that they would neither propose nor accept an article, so disagreeable to England."

This, sir, is a good comment on their former proceedings with respect to this right; and proves, that

they never meant to renounce it, though they were willing, for a short time and for a particular purpose, to suspend its exercise. It is true that France afterwards, in the years 1786 and 1787, made a treaty with Russia, in which this right was finally relinquished. The same thing is done in her treaty with England in 1786. But her having so long retained it, and her very agreement at last to give it up, proves most incontestably that she believes herself to possess it, under the general law of nations.

A dispute has arisen, whether the convention of the armed neutrality is permanent in its nature, or merely confined to the duration of the American war. I have been of the latter opinion myself, on the construction of the instrument itself, and of the acts which have grown out of it; and I shall not enter again into the discussion, which I believe to be wholly immaterial. Because, whether this convention be permanent or temporary, still it is no more than a treaty, and can have no effect on the general law of nations. I will, however, correct a mistake into which a gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) has fallen on this subject. In order to prove that the convention of the armed neutrality was permanent in its nature, that gentleman has asserted that Portugal acceded to it after the war. But the gentleman has forgot the dates. The accession of Portugal was signed at Petersburg, July, 1782, and ratified at Lisbon, September, 1782. The ratifications were exchanged on the 21st of January, 1783. Whereas the provisional articles of peace were not signed till November 30th, 1782. The armistice for suspending hostilities took place on the 20th of January, 1783, and the definitive treaty, by which the war was really ended, was not signed till September, 1783, many months after the accession of Portugal. That accession even preceded the provisional articles by some months; and yet the gentleman from Pennsylvania has told the committee that Portugal acceded after the war.