nature of the British government may require and justify a course of proceeding in respect to treaties, that is unwarrantable here.

The British government is a mixed one. The king, at the head of the army, of the hierarchy, with an ample civil list, hereditary, unresponsible, and possessing the prerogative of peace and war, may be properly observed with some jealousy in respect to the exercise of the treaty-making power. It seems, and perhaps from a spirit of caution on this account, to be their doctrine, that treaties bind the nation, but are not to be regarded by the courts of law, until laws have been passed conformably to them. Our concurrence has expressly regulated the matter differently. The concurrence of parliament is necessary to treaties becoming laws in England, gentlemen say; and here the senate, representing the states, must concur in treaties. The constitution and the reason of the case, make the concurrence of the senate as effectual as the sanction of parliament, and why not? The senate is an elective body, and the approbation of a majority of the states affords the nation as ample security against the abuse of the treaty-making power, as the British nation can enjoy in the control of parliament.

Whatever doubt there may be as to the parliamentary doctrine of the obligation of treaties in Great Britain, (and perhaps there is some,) there is none in their books, or their modern practice. Blackstone represents treaties as of the highest obligation, when ratified by the king; and for almost a century, there has been no instance of opposition by parliament to this doctrine. Their treaties have been uniformly carried into effect, although many have been ratified, of a nature most obnoxious to party, and have produced louder clamor than we have lately witnessed. The example of England, therefore, fairly examined, does not warrant, it dissuades us from a negative vote.

Gentlemen have said, with spirit, whatever the true doctrine of our constitution may be, Great Britain has no

right to complain or to dictate an interpretation. The sense of the American nation as to the treaty power, is to be received by all foreign nations. This is very true as a maxim; but the fact is against those who vouch it. The sense of the American nation is not as the vote of the House has declared it. Our claim to some agency in giving force and obligation to treaties, is beyond all kind of controversy novel. The sense of the nation is probably against it. The sense of the government certainly is. The President denies it on constitutional grounds, and therefore cannot ever accede to our interpretation. The senate ratified the treaty, and cannot without dishonor adopt it, as I have attempted to show. Where then do they find the proof, that this is the American sense of the treaty-making power, which is to silence the murmurs of Great Britain? Is it because a majority of two or three, or at most of four or five of this House, will reject the treaty? Is it thus, the sense of our nation is to be recognized? Our government may thus be stopped in its movements-a struggle for power may thus commence, and the event of the conflict may decide who is the victor, and the quiet possessor of the treaty power. But, at present, it is beyond all credibility, that our vote, by a bare majority, should be believed to do any thing better than to embitter our divisions, and to tear up the settled foundations of our departments.

If the obligation of a treaty be complete, I am aware that cases sometimes exist which will justify a nation in refusing a compliance. Are our liberties, gentlemen demand, to be bartered away by a treaty,—and is there no remedy? There is. Extremes are not to be supposed, but when they happen, they make the law for themselves. No such extreme can be pretended in this instance, and if it existed, the authority it would confer to throw off the obligation, would rest where the obligation itself resides in the nation. This House is not the nation-it is not the whole delegated authority of the nation. Being only a part of that au

thority, its right to act for the whole society obviously depends on the concurrence of the other two branches. If they refuse to concur, a treaty, once made, remains in full force, although a breach on the part of a foreign nation would confer upon our own, a right to forbear the execution. I repeat it, even in that case the act of this House cannot be admitted as the act of the nation, and if the President and senate should not concur, the treaty would be obligatory.

I put a case that will not fail to produce conviction. Our treaty with France engages that free bottoms shall make free goods, and how has it been kept? As such engagements will ever be in time of war. France has set it aside, and pleads imperious necessity. We have no navy to enforce the observance of such articles, and paper barriers are weak against the violence of those, who are on the scramble for enemies' goods on the high seas. The breach of any article of a treaty by one nation gives an undoubted right to the other to renounce the whole treaty. But has one branch of the government that right, or must it reside with the whole authority of the nation? What if the senate should resolve, that the French treaty is broken, and therefore null and of no effect. The answer is obvious, you would deny their sole authority. That branch of the legislature has equal power in this regard with the House of Representatives. One branch alone cannot express the will of the nation.

A right to annul a treaty, because a foreign nation has broken its articles, is only like the case of a sufficient cause to repeal a law. In both cases the branches of our government must concur in the orderly way, or the law and the treaty will remain.

The very cases, supposed by my adversaries in this argument, conclude against themselves. They will persist in confounding ideas that should be kept distinct, they will suppose that the House of Representatives has no power unless it has all power. The House is nothing if it be not the whole government-the nation

On every hypothesis, therefore, the conclusion is not to be resisted; we are either to execute this treaty, or break our faith.

To expatiate on the value of public faith may pass with some men for declamation-to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge-can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement? Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue, and their standard of action?

It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame and disgust.

What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference because they are greener? No, sir, this is not the character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see, not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious, but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defence, and is conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For, what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a state renounces the principles that constitute their security? Or if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious in the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent? The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a banished man in his native land.

I see no exception to the respect, that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period, when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politics, the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians-a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string of beads, gives not merely binding force, but sanctity to treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise, or too just, to disown and annul its obligation. Thus we see, neither the ignorance of savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows, if the victims of justice could live again, collect together and form a society, they would, however loath, soon find themselves obliged to make justice, that justice under which they fell, the fundamental law of their state. They would perceive, it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good faith.

It is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even the supposition, that America should furnish the occasion of this opprobrium. No, let me not even imagine, that a republican government, sprung, as our own is, from a people enlightened and uncorrupted, a government whose origin is right, and whose daily discipline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option to be faithless-can dare to act what despots dare not avow, what our own example evinces, the states of Barbary are unsuspected of. No, let me rather make the supposition, that Great Britain refuses to execute the treaty, after we have done every thing to carry it into effect. Is there any language of reproach pungent enough to express your commentary on the fact? What would you say, or rather what would you not say? Would you not tell them, wherever an Englishman might travel, shame would stick to him-he would