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ed full compensation to England for every possible claim they may have against us, that we have abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we have consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated-that after having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment of past differences, we have entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which have heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that, by this treaty of commerce and navigation, we have obtained no commercial advantage, which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we have parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of selfdefence which is calculated to give us any security.

There is yet another article which stands by itself, unconnected either with adjustment of past disputes, or with commercial regulations; I mean the ninth article, which provides that British subjects now holding lands in the United States, shall continue to hold them, and may sell or devise the same; and that neither they, nor their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens. I am not a lawyer, and, in expressing an opinion, I mean nothing more than to communicate my doubts, and ask for an explanation. There would be no difficulty in finding the meaning of the article, did it apply only to those British subjects, who have acquired lands under the laws of the states; but the former connexion of this country with England, renders the subject difficult to be explained, even by men of legal abilities; for its explanation must depend on the consequences of a principle unknown to the laws of England. The principle of the English law is, that no subject can shake his allegiance, that is to say, that no man who was once a citizen, can become

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an alien. Yet, by the effect of the revolution, British subjects, who, before 1776, had a right to hold lands in America, as part of the British empire, have become aliens in the United States, and the effect of that alienage upon their titles to such lands, and how far that effect is changed by the operation of the treaty, seem to me to be questions of a very nice nature. I will, however, beg leave to suggest what to me appears to be the effect of the treaty. So far as lands have been confiscated by the laws of any state, and those laws carried into effect, and so far as such lands having been considered as escheated, an office has been found, and the escheat been completed, I conceive the treaty will create no alteration; but where the lands have not been confiscated, either because no laws had been passed for that purpose, or because they had not been carried into effect before the treaty of 1783, and where the legal formalities of finding an office, &c. necessary to complete an escheat have been neglected, it seems to me the treaty may operate in three ways. Firstly, it will prevent any state from completing an escheat by finding an office, &c. when they have neglected doing it. Secondly, it will enable the British subjects to sell or devise, and therefore to convert their life estate into a fee-simple for ever. And thirdly, it will enable those subjects to institute suits in courts for the recovery of those lands, providing them with a legal remedy, they had not before, since their alienage would have been a sufficient bar against bringing real actions. If the treaty may be supposed to have that effect, its tendency so far as relates, not to private estates, but to the former proprietary estates, may prove vexatious and injurious to several of the states. It will strengthen the proprietary claims of the Penn family, not in Pennsylvania, but in the state of Delaware. It may have some effect on the decision of the Fairfax claim in Virginia, and even on such parts of the lands of Maryland.

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which have been sold, although formerly the property of the Baltimore family, as vacant lands and not as confiscated lands. In North Carolina, the proprietary claim of the Grandville family, which includes the best half of that state and of the southwestern territory, may be revived by the treaty; for although a law has passed in that state to confiscate the lands of all the British subjects who should be absent on a certain day, yet the proprietary lands were not meant to be comprehended within that provision; the commissioners, who were to sell the confiscated property, never disposed of a single acre of the lands, which were granted by another law of the state as vacant and not as confiscated lands, without having been actually escheated to the state by an office being found or any other formality whatever; and they are even expressly distinguished from land to be confiscated by the very act passed for the purpose of confiscating. (Mr. Gallatin here read the clause of the act he alluded to.) Supposing, however, every thing I have said on this subject as very doubtful, it is not less true that this article, under an appearance of reciprocity, grants a positive advantage to Great Britain without any equivalent being given-is, if not an infraction, at least a restriction over the legislative powers, and an exception to the laws of the different states on a subject of a delicate nature-may involve not only some of our citizens, but even several of the states in complex lawsuits and serious embarrassment, and although it may thus create much mischief, can give us no possible benefit.

From the review I have taken of the treaty, and the opinions I have expressed, it is hardly necessary for me to add, that I look upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and that I earnestly wish it never had been made; but whether in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to carry it into effect, and what will be the probable conse

quences of a refusal, is a question which requires the most serious attention, and which I will now attempt to investigate.

Should the treaty be finally defeated, either new negociations will be more successful, or Great Britain will refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they now are, or war will be the consequence. I will, in the course of my observations, make some remarks on the last supposition. I do not think that the first will be very probable at present, and I am of opinion, that under the present circumstances, and until some change takes place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it is to be apprehended, that, in such a case, new negociations will either be rejected, or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have perhaps followed a rejection of the treaty even by the senate or by the President. After the negociator, employed by the United States, had once affixed his signature, it must have become very problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made, would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new treaty. I conceive that the hopes of obtaining better conditions, by a new negociation, are much less in the present stage of the business than they were, when the treaty was in its inchoate form before the Executive; and in order to form a just idea of the consequences of a rejection at present, I will contemplate them upon this supposition, which appears to me most probable, to wit, that no new treaty will take place for a certain period of time.

In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, Į have already stated the advantages which, in my opinion, would result to the United States from the nonexistence of that instrument; I will not repeat; but proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue, that can be set off against those advantages.

As I am not sensible that a single commercial ad

vantage has been obtained by the treaty, I cannot mention the loss of any, as a mischief that may attend its rejection. If, however, the East India article is supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other hand, be conceded, that we have enjoyed every benefit arising from it for a number of years, without treaty, and consequently because it was the interest of the East India company that we should enjoy them, and that it is not probable, that circumstances will so far change there, during the short period to which this article is limited, as to induce that company to adopt a different policy towards us.

The indemnification, to be obtained from Great Britain for spoliations on our trade, if considered as a national reparation for a national aggression, is certainly, as I have already stated it, an important object gained by the treaty. But, if it is to be viewed as a money transaction, and its loss as a national loss of money, it will be well to examine, whether in this point of view, viz. of money, we should not be gainers, on the whole, by not carrying the treaty into effect. I have made no objections to that article of the treaty which relates to British debts. Whatever the amount may be, if it is just that we should pay them, it must be just to pay that amount; but when we are examining the situation in which we should be, if we had no treaty, when we are calculating the losses we are to experience by obtaining no compensation for our claims, it is right to consider the amount of those claims, and to compare it with the probable amount of the claims of the other party, and of the sums of money which a non-execution of the treaty, and a refusal on the part of Great Britain to do us justice, to indemnify us for our own losses and to enter into new negociations, would justify us in withholding. That subject has already undergone a full discussion, and I will recall the attention of the committee only to the demand of Great Britain for interest on the British debts. It is well known that our courts have uniformly

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