As far, however, as a vote was taken upon it, a majority of the house appeared in favor of that proceeding. On the 6th of November, 1793, an additional order was issued, the purport of which was, to take and bring to legal adjudication all neutral vessels bound to French ports. This additional evidence of hostility gave rise to three other measures; the one was an embargo for a limited time, which was effected; the second was the suspension of commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain; the third, a sequestration, or rather the arrestation of debts due to British subjects. The proposition for the arrestation of debts, was moved the 27th of March: the proposition for the suspension of intercourse, 7th of April, 1794. On the 4th of April, 1794, the President laid before the House a communication from Mr. Pinckney, minister from the United States to Great Britain, containing a conversation between Mr. Pinckney and Lord Grenville, of a very extraordinary nature, which always appeared to me to be the ground work of the change, which shortly afterwards took place in the conduct of the Executive of the United States towards the House of Representatives."

The part of the communication alluded to, is in the following words.-Extract of a letter from Mr. Pinckney to the secretary of state, dated 9th of January, 1794.

"Lord Grenville answered, that the only reason for renewing them was, lest the present instruction, being a revocation of that of the 6th of November, might also be deemed to revoke the articles which were connected with it. His lordship then explained the motives which had induced this government to issue the present instruction. The first, he said was the sincere desire of administration to maintain the best understanding and harmony with the United States. The second was, what he could not mention to me officially, but what he still thought it right, I should be apprized of, that no misconception of their motives might be entertained; that he was aware of the delica

cy of speaking to a foreign minister concerning the internal state of his country, neither could he expect an answer from me on the subject; but that their second reason was, by this conduct, to take away every pretext, from evil disposed persons among us, who according to the intelligence he had received, were endeavoring to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, and, in short, to reduce us to the present situation of France; a misfortune, which they deprecated, as well for our sakes, as for the common welfare and tranquillity of mankind. He further took occasion to observe, with respect to the conduct of our government, in maintaining our neutrality, that although there were some matters, with which this government was not perfectly satisfied, (and to which, for the same reason, they refrained from giving that opposition they thought they would be justified in doing,) yet, from the general tenor of the conduct of our government, they were convinced, it was their desire to maintain a full neutrality, which was an additional motive for their present conduct."

It is to be remarked, that on the 8th of January, the revocation of the hostile order of the 6th of November took place, and on the next day, after an apology for the acknowledged indelicacy of interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign government, Lord Grenville modestly undertakes to intermeddle with the affairs of the United States. It has always been matter of surprise to me, that the American minister should have listened to such a communication, and still more surprising, that it should have met with a favorable reception in the United States. But the fact is, that on the 19th of April, 1794, the chief justice was taken from the exercise of his judicial duties, and nominated envoy extraordinary to Great Britain, during the pendency of two of the beforementioned propositions in the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives proceeded to pass the bill for the suspension

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of commercial intercourse on the 25th of April, by an uncommonly large majority, and on the 27th of April, the bill was negatived by the senate upon the casting vote of the vice-president. The effect of this vote was a discontinuance of the embargo, and an abandonment. of all the other measures proposed for self-protection. In these acts will be seen, the commencement of what gentlemen call the hostility of departments; but what I shall term the due exercise of the checks, provided by the constitution. And, if it is to be traced to this source, the House of Representatives will evidently appear not to be the aggressor. The House, viewing their measures defeated by the constitutional check, acquiesced in the decision without a murmur. Now we are told, if the House should exercise its constitutional check, a dissolution of the government would necessarily ensue. This conclusion seems to me without foundation, and ought not to be brought into calculation, in estimating the present question.

The treaty itself was concluded on the 28th of October, 1794. It was communicated to this House, the 1st of March, 1796, having on the same day been promulgated by proclamation declaring it to be obligatory.

The treaty originated from an intimation of lord Grenville, which has always excited my apprehension; it was commenced against the known sense of the House of Representatives, and every step of its progression seems to have been marked with peculiar

coercion.

When a British minister undertakes to declare, that the motive for the revocation of a hostile order was, to take away every pretext from evil disposed persons among us, who, according to the intelligence he had received, were endeavoring to irritate our own people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, &c., and to assign the same reason, for refraining from giving that opposition to some exceptionable measures of our government. which he otherwise might have done; and when the

United States so far listen to this language, as immediately to enter into negociation upon the subject, my apprehensions of British interference, of British influence, are strongly excited, particularly when the British minister seems to make a common cause between the two governments against what he is pleased to call evil disposed persons. I will here incidentally remark, that as far as these "evil disposed persons" have produced the revocation of the hostile order of November, and a relaxation of British hostility in other respects, they are certainly entitled to applause from the United States, whatever epithets may have been bestowed upon them by a British minister.

The contents of the treaty have very much confirmed my original apprehensions. Gentlemen have often said, show us the danger of British interference, of British influence. To my mind, the treaty itself contains the evidence, The treaty itself corresponds with what I consider as the object of the British minister in giving the invitation to it.

I find it in the following particular instances. Before the treaty, the right of laying a special, as well as a general embargo existed in the United States: the right of laying a special embargo upon British vessels, is surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of sequestration existed, and the exercise of it was proposed. This right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is forever surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of discriminating against British goods, in favor of those of other nations, existed, and the exercise of it was proposed. This right is surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of suspending commercial intercourse with Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exercised'; the exercise of that right is stipulated against for a limited time, &c. All these are restrictions of the exercise of the rights of national sovereignty, and seem to me complete evidence of British interference.

These circumstances furnish two reflections. The one is, that the British cabinet deem the measures

proposed, to be more efficacious, than they have generally been represented to be in the United States; and hence, the extreme caution to stipulate against the future exercise of them. The other is, that party sensations must have had great influence upon the extraordinary envoy of the United States, to induce his consent to these great abridgments of the rights of national sovereignty. The treaty not only contains abridgments of the national rights, but changes the municipal regulations of the United States: and how have these things been effected?-By the substitution of a foreign power in the place of the House of Representatives. If the treaty-making power be thus extensive, and if it be so absolutely obligatory, as to deprive the House of Representatives of the right of judging as to the expediency of making the provisions for its complete effectuation, of what use is the House of Representatives as a distinct branch of the government? Will it not be a mere formal, and not an efficient branch of the government? An entire new system of jurisprudence may thus be introduced by treaty, and become obligatory upon the House of Representatives-obligatory upon the nation.

Whenever the question, which necessarily results from the unlimited scope given to the treaty-making power, shall be presented to the people of the United States, to wit:-Shall the House of Representatives become a formal, or remain an efficient, branch of the government; they will pause, before they will decide upon its annihilation. Their love of liberty, their love of their own interests, will check, for a moment, personal affections, or antipathies: party sensations, state jealousies will be disarmed, and the people will be found right in their decision.

Even in the midst of the clamor of war and disunion, which has been momentarily excited for a particular object, the people cannot be led to such fatal extremities, as the doctrine contended for would necessarily produce. Much less will this be the case after they