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matter of opinion; and opinions are vastly different upon the subject. A proof of this is drawn from the representations in the state legislatures. In Massachusetts, the assembly consists of about three hundred -in South Carolina, of nearly one hundred-in New York there are sixty-five. It is observed generally, that the number ought to be large; let the gentlemen produce their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me to say what number may be said to be sufficiently large. On one hand, it ought to be considered, that a small number will act with more facility, system and decision: on the other, that a large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a reasonable man, may appear to be as near the proper medium as any number whatever; at least, for the present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon any constructions of the constitution; it is the creation of new states. Vermont, Kentucky and Franklin, will probably become inde pendent; new members of the union will also be formed from the unsettled tracts of western territory. These must be represented, and will all contribute to swell the federal legislature. If the whole number in the United States be, at present, three millions, as is commonly supposed, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have on the first census, a hundred representatives. In ten years, thirty more will be added; and in twenty-five years, the number will double: then, sir, we shall have two hundred, if the increase goes on in the same proportion. The convention of Massachusetts, who made the same objection, have fixed upon this number as the point at which they chose to limit the representation. But can we pronounce with certainty, that it will not be expedient to go beyond this number? We cannot. Experience alone must determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left to the discretion of the legislature, as it will be the interest of the large and in

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creasing states, of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, &c. to augment the representation. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely calculate upon a growing representation, according to the advance of population, and the circumstances of the country.

The state governments possess inherent advantages, which will ever give them an influence and ascendency over the national government; and will for ever preclude the possibility of federal encroachments. That their liberties indeed can be subverted by the federal head, is repugnant to every rule of political calculation. Is not this arrangement then, sir, a most wise and prudent one? Is not the present representation fully adequate to our present exigencies; and sufficient to answer all the purposes of the union? I am persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal government will afford a conclusive

answer.

Many other observations might be made on this subject, but I cannot now pursue them; for I feel myself not a little exhausted: I beg leave, therefore, to waive for the present the further discussion of the question.

On the 21st, Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks as follows :

When I had the honor to address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances which attended the convention, when forming the plan before you. I endeavored to point out to you the principles of accommodation, on which this arrangement was made, and to show that the contending interests of the states led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the second place, I attempted to prove, that, in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree

that there should be a broad democratic branch in the national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is impossible, in the first instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on the subject of government, I rely more on the interests and opinions of men, than on any specu lative parchment provisions whatever. I have found, that constitutions are more or less excellent, as they are more or less agreeable to the natural operation of things. I am therefore disposed not to dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and forms; but to adopt a system, whose principles have been sanctioned by experience, adapt it to the real state of our country, and depend on probable reasonings for its operation and result. I contend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies, afford perfect security, in the present state of things; and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the general convention, will not leave an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the members of Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reasoning upon the subject, there seems to be this fallacy: they suppose that the representative will have no motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty; or on the other, but corruption. They do not reflect, that he is to return to the community; that he is dependent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this rule there are certain conjunctures, when it may be

necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the people have formed. But in the general course of things, the popular views, and even prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers.

All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case. In these, the will of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the laws which control the community, receive their tone and spirit from the public wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined. Here then we may expect the laws to be proportionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy; and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate conformity between the views of the representative and his constituent. If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them. Sir, if I believed that the number would remain at sixtyfive, I confess I should give my vote for an amendment; though in a different form from the one proposed.

The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twenty thousand. I would ask, by what rule or reasoning it is determined, that one man is a better representative for twenty than thirty thousand? At present we have three millions of people; in twenty-five years, we shall have six millions; and in forty years, nine millions: and this is a short period, as it relates to the existence of states. Here then, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have, in forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be true, and if this be a safe representation, why be dissatisfied? Why embarrass the constitution with amendments, that are merely speculative and useless? I agree with the gentleman, that a very small number

might give some color for suspicion: I acknowledge, that ten would be unsafe; on the other hand, a thousand would be too numerous. But I ask him, why will not ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation? This at present appears to be the proper medium. Besides, the president of the United States will be himself the representative of the people. From the competition that ever subsists between the branches of government, the President will be induced to protect their rights, whenever they are invaded by either branch. On whatever side we view this subject, we discover various and powerful checks to the encroachments of Congress. The true and permanent interests of the members are opposed to corruption: their number is vastly too large for easy combination: the rivalship between the houses will for ever prove an insuperable obstacle: the people have an obvious and powerful protection in their state governments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual observation, will be capable of forming and conducting plans of regular opposition. Can we suppose the people's love of liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused into resistance, and the madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow? Sir, the danger is too distant; it is beyond all rational calculation.

It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. In these assemblies, the enemies of the people brought forward their plans of ambition tematically. They were opposed by their enemies, of

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