consider, first, how far it may be necessary; secondly, how far it may be practicable; thirdly, how far it may be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at large, as to the state legislatures; and fourthly, with respect to economy.

First then, is it necessary? I must acknowledge that concur in opinion with those gentlemen who told you, that this branch of revenue was essential to the salvation of the union. It appears to me necessary, in order to secure that punctuality which is requisite in revenue matters. Without punctuality individuals will refuse it that confidence, without which it cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to consider the situation of this country, if unhappily the government were to be deprived of this power. Let us suppose for a moment that one of those great nations that may be unfriendly to us, should take advantage of our weakness, which they will be more ready to do when they know the want of this resource in our government, and should attack us, what forces could we oppose to it? Could we find safety in such forces as we could call out? Could we call forth a sufficient number, either by drafts, or in any other way, to repel a powerful enemy? The inability of the government to raise and support regular troops, would compel us to depend on militia. It would then be necessary to give this power to the government, or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief, that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the United States, it would at once flash conviction on the minds of the citizens, and show them, to their deep regret, the necessity of vesting the government with this power, which alone can enable it to protect the community. I do not wish to frighten the members of this convention into a concession of this power, but to bring to their minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity. If we were secured from the possibility, or the probability of danger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that

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concourse of dangers which may probably arise at remote periods of futurity, nor all those which we have immediately to apprehend; for this would lead me beyond the bounds which I have prescribed to myself, But I will mention one single consideration, drawn from fact itself. I hope to have your attention.

By the treaty between the United States and his most christian majesty, among other things it is stipu lated, that the great principle on which the armed neutrality in Europe was founded, should prevail in case of future wars. The principle is this, that free ships shall make free goods, and that vessels and goods shall be both free from condemnation. Great Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was against her, she held out without acceding to it. It has been considered for some time past, that the flames of war, already kindled, would spread, and that France and England were likely to draw those swords which were so recently put up. This is judged probable. We should not be surprised, in a short time, if we found ourselves as a neutral nation-France being on one side, and Great Britain on the other. Then, what would be the situation of America? She is remote from Europe, and ought not to engage in her politics or wars. The American vessels, if they can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the contending nations. It is a source of wealth which we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, sir, is there not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution, we shall be drawn into the war? If American vessels have French property on board, Great Britain will seize them. By this means, we shall be obliged to relinquish the advantage of a neutral nation, or be engaged in a war. A neutral nation ought to be respec table, or else it will be insulted and attacked. America, in her present impotent situation, would run the risk of being drawn in, as a party in the war, and lose the advantage of being neutral. Should it happen, that the British fleet should be superior, have we not

reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that nation to us and to all the world, that we should be insulted in our own ports, and our vessels seized? But if we be in a respectable situation; if it be known that our government can command the whole resources of the union, we shall be suffered to enjoy the great advantages of carrying on the commerce of the nations at war; for none of them would be willing to add us to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more on this point, there being others which merit your consideration.

The expedient, proposed by the gentlemen opposed to this clause, is, that requisitions shall be made, and if not complied with, in a certain time, that then taxation shall be recurred to. I am clearly convinced, that whenever requisitions shall be made, they will disappoint those who put their trust in them.

One reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of delinquency in others. States will be governed by the motives that actuate individuals.

When a tax law is in operation, in a particular state, every citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to enforce payment, and that every other citizen is performing his duty, will cheerfully discharge his duty; but were it known, that the citizens of one district were not performing their duty, and that it was left to the policy of the government to make them come up with it, the citizens of the other districts would be very supine and careless in making provisions for payment. Our own experience makes the illustration more natural. If requisitions be made on thirteen different states, when one deliberates on the subject, she will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it also. This, sir, has been a principal cause of the inefficacy of requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce the same evil. If the legislatures are to deliberate on this subject, (and the honorable gentleman opposed to this clause, thinks their deliberation necessary,) is it not

presumable, that they will consider peculiar local circumstances? In the general council, on the contrary, the sense of all America will be drawn to a single point. The collective interest of the union at large, will be known and pursued. No local views will be permitted to operate against the general welfare. But when propositions should come before a particular state, there is every reason to believe, that qualifications of the requisitions would be proposed; compliance might be promised, and some instant remittances might be made. This will cause delays, which, in the first instance, will produce disappointment, and produce failures every where else. This, I hope, will be considered with the attention it deserves. The public creditors will be disappointed, and of course, become more pressing. Requisitions will be made for purposes equally pervading all America; but the exertions to make compliances, will probably not be uniform in the states. If requisitions be made for future occasions for putting the states in a condition of military defence, or to repel an invasion, will the exertions be uniform and equal in all the states? Some parts of the United States are more exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert themselves equally? We know that the most exposed will be more immediately interested, and will incur less sacrifices in making exertions. I beg gentlemen to consider, that this argument will apply with most effect to the states which are most defenceless and exposed. The southern states are most exposed, whether we consider their situation, or the smallness of their population. And there are other circumstances which render them still more vulnerable, which do not apply to the northern states. They are therefore more interested in giving the government a power to command the whole strength of the union in cases of emergency. Do not gentlemen conceive that this mode of obtaining supplies from the states, will keep alive animosities between the general government and particular states?

Where the chances of failures are so numerous as thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment, in the ⚫ first place, and consequent animosity, must inevitably take place.

Let us consider the alternatives, proposed by gentlemen, instead of the power of laying direct taxes. After the states shall have refused to comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by Congress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamors will be raised among the people against the government; hatred will be excited against it. It will be regarded as an ignominious stigma on the state. It will be considered at least in this light by the state where the failure is made, and these sentiments will, no doubt, be diffused through the other states. Now let us consider the effect, if collectors are sent where the state governments refuse to comply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition of mankind not to stop at one violation of duty. I conceive that every requisition that will be made on any part of America, will kindle a contention between the delinquent member, and the general government. Is there no reason to suppose divisions in the government (for seldom does any thing pass with unanimity,) on the subject of requisitions? The parts least exposed will oppose those measures which may be adopted for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to presume, that the representatives from the delinquent states will be more likely to foster disobedience to the requisitions of the government, than to endeavor to recommend a compliance with them to the public?

There is, in my opinion, another point of view in which this alternative will produce great evil. I will suppose a case that is very probable, namely, that partial compliances will be made. A difficulty here arises, which fully demonstrates its impolicy. part be paid, and the rest be withheld, how is the general government to proceed? They are to impose a

If a