effectual or productive? Will not the same local interests, and other causes, militate against a compliance? Whoever hopes the contrary must forever be disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause. Let each county in this commonwealth be supposed free and independent: let your revenues depend on requisitions of proportionate quotas from them: let application be made to them repeatedly, and then ask yourself, is it to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate collection could be made from partial compliances? It is now difficult to collect the taxes from them: how much would that difficulty be enhanced, were you to depend solely on their generosity? I appeal to the reason of every gentleman here, and to his candor to say whether he is not persuaded, that the present confederation is as feeble as the government of Virginia would be in that case: to the same reason I appeal, whether it be compatible with prudence to continue a government of such manifest and palpable weakness and inefficiency.

If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind, I undertake to say, that no instance can be produced by the most learned man, of any confederate government, that will justify a continuation of the present system; or that will not, on the contrary, demonstrate the necessity of this change, and of substituting to the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system now under consideration, or one equally energetic. The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies, is, that instead of promoting the public happiness, or securing public tranquillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion-ineffectual for the preservation of harmony, and a prey to their own dissensions and foreign invasions.

The Amphictyonic league resembled our confederation in its nominal powers: it was possessed of rather more efficiency. The component states retained their

sovereignty, and enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our present system, yet it had the same radical defect. Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders, and final destruction. It was compelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to foreign assistance: by complying with that application, and employing his wiles and intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired sufficient influence to become a member of the league; and that artful and insidious prince soon after became master of their liberties.

The Achæan league, though better constructed than the Amphictyonic, in material respects, was continually agitated with domestic dissensions, and driven to the necessity of calling in foreign aid; this also eventuated in the demolition of their confederacy. Had they been more closely united, their people would have been happier; and their united wisdom and strength would not only have rendered unnecessary foreign interpositions in their affairs, but would have enabled them to repel the attack of any enemy. If we descend to more modern examples, we shall find the same evils resulting from the same sources.

all

The Germanic system is neither adequate to the external defence, or internal felicity of the people; the doctrine of quotas and requisitions flourishes here. Without energy-without stability-the empire is a nerveless body. The most furious conflicts, and the most implacable animosities between its members, strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and co-operation are incompatible with such an injudiciously constructed system.

The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced for its stability; but even there, dissensions and wars of

a bloody nature, have been frequently seen between the cantons. A peculiar coincidence of circumstances contributes to the continuance of their political connexion. Their feeble association owes its existence to their singular situation. There is a schism this moment in their confederacy, which, without the necessity of uniting for their external defence, would immediately produce its dissolution.

The confederate government of Holland is a further confirmation of the characteristic imbecility of such governments. From the history of this government we might derive lessons of the most important utility.

[Here Mr. Madison quoted sundry passages from De Witt, respecting the people of Holland, and the war which they had so long supported against the Spanish monarch; showing the impolitic and injudicious structure of their confederacy; that it was entirely destitute of energy, because their revenues depended chiefly on requisitions; that during that long war, the provinces of Guelderland and Overyssel had not paid their respective quotas, but had evaded altogether their payments; in consequence of which, two sevenths of the resources of the community had never been brought into action; nor contributed in the least towards the prosecution of the war: that the fear of pressing danger stimulated Holland and the other provinces to pay all the charges of the war: that those two provinces had continued their delinquencies; that the province of Holland alone paid more than all the rest; still those provinces which paid up their proportional shares, claimed from the failing states the amounts of their arrearages; that the most fatal consequences had nearly resulted from the difficulty of adjusting those claims, and from the extreme aversion of the delinquent states to discharge even their most solemn engagements: that there are existing controversies between the provinces on this account at present; and to add to the evils consequent upon requisitions, that unanimity and the revision and sanc19

VOL. I.

tion of their constituents, were necessary to give validity to the decisions of the states general. He then proceeded,]-Sir, these radical defects in their confederacy must have dissolved their association long ago, were it not for their peculiar position-circumscribed in a narrow territory; surrounded by the most powerful nations in the world; possessing peculiar advantages from their situation; an extensive navigation and a powerful navy-advantages which it was clearly the interest of those nations to diminish or deprive them of. Their late unhappy dissensions were manifestly produced by the vices of their system. We may derive much benefit from the experience of that unhappy country. Governments, destitute of energy, will always produce anarchy. These facts are worthy the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. Does not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lessons drawn from our own experience? I most earnestly pray that America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instructive information she may derive from a contemplation of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a similar fate, by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprung. If the general government is to depend on the voluntary contributions of the states for its support, dismemberment of the United States may be the consequence. In cases of imminent danger, those states alone, more immediately exposed to it, would exert themselves; those remote from it, would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive. The general government ought therefore to be armed with power to defend the whole union.

Must we not suppose, that those parts of America which are most exposed, will first be the scenes of war? Those nations, whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power, and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and wealthy,

must naturally be inclined to exert every means to prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be impelled to attack the most exposed parts of the union? Will not their knowledge of the weakness of our government stimulate them the more readily to such an attack? Those parts to which relief can be afforded with most difficulty, are the extremities of the country, and will be the first objects of our enemies. The general government, having no resources beyond what are adequate to its existing necessities, will not be able to afford any effectual succor to those parts which may be invaded.

In such a case, America must perceive the danger and folly of withholding from the union, a power sufficient to protect the whole territory of the United States. Such an attack is far from improbable, and if it be actually made, it is difficult to conceive a possibility of escaping the catastrophe of a dismemberment. On this subject we may receive an estimable and instructive lesson, from an American confederacy; from an example which has happened in our country, and which applies to us with peculiar force, being most analogous to our situation. I mean that species of association or union which subsisted in New England. The colonies of Massachusetts, Bristol, Connecticut and New Hampshire, were confederated together.

The object of that confederacy was primarily to defend themselves against the inroads and depredations of the Indians. They had a common council, consisting of deputies from each party, with an equality of suffrage in their deliberations. The general expenditures and charges were to be adequately defrayed. Its powers were very similar to those of the confederation. Its history proves clearly, that a government, founded on such principles, must ever disappoint the hopes of those who expect its operations to be conducive to public happiness.

There are facts on record to prove. that instead of