inquiring mind of Hamilton sought to ascertain the reasons for this change. "America once had a representation," he writes to Governor Clinton, "that would do honour to any age or nation. The present falling off is very alarming and dangerous. What is the cause? and how is it to be remedied? are questions that the welfare of these States requires should be well attended to. The great men, who composed our first council-are they dead, have they deserted the cause, or what has become of them? Very few are dead, and still fewer have deserted the cause; they are all, except the few who still remain in Congress, either in the field, or in the civil offices of their respective States; the greater part are engaged in the latter. The only remedy, then, is to take them out of these employments, and return them to the place where their presence is infinitely more important. Each State, in order to promote its own internal government and prosperity, has selected its best members to fill the offices within itself, and conduct its own affairs. Men have been fonder of the emoluments and conveniences of being employed at home; and local attachment, falsely operating, has made them more provident for the particular interests of the States to which they

belong, than for the common interests of the confederacy. This is a most pernicious mistake, and must be corrected. However important it is to give form and efficiency to your interior constitutions and police, it is infinitely more important to have a wise general council; otherwise, a failure of the measures of the Union will overturn all your labours for the advancement of your particular good, and ruin the common cause. You should not beggar the councils of the United States, to enrich the administration of the several members. Realize to yourselves the consequences of having a Congress despised at home and abroad. How can the common force be exerted, if the power of collecting it be put in weak, foolish, and unsteady hands? can we hope for success in our European negotiations, if the nations of Europe have no confidence in the wisdom and vigour of the great Continental government?"

How

Thus early had the difficulties of a federal organization forced themselves on the notice of that keen observer; and already was the young soldier occupied with the problems of the future statesman. Meanwhile, the year 1778 had opened in clouds and darkness on the encampment at Valley Forge.

Famine and pestilence were in the American army; and the numbers of the effective troops were so greatly reduced, that it seems almost certain, that, had they been vigorously attacked by the English, they must have suffered a disastrous defeat. Yet they struggled on through the winter, without yielding to despair, and the month of May brought them the important intelligence, that a treaty of defensive alliance had been concluded between France and the United States. The news revived the drooping spirits of the Americans, and was received, throughout the country, with solemn thanksgivings and public rejoicings.

It might, indeed, have been anticipated. From the first, France had secretly encouraged the revolution; and, long before the breaking out of actual war, had been preparing to use the colonies as an instrument of aggression against Great Britain. It now rests on the unquestionable evidence of original documents, that, as far back as 1766, the Duke de Choiseul was sending agents to America, "for the purpose of putting the king in a condition to be able to undertake useful operations against his enemies ;" and that he constantly impressed on the French ambassadors in London, to keep him

regularly informed on American affairs, with a view to the ultimate dismemberment of the British empire. The same policy seems to have been taken up by the Count de Vergennes in 1775, though at first with considerable caution. While assuring the English government, "that the king's inclination, as well as a sense of justice, would prevent his majesty from ever favouring the troubles in America," he had a secret agent at Philadelphia, in direct communication with Franklin and the leaders of the colonists. This agent was to hold out hopes, without giving any definite promises, so as to leave France at liberty to take advantage of events. And in a paper drawn up by the Count de Vergennes himself, in 1776, to be laid before the king, it is assumed, as a matter of course, that the interests of France and Spain, and those of humanity in general, must be served by the injury and humiliation of England; and it is recommended, that the English ministry be kept in ignorance of the intentions of the French government, but that the insurgents be clandestinely supplied with money and military stores, and that France proceed to arm as quietly and circumspectly as possible.

There can be no doubt that this treacherous and

unworthy policy was inspired solely by hatred of England, and not in the slightest degree by love of American freedom. Yet a claim has often since been made on the gratitude of America, as though she were under lasting obligations to the chivalrous generosity of France. The truth is, that the French government, which had never forgiven the loss of Canada, saw an opportunity of taking revenge on an old rival, and had not the virtue or magnanimity to forego it. The Americans profited by assistance which was to them of the utmost value; but the wisest amongst them detected the motives of their new allies, and received the services rendered with the caution and suspicion they deserved.

However, as far as England was concerned, France had now thrown off the mask, and a French fleet was on its way to America. Meanwhile, Sir William Howe had been recalled, and Sir Henry Clinton was left in command at Philadelphia. He resolved to evactuate the city, and to remove his army to the neighbourhood of New York. Washington had intelligence of the march, and hastened to follow on his track. General Charles Lee, who had lately been released from his captivity (having been exchanged for General Prescott), and who appears to