Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological FormsCambridge University Press, 2007 M11 5 The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. In personal, social, and economic exchange, as studied in two-person games, cooperation exceeds the prediction of traditional game theory. This book relates these two findings to field studies and applications and integrates them with the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the thoughts of F. A. Hayek: through emergent socio-economic institutions and cultural norms, people achieve ends that are unintended and poorly understood. In cultural changes, the role of constructivism, or reason, is to provide variation, and the role of ecological processes is to select the norms and institutions that serve the fitness needs of societies. |
Contenido
| 1 | |
| 13 | |
IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE THE EXTENDED ORDER OF THE MARKET | 43 |
PERSONAL EXCHANGE THE EXTERNAL ORDER OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE | 189 |
ORDER AND RATIONALITY IN METHOD AND MIND | 281 |
References | 329 |
| 353 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Vernon L. Smith Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |
Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Vernon L. Smith Sin vista previa disponible - 2009 |
Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Vernon L. Smith Sin vista previa disponible - 2007 |
Términos y frases comunes
agents allocation anonymity assumptions asymmetric information backward induction behavior bidders brain buyers Camerer Chapter choice choose combinatorial auction competitive constructivist context convergence cooperation cultural decision demand dictator game dominant double auction double blind ecologically rational economists effect efficient emergent English auction environment equilibrium error example experimental economics experiments extensive form games fail firm game theory game tree game-theoretic Hayek human sociality hypothesis implies important incentive increases individual institutions interpretation investment knowledge laboratory learning maximize McCabe mechanism motivated Neuroeconomics norms observed offer one-shot opportunity cost optimal outcomes pairs payoff percent player predictions preferences problem procedures profit protocols reciprocity repeat interaction replicate reported response retail reward rules sellers single-play Smith social exchange stakes strategic subjects theoretical theorists tion trade treatment trust game two-person ultimatum game utility yield
Pasajes populares
Página 14 - DIVISION of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility — the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
Página 14 - It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their selflove ; and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.
Página 19 - Was, by their happy Influence, Made Friends with Vice: And ever since, The worst of all the Multitude Did something for the Common Good.
Página 14 - As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.
Referencias a este libro
Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization: Electricity Regulation ... L. Lynne Kiesling Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |