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Bank of the United States--Renewal of Charter.

[22d CONG. 1st SESS.

citizens of the country would be fraught with the most pernicious consequences.

whatever may be their professions, will be sufficient to satisfy any reflecting mind that all the evil consequences of corruption would flow from its exercise. Have not In the first place, it is a business to which, in the very our political contests too frequently degenerated into a nature of things, no Government is adapted, and, least of selfish scramble for the offices of the country? Are there all, a popular Government. There is no employment of not those who sincerely and honestly believe that these capital that requires a more vigilant and skilful superinoffices are legitimate objects of political warfare, and the tendence. Nothing but the ever active motive of indivirightful reward of the victorious party? And, disinterest-dual interest can supply the watchfulness necessary to seed and patriotic as the great body of every political party cure a banking institution against the grossest frauds and is admitted to be, the fact is no less true than it is lamenta-impositions. In pecuniary transactions, few men are to ble, that the most devoted and active partisans are very be found who will serve others, in cases involving the exoften mere soldiers of fortune, who watch the political signs, and enlist, at the eleventh hour, under the banners of the party most likely to prove successful. Such being, more or less, the composition of all political parties, what would be the probable use made of fifty millions of bank patronage, by a political party which conscientiously held the doctrine that all the offices in the gift of the Executive should be divided among the partisans of a successful political leader? Would not the same principle be even All Governments have found it expedient to place the more applicable to bank loans? And would not the Trea- public treasury under the guardianship of a high and consury of the United States, under the sanctifying influence fidential officer, aided, in the enforcement of a rigid of party delusion and party infatuation, be literally plun-responsibility, by a system of checks and counterchecks, dered by mercenary retainers, bankrupts in fortune, and operating upon all the subordinate officers concerned in adventurers in politics? collecting and disbursing the public revenue. Such is

ercise of discretionary power, with the same fidelity that they would serve themselves; and when we consider the strong motives, both of private friendship and political attachment, which would operate on the directors of a Government bank to bestow its favors without impartiality or prudence, it requires but little sagacity to foresee that enormous losses would be annually sustained by the insolvency of the Government debtors.

Even if the administration should be ever so much dis-our own system. No discretion is vested in the chief offiposed to restrain the abuse of this patronage, it would be cer of the treasury, much less in those that are subordiutterly impracticable to exercise any efficient control over nate, in the appropriation of a single dollar of the public the great number of bank directors who would be scatter-money. "No money can be drawn from the treasury, ed over the Union, and who, upon all the known principles of human nature, it may be confidently predicted, would principally consist of busy and officious political partisans.

but in consequence of appropriations made by law." How far these wise and provident safeguards, and this constitutional barrier, would be prostrated by placing not only the public revenue, but the public credit, at the disposal of some hundreds of bank directors in various parts of the Union, is a very grave question for the consideration of the House.

Such would be the depositaries-acting, not under the public eye, but under the protecting mystery of a sort of concealment and secrecy deemed indispensable in banking operations-to whom not only the whole treasury of the Our own experience has demonstrated the great danger Union would be confided, to be squandered, perhaps, in of having large masses of the community indebted to the profligate favoritism, but the tremendous power of putting Government. It was a deep conviction of this danger the whole property of the nation under mortgage, for the that induced Congress to abolish the system of credit sales redemption of the bills issued at their discretion. To say in the disposition of the public lands. Congress has been nothing of the utter insecurity of the public revenues un-compelled to yield to the pressing importunities of the der such a system, a new species of legislative power, purchasers of these lands, by granting them not only reunknown to the constitution, would be committed to peated indulgences, but by remitting some millions of the these irresponsible bank directors, of which no human debt. What, then, would be the situation of the Governsagacity can predict the consequences. ment, with a debt of fifty millions diffused throughout the A just analysis of the operation of granting loans by country, and due to it from the most active, enterprising, this Government bank in exchange for the notes of private and influential classes of the community? Nothing that individuals, will show that it involves the exercise, on the has not happened can be more certain, than that every unpart of the directors, of the twofold power of appropriat- favorable vicissitude in trade, every period of commercial ing the public revenue in the most dangerous of all forms distress and embarrassment, would give rise to importu--discretionary loans--and of pledging the responsibility nate and clamorous calls for indulgence, and for an injudiof the Government, to an unlimited extent, for the pay- cious extension of discounts, which no administration ment of the debts at the same time created against it. would have the firmness to resist. Every one who has These are among the highest functions of legislative power, witnessed the urgency and unanimity with which the reand have been expressly and exclusively vested in Con-presentatives of the States indebted for public lands have gress. Unless, therefore, it be assumed that Congress pressed the claims of their citizens for indulgence and may rightfully transfer the powers with which it is invest- remission, must be satisfied that, if the citizens of all the ed to these bank directors, it will be difficult to find any States should become indebted much more largely for warrant, either in the letter or spirit of the constitution, bank loans, the Government would have scarcely any fafor the creation of this tremendous engine of pecuniary culty of resistance when appeals for indulgence should influence. It may, indeed, be doubted whether all the come from all quarters of the Union, sustained by the branches of the legislative authority united have any con- strong plea of public distress and embarrassment. stitutional power to lend the public revenue, either to individuals, corporations, or States, without reference to the objects to which it shall be applied. But, whatever may be the power of Congress on this subject, it appears to the committee to be inexpedient, in every view of the question, that the Government should be converted into a great money lender. There is no species of trade in which it would be wise for the Government to embark; but of all the variety of pursuits known to human enterprise, that of lending money by the Government to the

The policy of extending indulgence to the public debtors, and of granting more liberal loans to the community, would, in the natural course of things, become the favorite theme of those who aspired to popular favor. Political parties would come to be divided upon the question of observing towards the public debtors a strict banking policy, indispensable to the maintenance of specie payments on the one hand, or a liberal Government policy, necessarily involving a suspension of specie payments, on the other. And when it is considered that the whole class of

22d CoNG. 1st SESS.]

Bank of the United States--Renewal of Charter.

debtors, always the most numerous and active portion of change between the various points of the country, was the community, would be naturally in favor of increasing evidently produced by the bank. The advantages probank issues, and extending bank indulgences, it can duced by this institution in the intercourse between the scarcely be doubted that specie payments would be sus- Western and Atlantic States, can be duly appreciated only pended in the first great pecuniary exigency, growing by one who sees passing before him the actual operation out of embarrassments in our commerce, or deficiencies in

our revenue.

of the system of exchange it has created. For example, Lexington, in Kentucky, annually accumulates a large surplus of funds to her credit in Charleston, derived from the sale of horses, hogs, and other live stock, driven to that as well as to other Southern markets by her citizens. Philadelphia is indebted to Charleston for exchange remitted, dividends on bank stock, &c.; and Lexington is indebted to Philadelphia for merchandise. Without the These evils, which would be so highly probable in time transportation of a single piece of coin, Lexington draws of peace, would be almost certain in the event of war. on Charleston, and remits the check to Philadelphis in The temptation to supply the federal treasury by the payment of her debt there, which operation adjusts the easy process of bank issues, rather than resort to the un- balance between the three points of the triangle almost popular process of internal taxation, would be too fasci- without expense or trouble. Could such facilities be ob nating to be resisted. We should thus experience, what tained from any other than an institution having branches every nation has experienced in like circumstances, the in different parts of the Union, acting as copartners in manifold evils of a mere paper currency, having no rela- one concern Local banks, whatever might be their wiltion to any standard of intrinsic value. In these views the lingness, could not accommodate in the same manner and committee are fully sustained by the opinion of Mr. to a like extent."

The Government, therefore, which is under the most sacred obligations to constrain all the banks to maintain specie payments, with a view to the uniformity and soundness of the currency, would, by its own example, perpetuate the great national evil of a fluctuating and depreciating circulating medium.

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Lowndes, expressed in 1819. These are his words: "The discounting of bills on the low terms established That the destruction of the [United States'] Bank would by the branch bank at this place, is a great benefit to the be followed by the establishment of paper money, he firm-agricultural interest, particularly in enhancing the price ly believed; he might almost say, he knew. It was an ex-of cotton and rice; and were the bank to stop its operations, tremity from which the House would recoil, if now pro- there is no saying how far these staples would be depress posed; but if the resolution on the table were passed, it ed. The private dealers in exchange would take the would very soon be proposed. The subject was too large place of the bank in that business, and their profits on bills for an incidental discussion. Gentlemen thought the would be taken out of the pockets of the planters, as the amount of Government paper might be limited, and depreciation prevented, by the rate of interest which should be exacted. Inadequate every where, the security was particularly ineffectual in the United States."

But the inevitable tendency of a Government bank to involve the country in a paper system, is not, in the opinion of the committee, the greatest objection to it. The powerful, and, in the hands of a bad administration, the irresistible and corrupting influence which it would exercise over the elections of the country, constitutes an objection more împosing than all others united. No matter by what means an administration might get into power, with such a tremendous engine in their hands, it would be almost impossible to displace them without some miraculous interposition of Providence.

merchants would always regulate the price they would
give for an agricultural production, by the high or low
rate at which they could negotiate their bills. On ac-
count of its connexion with all parts of the Union, the
bank affords this important advantage to the public: it is
always a purchaser and always a seller of exchange at fix-
ed and low rates, and thus prevents extortion by private
dealers."
"Before this bank went

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into operation, exchange was from eight to ten per cent. either for or against Charleston, which was a loss to the planter to that amount on all the produce of Georgia and South Carolina, and indeed you might say, all the produce of the Southern and Western States."

"If the Bank of the United States were destroyed, the local banks would again issue their paper to an excessive Deeply impressed with the conviction that the weak amount; and while a few adventurous speculators would point of a free Government is the absorbing tendency of be much benefited by such an issue, the honest and unExecutive patronage, and sincerely believing that the pro-suspecting citizens of our country would, finally, be the posed bank would invest that branch of the Government losers. If we look back to what took place in New York, with a weight of moneyed influence more dangerous in its Pennsylvania, the Western States, and even in our own character, and more powerful in its operation, than the State, we shall see the grossest impositions committed by entire mass of its present patronage, the committee have banks, commencing with a few thousand dollars in specie, felt that they were imperiously called upon, by the high-buying up newspapers to puff them as specie-paying est considerations of public duty, to express the views banks, in order to delude the public, and, after getting they have presented, with a frankness and freedom de- their bills in circulation, blowing up, and leaving the unmanded by the occasion. It is, at the same time, due to suspecting planter and farmer victims of a fraud, by their own feelings, that they should state unequivocally which they were deprived of the hard earnings of years their conviction that the suggestion of the Chief Magis- of honest industry. But, sir, I believe the bank owes a trate, which they have thus freely examined, proceeded great deal of the opposition which exists, and has existed, from motives of the most disinterested patriotism, and was to the fact that it has put down these fraudulent instituexclusively designed to promote the welfare of the coun- tions, got up by combinations and conspiracies of specu try. This is not the mere formal and heartless homage, sometimes offered up to official station, either from courtesy or interest, but a tribute which is eminently due, and cheerfully rendered, to the exalted character of the distinguished individual on whom it is bestowed.

lators, and who, after receiving large dividends, managed to destroy the credit of their own paper, and, by the agency of brokers, bought it up at half its nominal value.

"Since I last wrote you, I had a conversation with a gentleman in the confidence of some of the moneyed men Extract of a letter from an intelligent merchant in Charles-up the United States' Bank, to enable them to use their of the North; and he says they are determined to break ton, South Carolina, to the chairman of the Committee of money to advantage, as that institution gives so many faWays and Means, illustrating the exchange operations of cilities to the community, as to deprive them of their the Bank of the United States. former profits."

"This effect of diminishing the vast difference of ex

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"There is another consideration: the distress would be

Bank of the United States-Renewal of Charter.

[22d CoNG. 1st SESS.

immense, which a refusal to renew the charter would pro-vor of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they duce among those who are indebted to the institution; for are clearly misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the I find that to this branch the planters owe upwards of a constitution has placed a check in the negative of the million of dollars, and, I have no hesitation in saying, as President." The opinion of Mr. Jefferson upon this leadsafe a debt as is owing to any bank in the Union. But if ing measure of the then dominant party in Congress, the bank should wind up its affairs, these planters could expresses so fully our views on the constitutional point, not get credit from other institutions; and as the bank that it is herewith appended, and made a part of this recan sue in the United States' court, where judgment is port. In confirmation of the principles therein containobtained almost at once, property would be greatly de-ed, and which we believe governed the republican party pressed, and moneyed men would buy it up for half its in those times, who awfully feared that construction and value. Throughout the Union, all classes would suffer, implication would do away the restraints which the conexcept those who should hold up their money to go into stitution had imposed upon Congress, (and, there is too the brokerage business, or buy property at a sacrifice. If too much reason to think, has of late been the case,) we I were sure the bank would not be rechartered, I would see Mr. Madison then standing by the side of Mr. Jefferconvert my property into money, with a view of dealing son, the foremost and boldest in debate in the House of in exchange. I could make a vast fortune by it."

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, February 9, 1832.

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.

The undersigned, differing from the majority of the Committee of Ways and Means in their report of a bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States, ask leave to submit the views which they entertain upon a subject of so much importance to the general interest of the American people.

Representatives, denouncing the incorporation of the bank, in the following strong, emphatic terms: "That it was condemned by the silence of the constitution; condemned by the rule of interpretation arising out of the constitution; condemned by its tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the constitution; condemned by the exposition of the friends of the constitution, whilst depending before the public; condemned by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified the constitution; condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves to the constitution; and he hoped it would receive its final condemnation by the vote of the House."

The question of establishing a national bank has been, from the commencement of the Government down to the present time, deemed, by many of the wisest and best If it be claimed for the decision of this question at that of men, an unconstitutional exercise of power, and of ex-day, that it was made by the patriots of the revolution, tremely doubtful policy. and the sages of the federal convention, with WashingWe cannot concede the principle that the constitution ton at their head, something is also due to the opinion of of the country should change with the change of political those who, differing from them, were equally patriots of parties, when clearly understood; nor be broken down by the revolution and members of the federal convention; the array of legal decisions, and the names of great men, the latter, believing that the constitution was a grant of spewhose opinions may vary, from time to time, according cific powers, saw at once that this fatal admission, dependIt was designed for a far nobler pur- ing upon construction altogether, would lead to others pose a safeguard and guaranty of rights on the part of still more dangerous, and finally end in consolidation, or the weak, against the oppressions of the strong. a Government unlimited as the Parliament of Great BriIn this point of view, we have looked upon it as an in-tain. The tendency seemed to be to give that form and strument of delegated powers only, conferring nothing structure to the Federal Government in a course of legismore than what is expressly granted upon its face, or lation, which had failed to be adopted in convention, and clearly necessary to carry into effect any one of the speci- this they most fearfully apprehended; not without cause, fied powers. According to this rule, which, it is believ-for we find the alien and sedition laws were afterwards ed, all parties concur in admitting to be the true one of passed, deriving their existence from the same power of Construction, we propose to test the establishment of a implication so justly condemned by the American people

to circumstances.

national bank.

as acts of usurpation, as to have resulted in the election of Mr. Jefferson. Fortunately for the country, these were acts affecting the rights of person and the liberty of speech and of the press, in which were seen more clearly the injustice and oppression than the bank charter, which indirectly operated upon them to an injurious extent, under the specious pretence of dispensing benefits.

We find, soon after the Government went into operation, the question came up for decision, and may be said to have formed the first line of distinction between the two great political parties at that day, usually denominated federal and republican. And although President Washington signed the first bill chartering the Bank of the United States, it was under such circumstances as by no means to claim for it a clear authority, settling the con- a stitutional difficulty.

Accordingly, in 1811, when the bank came forward for renewal of its charter, the same party which brought Mr. Jefferson into the administration, and continued Mr. After the subject had been debated in both Houses of Madison, was found opposing the application upon the Congress, it was a matter of grave deliberation with the very same grounds taken in 1791, which resulted in its then cabinet; so much so, that the President was brought rejection.

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to pause: and not till the last moment allowed by the con- The war immediately following, the Government was stitution for the approval, did he give it his official sanc-enabled to prosecute it to a successful issue without the tion. It is well known, at that day, that his cabinet was aid of the bank, under the most disadvantageous circumequally divided upon the question-Mr. Jefferson and stances, being illy prepared for such a contest, and against Mr. Randolph opposing it upon constitutional grounds, the united strength of the opposition, who had recently and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Knox supporting the power. been defeated in this their most favorite measure. That In this state of things do we find him signing the charter, a bank would have added facilities to the Government in which perhaps he should have done, according to the rule carrying on the operations of the war, may be granted, suggested by Mr. Jefferson, "that unless the President's without giving any weight to the argument in the absence mind, on a view of every thing which is urged for and of a power authorizing its establishment. It is believed, against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized however, like the rest of the banks, it would have been by the constitution, if the pro and con hang so even as to compelled to have suspended specie payments, and been balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of found inadequate towards reducing the rate of exchange, the Legislature would naturally decide the balance in fa- or correcting the then depreciated state of the currency.

Vol. VIII-t

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Bank of the United States--Renewal of Charter.

If, after so short a period, when going into operation in the year 1818, with eight millions and upwards of Government deposites, the bank was almost reduced to the necessity of stopping specie payments, how can it be expected to stand the shock of a general depreciation of currency, which a state of war must always bring upon the country? The nation itself, with all its resources, was unable to escape the calamity, and its credit was reduced much lower than many of these local institutions.

treasury to do, by refusing, in the collection of the revenue, the notes of all banks failing to pay specie; which would prove as salutary a check against excessive issues as any supposed agency of the bank, and is the only right ful control which the Government should exercise over such local institutions of the States. To say that you can, by the application of a principle in this way, restrain their power, is to say that you can destroy them altogether. We have seen the president of the bank, upon the interrogatory put to him, "Has the bank, at any time, oppressed any of the State banks?" after answering negatively, affirming the fact, that "there are very few banks which might not have been destroyed by an exertion of the power of the bank."

We do not mean to go into all the reasoning which, at different times and in different places, has been employed to disprove arguments founded on implication in favor of the constitutionality of the bank. This has been so often done, and it is so well understood, that it will be merely sufficient to state the positions, and leave the deductions to be drawn out by the investigating mind.

Such appears to have been the history of the bank up to the period of 1816, when it was last chartered, and the particular circumstances of the times operating upon it whenever brought to the consideration of Congress; and although the Supreme Court of the United States has since decided in favor of its constitutionality, it is an authority resting entirely upon the principles of 1791, which first brought it into existence, but afterwards repudiated; and is, therefore, entitled to that weight alone which reason and argument can furnish. We are not responsible for the change of opinion in men upon questions of great political importance, leaving the decision at all times to their conscience and their country. But we do not re- It is admitted by all parties that the constitution is not cognise any precedent, either legislative or judicial, as only a grant of enumerated, but limited powers, to a cersettling what we conceive to be a fundamental principle, tain extent; that nothing is conferred, but what is express nowhere found in the constitution itself, nor fairly dedu-ly given, or clearly necessary to the execution of a given cible from it by any legitimate rule of interpretation. It is a fact worthy of remark, that at every period when the question arose for chartering a Bank of the United States, it was after the country had experienced all the evils of a depreciated currency, and was just returning to a wholesome circulation. The continental paper money brought into existence the North American Bank; the funding system and the assumption act, that of the first Bank of the United States; and the depreciated paper money at the close of the late war, the present institution. Like causes will always produce like effects; and what has occurred to the Bank of England may be considered as applicable to any Bank of the United States, under similar circumstances. In 1797, a run was made upon the Bank of England. It applied to Government, its greatest creditor, for relief. Mr. Pitt had no money, but gave an order restricting the bank from paying its notes in gold. This order was extended six months after a general peace, and continued a quarter of a century afterwards.

power. With this view, and to satisfy those who opposed the ratification upon the ground that all power would be assumed, unless further restrained, was the tenth amend ment adopted, which declares, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Crawford, on that provision to lay and collect taxes."

It is not pretended by any one to affirm that there is a distinct, substantive power in the constitution to create a corporation, or to establish a bank with corporate powers; yet it is claimed as one of the necessary means to effectuate a given purpose in the constitution. We are naturally led to inquire, in the first place, what is the end to be accomplished, in order to determine whether the mears are appropriate. It is said you have the power to raise and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare war; to coin money, and regulate the value thereof. We admit that these are all specific grants of power, but should like to know upon which of them From the general derangement of the circulating medi- it is intended, at this time, to locate the bank. It was um, during the war, and the low state to which the cre- very happily and forcibly said by a Senator, in debate dit of the Government had sunk, the expedient was again upon this question in 1811, (Mr. Clay,) that "this va resorted to, upon the recommendation of the Secretary grant power to erect a bank, after having wandered of the Treasury, of establishing a national bank, which, throughout the whole constitution in quest of some conafter passing both branches of the Legislature, was re-genial spot to fasten upon, has been at length located by turned by Mr. Madison, with his objections. It was renewed in 1816, after peace, and received his sanction. The condition of the currency at that time, and the It cannot be necessary now to raise money by taxation; ́great losses sustained by the treasury in the collection of nor to borrow, having more than we could wish; nor to the revenue, it is believed, induced many to surrender regulate commerce, which, if left to individual enterprise, up opinions previously entertained in regard to the esta- will regulate itself without any such agency, under the blishment of a national bank, to the supposed necessity rules which have been prescribed by law; nor to declare of the case, and public opinion. The danger was, how-war and raise armies; and we humbly conceive it is not ever, over, and these evils would have been corrected in necessary to the power to coin money, and regulate the a short time by commerce and internal trade resuming value thereof. The question to be determined by every their accustomed channels. The great credit that is at-rational mind, is, whether the bank can be considered, in tributed to the United States' Bank in causing specie pay- the common acceptation of the words, "necessary and ments to be restored by the local institutions, is by no proper," as an adjunct, to carry into effect any of the above means merited to the extent generally claimed for it. objects; not that it is more convenient, more useful, or more The arrangement of the banks in the several States of the needful than another which is ordinarily adopted. A corpo Union, with this view, at a stated period shortly after ration is said to be one of the lowest attribute appertain peace, together with the compulsory process of some of ing to sovereignty, and classed among the incidents of a the States, aided by the joint resolution of the two Houses power. We think it of a much higher order, originating of Congress instructing the Secretary of the Treasury from the very source of sovereignty itself, and must be to receive only the notes of specie-paying banks for all considered as a distinct, substantive power, and not one debts to the Government, brought about this result even of the attributes belonging to every power. It resides in before the United States' Bank was fairly in operation. the King of England, although not exclusively. The so This it is at all times competent for the officer of the vereignty here belongs to the people, except that portion

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Bank of the United States--Renewal of Charter.

[22d CONG. 1st SESS.

of it which they have transferred to the Federal Govern- pose" than the law to protect the Post Office Department ment. Corporations are viewed with distrust by all Go- from robbers and assassins; which, if it is not stained with vernments, and properly denominated in law as bodies as much blood, is marked with as cruel imprisonment without souls. They are invested with exclusive privi- against the counterfeiting of its notes, and, in our opinion, leges beyond the rest of society, permitted to hold pro-illegal orders, otherwise called drafts? And this brings us perty in mortmain, and may be so constituted as to change to ask, where is the power obtained to punish for counthe course of descents in the several States, so far as their terfeiting the notes of the Bank of the United States? corporate character is concerned; and so protected with Now, mark the difference between the "more humble the panoply of the Legislature and the judiciary, that purpose" of creating this corporation, and the incidental their rights are held inviolable, and not to be reached by power of punishment under the Post Office law. The law without their consent. It is all this, and even more; power to punish is derived incidentally from the right to and yet we are told that it is the mere incident, the ne-establish the office or road. The power to create the corcessary mean to carry into effect one of the principal poration is said to be incidental to some other power, and powers. then the power to punish is incident to that: so, we have Let us trace the extent to which this doctrine leads, and the incident of an incident to a power, carrying with it see if it be not subversive of every limitation placed upon the right of punishing with death or imprisonment. So Congress by the grant of delegated powers. far then from being the less, it becomes the greater powYou have the power to regulate commerce. Accord-er, and makes the less equal the greater. ing to the opinion of some, that authorizes you to protect manufactures; the best mean, that is, the necessary and proper mean, is an act of incorporation; therefore, it is constitutional to protect manufactures by an act of incorporation; and every such company now in the United States may, with equal propriety, apply to Congress for an act of incorporation, as the stockholders of the bank, who, to a certain extent, are nothing but traders and dealers in paper money independent of the fiscal operations of the Government. Again: it may be considered, in the wisdom of our legislation, that Congress has power to colonize the free people of color: certainly the most necessary, the most convenient and proper way would be to incorporate at once the Colonization Society, and vest your funds there, which could be better managed for the purpose. What is there to prevent Congress from incorporating every internal improvement company, and becoming part stock owner, holding out, as it does, a more convenient, responsible, and economical mean in the disbursement of public moneys, than any which has heretofore been used? Why, nothing but to raise this power from an incident, where it has been placed by the Supreme Court in the decision of the bank, in the case of McCulloch against the State of Maryland, and consider it as a principal which there is strong reason to believe was intended by the framers of the constitution excluding it from the instrument. Even as a mean, we think it a strained construction to erect a corporation, to execute any one of the enumerated powers which can be carried on without it, though, perhaps, not quite so well.

It is laid down in the report of the Committee of Ways and Means upon this subject, made in 1830, that, "if Congress, under the authority to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in all or any of the departments of the Government, may rightfully pass a law inflicting the punishment of death, without any other authority, it is difficult to conceive why it may not pass a law, under the same authority, for the more humble purpose of creating a corporation." Now, let us see how the parallel runs: In the first place there should be a fitness, a due relationship, between the power and the incident to justify it. It has been likened to the power to establish post offices and post roads," by which you undertake to pass a law punishing, with death or imprisonment, the robbing or stopping of the United States' mail. Every one must see that your law establish ing post offices and post roads would fail to be executed without a power to punish for its violation, and no one has ever denied but that it was a necessary and proper mean to execute the end. But not so to collect and disburse the revenue, to borrow money, &c., because all these can be done through the simple agency of your Treasury Department without the aid of the bank. But is the creation of this corporation a "more humble pur

Under the law establishing the North American Bank, no power was attempted to be exercised providing against counterfeiting its notes or seal, deeming it unauthorized by the articles of confederation. We find in the constitution the power given "to coin money, and regulate the value thereof;" it was not even left to implication, as it might have been fairly done, to provide against counterfeiting and debasing the same. But, from the great necessity of the case, and out of abundant caution, knowing that the power did not exist during the confederation, did the convention insert the clause also "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States." A bank note is neither a Government security, nor current coin; and, therefore, without this provision of the constitution, it is the creature of the corporation itself, and must, therefore, look to that for protection. To give protection, it should be shown to be a principal, substantive power in the constitution, which cannot be done, as it is nowhere among the enumerated articles.

These views are applicable to every branch of the subject depending upon construction and implication; and it is, therefore, deemed unnecessary to press them further. It is, however, a little strange to think that, after ransacking all the powers of the constitution, under which to locate this incident, as it is called, it is at last found to reside under the power "to coin money, and regulate the value thereof." Now, what is the plain meaning of all this? Has not this power executed itself, long since, without the aid of a bank or corporation? Nor is either necessary for the purpose. Coin is a term known all over the world as applicable to metallic substances as money, in contradistinction of paper. Who ever heard of a mint coining paper? It is a generic term, of which there are different species, and paper is but the representative of money. It is capable of division and subdivision into aliquot parts, and the proper business of regulation is to say of what each part shall consist. This has been the interpretation of the clause under consideration, from the foundation of the Government down to the present time, and the necessary laws made in pursuance thereof. A committee of this House has been raised, the present session, to regulate the value of "coin;" and I am sure they do not mean to do so by a bank charter, or an act of incorporation: for these are the measures the Committee of Ways and Means have to consider, which are separate and distinct from the regulation of the current coin. The incident here, then, does not follow the principal.

If the States are authorized to establish banks, and issue paper founded on a specie basis, and thereby vitiate the circulating medium, by stopping payment, or over-issues, it does not follow that you have the right to control them, by substituting the same currency, which is liable to the same consequences. Your power, under the constitution, must be perfect; and if it be the State banks you design

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