1

the field."

little call for it. We have heard that Ber- | army, whether in rank or merit, and upwards trand, at St. Helena, set much store by an of 10,000 soldiers, fell or retired wounded from opera-glass through which Napoleon had discovered the English general at Waterloo. We believe that neither the Duke nor his staff succeeded at any moment of the action in identifying the person or exact position of his great opponent, though few great battles have brought rival leaders so near. That our chief was everywhere except in the rear is well known; and the casualties among his own staff, of whom many were hit at his side, bespeak the hot service he went through. Danger pursued him to the last. After sixteen hours in the saddle, he was alighting at his own quarters, when the spirited animal, long afterwards a pensioner in the paddocks of Strathfieldsaye, as if conscious of the termination of his labours, jerked out his heels in a fashion which a slight change of direction might have made fatal to his late rider. Such an exploit would have rendered poor Copenhagen rather more famous than the little gentleman in black velvet, so often toasted in our Jacobite revels of the last century. That the two allied nations should be altogether agreed as to the apportionment of the glory of the day was not to be expected. It is clear, to the lasting honour of both, that whatever feelings may have since grown up on this subject, none interfered for a moment with the cordiality of their subsequent operations. Blücher had none of the jealousies to contend with which had frequently embarrassed him when acting with Russians and Swedes; and any difficulties arising out of the diverging lines of communication with their resources, only served to show the goodwill and determination with which they were met by the commanders of the two armies. The following passage from a Prussian pen will show that just national pride is not always inconsistent with candour:

Prussians, that their loss on the 18th has We may here remark, in justice to the been greatly underrated by many writers. Pringle, among others, counts it at 700 men. The Prussian returns are given in Plotho's Appendix:† that of killed and wounded for the 4th corps alone shows a loss of 5000, of which 1250 were killed. This bloody struggle occurred principally in the village of Planchenoit, the capture of which is compared by the Prussians with that of Blenheim in the battle of Hochtsett. It is a part of the action which has been little noticed, but was creditable alike to French and Prussians. The vil、 lage was stormed and retaken three times. We think that the entire loss of the Prussian army on the 18th could hardly have been less than 7000, at which their authorities compute it. Especial credit is due to Thielman, who, during the day of the 18th, resisted the obstinate endeavours of Grouchy's far superior force to cross the Dyle at Wavres. Grouchy, indeed, effected towards evening the passage of that river at Limales, but too late for his purpose of dividing the Prussian army, or forcing Blücher to concentrate his force, and abandon his allies. We know not which most to admire, the determination of Blucher to redeem his pledge of succour to Wellington, or the gallantry with which Thielman enabled Blücher to carry this resolution into effect, protecting at once the flank and rear of the Prussian army, guarding one road of direct access to Brussels itself, and preventing Grouchy from marching to the assistance of Napoleon.

6

Upon the question, who really fought and won the battle of the 18th, no discussion, much less contention, ought to have arisen. Without in the slightest degree impeaching the just share of Prussia in the victory, or losing sight for a moment of the fact that she bore a great share of the danger, and drew much of it from her allies and upon herself at a decisive moment, no unprejudiced person can conceal from himself that the honour of the day is due to the Anglo-Netherlandish army, and to the measures of its great leader. The struggle of Mount St. Jean was conducted with an obstinacy, ability, and foresight of which history affords few examples. The great loss of the English also speaks the merit of their services. More than 700 officers, among them the first of their

VOL. LXX.

33

This struggle, so unequal in point of numbers, was continued for some hours on the 19th. It was not till Vandamme had advanced on the direct road to Brussels, as far as Rossières, on the verge of the wood of Soignies, thereby turning the right flank of Thielman, that the latter abandoned the defence of Wavres, and began an orderly. retreat on Louvain. learned the extent of the success of the He had previously allies on the 18th, and must have been easy as to the result of any further advance of Grouchy. The news reached the Frenchman a little later, and he forthwith commenced a retreat, which, perhaps, in its execution did him even more honour than his previous exploits.

culated to render bare justice to the con-
The above remarks, which we think cal-

Frank fort, 1820. Vol. iii., p. 374.
Geschichte des Preussischen Staates, 1763-1815;

+ War of the Allied Powers, &c. Berlin, 1818.

aspires.

Mr. Alison (History of Europe, &c., vol. x., p. 991) speaks of

'Buonaparte's favourite military manœuvre of interposing between his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the right hand and then on the left,'

as having been attempted by him and baffled in this campaign. We doubt whether the expression of interposing between two adversaries can be correctly applied to any of Buonaparte's successful campaigns, and we almost suspect that if he had in contemplation a manœuvre of so much hazard on this occasion, it was the first on which he can be said to have attempted it. Hear Clausewitz on this matter :

duct of our Prussian allies, are founded on of the dignity and importance to which he the minute and authentic official reports of Plotho's fourth volume. That some caution is requisite in dealing with the numerous narratives which have been published of these transactions may be proved from such an instance as the following passage, which is to be found in a History of Napoleon, by a M. de Norvins, published for military readers, and beautifully illustrated by the pencil of Raffet. Speaking of Wellington's position at Waterloo, he says:The post of Hougomont, on the left of the English, became to them of the last importance, for it was there that the Prussians were to join them.' This is only to be equalled by the change in the relative positions of the heart and liver adopted by Molière's impromptu physician. Errors so flagrant as this are, indeed, of rare occurrence, but the subject is a dangerous one to unprofessional writers, unless they enjoy the advantage, All writers who have treated of this camand condescend to use it, of communica-paign set out by saying that Buonaparte threw tion with sound military authorities. An accomplished civilian of our own has lately closed with an account of this final struggle a voluminous History, which has, we know, enjoyed in its progress a very high share of popularity. Agreeing as we do with many of Mr. Alison's political opinions, and approving the spirit of his moral reflections, we have no disposition to question the general merits of a work which is at all events entitled to a formal and separate article, and which we hope to make the subject of one in due season. Meanwhile, however, since the subject of the Waterloo campaign has come in our way, we may be pardoned for remarking in general that a writer of Mr. Alison's particular qualifications would have acted wisely in compressing the military narratives and disquisitions which abound in his volumes, and in abstaining from certain conclusions, which, coming from him, possess, indeed, no other authority than that with which his mere powers of language can invest them, but may be quoted by interested persons for their own purposespersons who would otherwise pay little attention to Mr. Alison or his work. In his account of the Belgian campaign, he has, in our opinion, only added one to a long list of imperfect narratives, fitter for the pages of a magazine than for a compilation

Among the battles on which Mr. Alison has, we think, most unfortunately laboured, we must notice particularly those of Assye and Toulouse. As to both, his rashness and inaccuracy are, as we shall probably have occasion to show in detail by and by, most flagrant, and, after the publication of Colonel Gurwood's book especially, most inexcusable.

himself between the two armies, in order to separate them. This expression, however, which phraseology, has no clear idea for its foundation. has become a terminus technicus in military The space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation. It would have been very unfortunate if a commander like Buonaparte, having to deal with an enemy of twice his force, instead of falling on the one the empty interval, and thus made a blow in half with his united strength, had lighted on the air, losing his time whilst he can only double his own force by the strictest economy of that commodity. Even the fighting the one army in a direction by which it will be pressed away from the other, even if it can be effected without loss of time, incurs the great danger of being attacked in the rear by the other. If the latter, therefore, be not far enough removed to put this risk out of question, a commander will scarcely venture on such a line of attack. Buonaparte, therefore, chose the direction between the two armies, not in order to separate them by wedging himself between, but because he expected to find and fall on Blücher's force in this direction, either united or in separate bodies.'-Feldzug von 1815, &c., p. 54.

In the particular instance, Mr. Alison's supposition is so far supported, that Buonaparte's main attack was on the right and centre of the Prussian position rather than the left. The battle of Ligny began late in the day, and it was perhaps only want of time which prevented Buonaparte from pushing a column further on their right flank at Wagnelies. Whatever his purpose, he certainly was under the conviction after his success that Blücher had retreated towards Namur, and his neglect in ascertaining this fact would appear to have been a singular and fatal error.

But his

In discussing the vexata quæstio of Grouchy's conduct on the 18th, Mr. Alison, p. 995, speaks of his force as fully matched by the Prussian corps opposed to him at Wavres. No account, French or other, which we have seen, rates Grouchy's corps at less than 32,000 men. The third Prus

'No official account of the Prussian loss,' says Mr. Alison, p. 994, has ever been published.'

The position, as occupied by the Prussian corps, under Thielman,-instead of sians, has been considered very defective rising, as Mr. Alison says, to 35,000-did by better authorities than Mr. Alison.* not exceed 16,000! English officers are, we believe, pretty well agreed on this point; but if their judgment be questioned, no writer has pointed out some of its defects more clearly than General Clausewitz, who, having served as chief of the staff to the third corps of the Prussian army, writes with greater authority on this part of the campaign than perhaps on any other. He particularly censures the occupation and defence of St. Amand, one of Mr. Alison's admirable villages, as a pernicious hors d'œuvre. It was too far advanced, and the Prussians, as the action proceeded, were exposed to greater loss than the assaulting enemy, in moving successive battalions down the slope to its defence. Their strength was thus consumed before Napoleon made his final attack with his reserves.

Meaning their loss on the 18th. As we have already had occasion to signify, Mr. Alison might have found the official returns most minutely given in the Appendix to Plotho's fourth volume, distinguishing officers, men, and horses, down to what Mr. Canning called the fraction of a drummer. A separate list for Thielman's loss in the action at Wavres is alone wanting to make these returns quite complete.

Mr. Alison says, p. 924,

'It was in the evening of the 15th, at halfpast seven, that Wellington received the intelliPosts which cost the defend-gence at Brussels. Orders were immediately ers more outlay of life than the assailants, despatched,' &c.

though sometimes necessary evils, can As Buonaparte's first attack was on the hardly deserve the epithet admirable. (See Feldzug von 1815, p. 91.

The cavalry action of the 17th at Genappe is briefly but incorrectly described in the following passage:

So roughly had the French been handled on the field of battle the preceding day that no attempt was made by them to disturb the retreat of either army, except by a body of French cuirassiers, which, about four o'clock in the afternoon, charged the English cavalry, who were covering the retreat between Genappe and Waterloo.'-Alison, p. 932.

For cuirassiers read lancers. They did not in the first instance charge the English cavalry, but pressing rather close on our rear, were charged gallantly but ineffectually by the 7th Hussars, who could make no impression on the front of their column in the defile, and lost officers and men, wounded and prisoners. When the lancers, flushed with success, debouched on a wider space, they were ridden over by the

1st Life Guards.

many

We believe we may safely state that in the course of their previous interview already noticed, the Duke of Wellington did not conceal from Marshal Blücher his apprehensions as to the choice of the position near Ligny.

Prussian outposts at Thuin, it was natural
that the first intelligence of hostilities should
come from the Prussians, but their officer
met with some delay, and the news was, in
fact, brought by the Prince of Orange.
He found the Duke, not at half-past seven,

but soon after three o'clock, at dinner at his
hotel, about 100 yards from his quarters in
the park, which he had taken care not to
quit during the morning, nor even on the
day preceding, though pressed to do so in
at least one instance by a person of high
consequence, who was not probably aware
The Prince
of his reason for remaining.
of Orange, who had thus come in from the
Belgian outposts to dine with the Duke,
was soon after followed by the Prussian
General Muffling, who brought accounts of
the affair of Thuin, and orders were imme-
diately issued for the movement of the army
to the left. These, despatched about five,
must have reached most of the corps by
eight, and probably all before ten. The
Duke's detailed orders are not all as yet
before the public; but it is, perhaps, suffi-
cient to refer to the Memorandum of 15th
June, 1815, as printed by Colonel Gur-
wood. Before ten, further accounts were
received from the Hanoverian General
Dornberg, showing that all was quiet in the

pursuit to the Prussians, nothing loth to accept it.

The above remarks have been called forth by Mr. Alison's propensity to the extraction of military details from questionable sources. We find graver cause of offence with him when he sits down in his

Oudenarde. If Napoleon had advanced in this direction, it is probable that the battle for the defence of Brussels would have been fought here. Lord Hill's presence, however, was not necessary at Hal on the 18th; and we will venture to say that no general officer was under hotter fire in the action of Waterloo than our late commander-in-library-chair to distribute his praise and chief. He disposed and led on in person Sir F. Adam's decisive attack on the flank of Napoleon's guard. In the despatch of the 19th to Lord Bathurst, the Duke says, -I am particularly indebted to General Lord Hill for his assistance and conduct on this as on all former occasions.'-Gurwood, vol. xii. p. 483.

'During this terrible strife,' says Mr. Alison, p. 947, Wellington remained in his position at the foot of his tree, occasionally throwing himself into a square, or directing the advance of a line. So heavy was the fire of the cannon-shot to which he was exposed that nearly all his suite were killed or wounded by his side; and he was obliged in the close of the day to the casual assistance of a Portuguese, who stood near, to carry the most necessary orders.'

The historian in a subsequent page favours us with the ipsissima verba addressed by the Duke to the soldiery of two of the several squares into which his Grace thus threw himself. We are, however, able to assure Mr. Alison that the story, however generally current, of the Duke's occasionally flinging himself into a square is a fiction. He never once was in that position throughout the battle of the 18th. For Portuguese read Piedmontese. The young gentleman in question was of the family of De Salis, a subject of the Sardinian government, and in its service. The mission he undertook was one of danger, for his uniform made him liable to be mistaken for a Frenchman by the brigade to which he carried the Duke's order to advance. Were you ever in a battle before?' said the Duke. 'No, Sir.' Then you are a lucky man; for you will never see such another.'

'Blücher and Wellington, by a singular chance, met at the farm of La Belle Alliance, and mutually saluted each other as victors. p. 957.

They met, not at La Belle Alliance, but a short distance further on the Genappe road, near a farm called the 'Maison Rouge,' or 'Maison du Roi.' This was the furthest point to which the British advanced; at least it was here that the Duke gave orders for the halt and bivouac of his own exhausted troops, and handed over the task of further

censure between the two great commanders whom he summons before his tribunal. His parallel of Napoleon and Wellington, after the fashion of Plutarch, is a tissue of truisms and assumptions which must not at present detain us; but among his 'few observations conceived in an European spirit !'—there occurs a passage on which we think it worth while to say a few words :

'In the first place, it is evident, whatever the English writers may say to the contrary, that both Blücher and the Duke of Wellington were surprised by Napoleon's invasion of Belgium on the 15th of June; and it is impossible to hold either of them entirely blameless for that circumstance. It has been already seen from the Duke's despatches, that on the 9th of June, that is, six days before the invasion took place, he was aware that Napoleon was collecting a great force on the frontier, and that hostilities might immediately be expected. Why, then, trated, and placed in such a situation that they were the two armies not immediately concenmight mutually, if attacked, lend each other the necessary assistance? Their united force was full 190,000 effective men, while Napoleon's was not more than 120,000, or, at the utmost, 140,000. Why, then, was Blücher atBritish infantry, unsupported either by cavalry tacked unawares and isolated at Ligny, and the or artillery, exposed to the attack of a superior force of French, composed of all the three arms, at Quatre Bras? It is in vain to say that they could not provide for their troops if they had been concentrated, and that it was necessary to watch every bye-road which led to Brussels. Men do not eat more when drawn together than when scattered over a hundred miles of counmaintained armies of 100,000 men for months try. Marlborough and Eugene had long ago. together in Flanders; and Blücher and Wellington had no difficulty in feeding 170,000 men drawn close together after the campaign did commence. It is not by a cordon of troops, scattered over a hundred miles, that the attack of 120,000 French is to be arrested. If the British army had from the first been concentrated at Waterloo, and Blücher near Wavres, Napoleon would never have ventured to pass them on the road, however unguarded. Those who, in their anxiety to uphold the English general from the charge of having been assailed unawares, assert that he was not taken by surprise in the outset of the Waterloo campaign, do not perceive that in so doing they bring against him the much more serious charge of having so disposed his troops, when he knew they were about to be assailed, that infantry alone, without either cavalry or artillery, were exposed to