were revived from time to time by the inspired the mass with a spirit of enterAustrian war and Schill's chivalrous enterprise in action and endurance under defeat prise; but the prospect was soon clouded, of which few coalitions have presented an and, till the two colossal powers, Russia example. In ordinary times, or with ordiand France, once more arrayed themselves nary objects, Blücher's character and disagainst each other, the distant successes of position would have ill fitted him for acting England in the Peninsula could alone af with the subtle and jealous Russian, or the ford him a gleam of consolation. lukewarm Swede, to whom the Germans applied the well-known line from Schiller's Song of the Bell,

unable to remain in the saddle for the last attack on Montmartre, he gave his orders with calmness and precision from a carriage. His appearance on this occasion must have taxed the gravity of his staff, for, to protect his eyes, then in a state of violent inflammation, the grisly veteran had replaced his cocked-hat by a French lady's bonnet and veil. His health prevented him from sharing the triumphal entry of the sovereigns into Paris, and, on the 2d day of April, 1814, he resigned the burthen of his military command.

The peace of Paris by no means satiated his thirst for the humiliation of France. After enjoying the reward for his services in the enthusiastic congratulations of London and Berlin, he divided for awhile his residence between the latter city and Bres lau, at all times and in all places exhaling his discontent at the concessions of the allies. Unmeasured in his language, mixing freely in society of all classes, and venting his spleen on all diplomatists, but specially on Hardenberg, he became, without any personal object of aggrandizement or political ambition, but in the mere indulgence of his ill humour, the nucleus of a little Fronde, calculated to offend without influencing the sovereign and his ministers.

Blücher might have long gone on smoking, gaming, and scolding without interruption, if the great, event had not occurred which restored him to his more legitimate vocation. The news of Napoleon's escape found him accidentally at Berlin. His first impulse was to call on the English ambassador, to twit him with the negligence of his countrymen; his next to exhibit himself in the principal street of the capital in his field-marshal's uniform, a significant hint to younger generals not to expect that he would concede to them his place in the approaching fray. His nomination to that post of honour and danger soon ensued, and his old companion and adviser, Gneisenau, was once more at his side.

The Duke of Wellington reached Brussels from Vienna ou the 5th of April, 1815, and found Kleist in command of the Prussian force, for Blücher only arrived at Liege on the 17th. It appears from the Duke's letter to Lord Clancarty, of the 6th, that he found Kleist disposed to retire, in case of being attacked, behind Brussels, a plan which the Duke warmly opposed, in spite of his own opinion expressed in his letter to Lord Bathurst, of the same date, of the insufficiency of the force at his disposal. From Blücber's temper and turn of mind, as well as from the event, we may infer that That Blücher looked forward to another the Duke had little difficulty in recommendtrial of strength between his countrymen | ing to the former his own views, based, no and the French is evident, but it is hardly doubt, as much on political as military conpossible that at his age he should have siderations, in favour of a position in adcontemplated the probability of once more vance of Brussels. in person directing the fortunes of the contest, and of at last feeding fat the ancient grudge he bore not only to Napoleon, but to the nation. His speculations were probably more the offspring of his feelings than of any profound observation of the political state of Europe. A letter of the Duke of Wellington, however, to his brother Sir Henry Wellesley (Gurwood, December 17th, 1841), shows that his views were shared by one whose calmer judgment and nearer observation were not subject to such influences, and who had neither defeats to retrieve in his own person, nor insults to avenge in that of his country :

I believe the truth to be, that the people of this country (France) are so completely ruined by the revolution, and they are now suffering so severely from the want of the plunder of the world, that they cannot go on without it; and they cannot endure the prospect of a peaceable government. If that is the case, we should take care how we' suffered the grand alliance to break up, and we ought to look to our alliance with the powers of the Peninsula as our sheetanchor.'

From the Duke's letter to Lord Clancarty of the 10th of April, it appears that he contemplated, in the first instance, taking the initiative by the end of that month or the beginning of May, at which period he conceived that the allies might throw into France a force of 270,000 men to be opposed by some 180,000. (Gurwood, xii. p. 297.) We find, however, that, three days afterwards, his intelligence of Buonaparte's state of preparation had already led him to abandon this prospect. In enclosing a memorandum founded on his original ideas, he says:

'Since I wrote to your Lordship some important events have occurred in France, which will leave Napoleon's army more at his disposal than was expected at that time, and he has adopted measures which will certainly tend to increase it at an early period. You will see by the enclosed papers that it is probable that the Duc d'Angoulême will be obliged to quit France, and that Buonaparte, besides having called for the soldiers recently discharged, amounting, as I understand, to about 127,000, of which 100,000

will not be a very formidable force; but still

may be deemed immediately disposable, has the Duke's scheme for offensive operations organized 200 battalions of Grenadiers of the was throughout kept steadily dependent National Guards. I imagine that the latter upon the movements of the allies on the Lownumbers were too nearly equal according to the er and Upper Rhine. This is strikingly estimate I gave you in my letter of the 10th, evident from a letter to Schwarzenberg, for me to think it advisable, under present cir- dated 2d of June, 1815,* and from the one cumstances, to attempt to carry into execution of the same date which follows it to Sir what is proposed in the enclosed memorandum.' Henry Wellesley. Napoleon, however, took the game into his own hands, and played it, in the first instance at least, with a skill and energy worthy of his best days and reputation.

The subsequent correspondence shows that neither the condition of his own force nor that of his allies could have justified the experiment. The mutinous state of the It is probable that no extensive military Saxon troops might alone have been suffi- operation was ever conducted to its issue, cient to derange such a plan of action. whatever that issue might be, without many Some officers indeed of both nations have derangements of the original conceptions been of opinion that it was from the begin- of its leaders, arising from the casualties of ning far more in the power of Napoleon the busy moment, the failure of despatches, than of the allies to take the aggressive the misconstruction of orders, the misdireccourse; and that by crossing the frontier, tion of columns, &c. The operations now which it is said he might have done with in question were certainly no exception to 40,000 men, very soon after his reinstal- this rule on either side. As to Napoleon, ment in the Tuileries, he would have had if his own account of them be believed, few more chances in his favour than he found commanders in critical circumstances have in June. It is evident that, with all his ex- been worse seconded, as far as prompt ertions, the Duke of Wellington at least obedience and punctuality were concerned. had full occupation for the interval which If Ney and Grouchy are to be credited elapsed, in collecting and adjusting the in their defence, no subordinates ever component parts of an army, which at its suffered more from tardy and contradictory best was far inferior to any he had com- orders on the part of their chief. Captain manded in Europe. His correspondence Pringle, in his excellent remarks on the at once shows his unceasing anxiety to an- campaign of 1815, published in the appenticipate the offensive movement of the ene-dix to Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon, my, in which Blücher fully shared (see truly observes that, in French military Gurwood, 2d June, 1815), and justifies the works, the reader never finds a French prudence which forbade any forward move-army beaten in the field without some ment. It shows, moreover, that the diffi- plausible reason, or, as Las Casas terms it, culties of his position were not confined to a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities, to the well-known deficiencies and imperfec- account for it. 'Non nostrum tantas comtions of his army on which Napoleon so ponere lites.' To an ordinary reader much relied, its raw and heterogeneous Grouchy's defence of himself appears composition, the absence of the flower of difficult to answer. It is evident that in the English infantry, the refusal of the Por- this, as probably in every other similar tuguese, &c. Even the article of material, transaction, chance reigned arbiter over which it might have been supposed Wool- many important occurrences; nor wich would have supplied in profusion, was such accidents confined to the French slowly and scantily doled out to his press- army and operations. The English were ing remonstrances; and instead of 150 British pieces, for which he applies on the 6th of April, we find him on the 21st in expectation of only 42, making up, with the German guns, some 84 pieces; while he states, from the Prussian returns, that their corps on the Meuse are to take the field with 200, and their whole force with no less than 600. With respect to drivers, horses, the heavy artillery, pontoons, &c., his difficulties are shown to have been equally embarrassing. (See Gurwood, 21st April, 1815).—But in addition to all these lets and hindrances, it is evident that

were

*Sous ces circonstances il est très important que je sache aussitôt que possible quand vous pourrez commencer vos opérations; et de quelle nature elles seront, et vers quel tems nous pouvons attendre que vous serez arrivé à une hauteur quelconque, afin que je puisse commencer de ce côté-ci de manière à avoir l'appui de vos opérations. Le Maréchal Blücher est préparé et très impatient de commencer; mais je lui ai fait dire aujourd'hui qu'il me paraissait que fussions certain du jour auquel vous commencericz, nous ne pouvions rien faire jusqu'à ce que nous et en général de vos idées sur vos opérations.'-Gurwood, xii., p. 437.

+ The whole of Schwarzenberg's army will not 16th, at about which time I hope we shall begin.'— be collected on the Upper Rhine till towards the Gurwood, xii., p. 438.

not exempt; and that the fate of the knowledge and experience of the habits contest at Ligny on the 16th of June was and morale of his own troops, who, as he is seriously influenced by the absence of reported to have expressed himself, liked Bulow's corps, the fourth, is known to to see the enemy. In illustration of the every one. In Plotho's very circumstantial Duke of Wellington's opposite practice in account we find the fact mentioned, that this particular, we are tempted to quote the orders were forwarded to Bulow from following passage from a French military Sombrief, on the 15th, which were expected writer. It is from an article in the 'Bulletin to secure his junction for the next day. The Universelle des Sciences' for 1825, on a dispatch was sent to Hannut, where it was history of the Russian expedition, by the presumed that it would find his head- Marquis de Chambray :quarters established. These were still, however, at Liege, and the dispatch, appearing to be of no consequence, unwichtig scheinend, lay at Hannut unopened, and was found there by Bulow only on his arrival at 10 o'clock the next morning.

We shall have a word or two more to say by and bye as to the circumstances under which Blücher was brought into action at Ligny. That his infantry fought admirably against great odds on that occasion has never been disputed; with respect to the cavalry and the artillery Blücher expressed some dissatisfaction. Whatever were the merits of the position, it is clear that Napoleon was tasked to the utmost to wrest it before nightfall from the old warrior who held it. Few English narratives of the campaign have recorded the fact that it was visited by the Duke of Wellington shortly before the commencement of the action, on which occasion the two generals concerted in person their future measures for mutual co-operation, in whatever manner the first collision might end. The German accounts have not failed to record the interview, nor how the attention of the well-girded Prussians was drawn to the white neckcloth of the great commander, who, but for his cocked hat, with the cockade by its four colours bespeaking the field-marshal of four kingdoms-England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands -might have been taken for an English gentleman on his morning ride. We believe it to be the opinion of most English officers acquainted with the ground at Ligny, that the Duke under similar circumstances would have defended it in a different manner from that adopted by the Prussians, for that the locality admitted of a disposition which would have less exposed the masses not immediately engaged to the murderous fire of the French artillery. We have heard that Gneisenau was sensible of the objections to this feature in his own arrangements, but had adopted his course from

This view is borne out by the remarks of a very able Prussian critic of the campaign, the late General Clausewitz.

The author,' says the reviewer, 'compares the English and French methods of fighting, and the operations of the generals Massena and Wellington in 1811. Among the remarkable propositions to which the author is led by the results of this inquiry, we select the following for notice:-To defend a height, the English infantry did not crown the crest, after the prac tice of the infantry of other nations. Massena was repulsed, because the English employed for the defence of the heights they occupied the manoeuvre I have spoken of before (that of the crest, and leaving only tirailleurs on the placing themselves some fifty paces in rear of slope), which is preferable to that hitherto in use.' This manner of defending heights,' continues the reviewer, is not new. It has been sometimes employed, but it had been adopted generally by the English during the Spanish It had even been taught their troops in war. places itself usually on the crest in sight of the time of peace. The infantry of other nations assailant. French infantry remains rarely on the defensive; and when it has overthrown the enemy, pursues with such impetuosity as not always to preserve its ranks. Hence the reverses it has suffered on some of the occasions, which are few, when it has defended heights. For on most occasions, such as Corunna, Busaco, Fuentes de Oñoro, and Albuera, it attacked.'

6

There is doubtless great difference between the local features of Ligny and Busaco, between a Flemish slope and a Portuguese sierra, and we are aware that the brunt of the former action lay in the low villages of Ligny' and St. Amand; but the principle of non-exposure is the same. It has been stated that when Napoleon mounted his horse on the morning of the 18th, seeing few signs of the British force in his front, he began to vent his disappointment at their presumed escape, but that Foy, who had much Peninsular experience, warned him not to rely on appearances. Wellington,' he said, never shows his troops. A patrole of dragoons will soon ascertain the fact, but if he is yonder, I' warn your Majesty que l'infanterie Anglaise en duel est le diable.'

The incident of Blücher's fall under his ble act of devotion on the part of his aideexpiring horse at Ligny, and of the memorade-camp, is well known. Modern warfare

could probably hardly furnish a parallel | Anglesey, with the intelligence that the case, and Froissart has recorded no more 7th hussars had been engaged with the chivalrous exploit than that of Nostitz. French lancers, and that the enemy was From the Prussian accounts of this cavalry pressing his rear. He immediately returncharge, at the head of which Blücher had ed to the field, and remained on the ground thus exposed his person in vain, we collect till dark. Blücher, on the other hand, was that it was repulsed, not at the sword point, forced to keep his bed during this day. but by the carbine fire of the French cavalry, who stood firm in their ranks. This we imagine our officers would consider as rather an old-fashioned proceeding, and worthy of the cuirassiers of the sixteenth rather than of the present century. We find, however, that same method was again resorted to with success by the French cavalry under Grouchy in an affair near Namur on the 19th.

The victory remained with Napoleon, but Blücher, instead of obliging him by retiring on Namur, clung with tenacity to his communications with the English, and, exactly as had been agreed upon, directed his retreat on Wavre. No beaten army ever rallied quicker or to better purpose. Blücher was conveyed to a cottage, whence he dictated his dispatches and issued his orders, unshaken in spirit, though sorely bruised in body. While the surgeon was rubbing his bruises he asked the nature of the liniment, and, being told it was brandy, stated his opinion that an internal application would be far more efficacious. This was applied in the mitigated shape of champagne, and he said to the messenger who was on the point of departure with his dispatch, Tell His Majesty das ich hatte kalt nachgetrunken, and that all will do well.' His order of the day for the 17th, after some reflections on the conduct of the cavalry and artillery, concluded with these words-'I shall lead you again against the enemy: we shall beat him, for we must.'

The 18th, however, saw him again in the saddle, at the head of Bulow's newly-arrived division, urging its onward course, and his own, like Milton's griffin through the wilderness, cheering the march-worn troops till the defile of St. Lambert rang to his old war-cry and sobriquet Forwards '—reminding them of the rain which had spared so much powder at the Katzbach, and telling them of the promise of assistance which he stood pledged to redeem to the English. Nobly indeed was that promise redeemed, and the utter ruin of the French army is to be ascribed to that assistance. Ungrateful we should be not to acknowledge such service, though we cannot subscribe to the theories, whether French or Prussian, which give it the full merit of saving from destruction an army which had, while as yet unsupported, repulsed every attack and annihilated the French cavalry.

We know that no thought of so disastrous a result crossed the minds of those about the Duke's person, and that officers of his staff who left the field wounded towards the close of the action, did so with no other feeling of anxiety than for the personal safety of him they left behind. His servants, who, in the village of Waterloo, had the opportunity of witnessing the incidents of the rear of such a battle-which try the nerves more than those of the fray itself— knew their master well. The manœuvres of the kitchen were conducted with as much precision as those of the Footguards at St. James's. Reign what confusion there might in the avenue of Soignies, there was none in the service of the duke's table, and the honour of the Vattel of his establishment was preserved free from stain as his own.

We find in the Life of Napoleon' published in the Family Library, a story of a second interview between the Duke and Blücher on the 17th, stated as a fact well known to many superior officers in the Netherlands. The author and his inform- That he ever returned to eat the dinner ants, however superior, are mistaken. The so prepared was certainly not due to any Duke in the early part of the 17th had avoidance of personal exposure on his own enough to do to conduct his unexampled part. Of Buonaparte's conduct in that reretreat to Waterloo, from before Napoleon's spect on this his last field-day we have seen united force and superior cavalry—a move- no account on which we could rely. We ment which but for the trifling affair of have no doubt of his sang-froid under fire; Genappe would have been accomplished but whether Waterloo witnessed its conwithout the loss of a man. He remained spicuous display we are ignorant. On at Quatre Bras so occupied till half-past divers celebrated occasions he is known to one P. M., and then retired by the high have abundantly exposed himself; but in road to the field of next day's battle, which general he would seem to have been as he thoroughly examined, and was proceed-free as our own commander from the vuling to dinner at Waterloo, when he was gar ostentation of courting danger, and in overtaken by an aide-de-camp of Lord most of his greater battles there was little