the possibility of assuming the offensive; and at all events the supplies of specie to be procured for bills would be increased, and would be procured at a cheaper rate, if it was known that any sum whatever in specie (the amount of which need not be stated) was periodically received from England.

I have the honor to be, &c.

6

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

MY LORD, 'Castello Branco, 1st August, 1811. Since I addressed you on the 25th of July I have received intelligence which has induced me to believe that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was very ill supplied with provisions; and that Don Julian Sanchez had been more successful in preventing the introduction of supplies from the country than I had imagined the limited force under his command would have enabled him to be. I have therefore moved the whole army to their left, with the intention, if I should find the intelligence which I have received to be well founded, to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo immediately. If, however, I should find it otherwise, or if, as I imagine, the the enemy have within these last two days introduced a supply of provisions into the place, I propose that the army shall take up its cantonments in Lower Beira instead of Alentejo, till all the preparations will be completed for the further operation which I intend to carry on against Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit it.

I propose to leave General Hill, with the 2d and General Hamilton's divisions of infantry, and part of Sir William Erskine's division of cavalry, in the Alentejo, to observe the enemy's movements on that side.

I had been misinformed respecting the movements of the 5th corps when I addressed your Lordship on the 25th July. They had not then quitted Estremadura; but I understand they are now in march towards Andalusia.

The army of Portugal remain in the positions which I informed your Lordship that they occupied in my dispatch of the 25th July, excepting that the division at Plasencia has extended through the mountains to Bejar and Baños.

By a letter from General Silveira of the 21st July, which

I received on the 26th, I learned that General Santocildes had retired with the army of Galicia from the neighborhood of Astorga to Manzanal on the 17th, in consequence of Marshal Bessières having collected at Benavente a force, consisting of 11,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry. General Santocildes intended to endeavor to maintain himself at Manzanal; and, although I have not heard from that quarter since the receipt of General Silveira's letter of the 21st, I imagine that the enemy have been satisfied with obliging Santocildes to retire to the mountains, as I learn from Don Julian, from Ledesma, on the 26th, that a detachment of Bessières' troops, consisting of 6000 men, had arrived on that day at Salamanca; and I have since heard from other quarters that these same troops had moved with a convoy towards Ciudad Rodrigo. These two last reports, however, have not been confirmed from any other quarter, or by any accounts from Don Julian since the 26th.

It is reported that Marshal Soult is gone to Granada; but this report has not been confirmed.

you

It is very evident to me that have not before you a true statement of the case regarding the payment of soldiers in the depôt at Belem; and I beg you therefore to delay to give any orders, or, if you have given orders upon the subject, to recall them, till I shall have inquired how this matter really stands. It cannot be as you suppose it is.

I have received your letter of the 29th. In all the discussions which we have with the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish, Government, on the subject of the resources for the war, one would imagine they had no interest, or a minor interest, in carrying it on; and that we were the principals,

It is too bad that they in particular should be so unfit for

MY DEAR SIR,

'Portalegre, 27th July, 1811. I have received your letter of the 21st. General Castaños certainly informed me of the intention of the cavalry of the 5th army to return through Portugal into Estremadura; but I concluded that of course they would wait for a military route before they would march, and that, till that was called for, I did not think it necessary, or rather it did not occur to me to apprise you of this march.

I now enclose you the route, and beg you to fill up the days, and apprise the British Commissary at Beja, &c., when they will pass each place, that they may be prepared. Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Austin.

MY DEAR SIR,

6

To Lieut. General Graham.

⚫ WELLINGTON.

'Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th last night; and I write to let you know that there is no reason why you should hurry yourself from Lisbon.

Upon a comparison of the strength which we can bring upon one point with that which the enemy can collect in Castille, I think I have a chance of succeeding in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, and the preparations are in progress for that enterprise.

I can certainly undertake nothing else at present which would at all improve the situation of the allies in the Peninsula; and, adverting to the facility with which the French march corps from one side of the Peninsula to the other, and to the little detriment to their interests which results from the abandonment of a province or kingdom to collect a large force against us, I must consider it not improbable that I shall be obliged to abandon the enterprise. The preparation for it, however, will take up a considerable time,

and you will see that there is no occasion for your hurrying yourself.

We have reports, as usual, that Ciudad Rodrigo is but ill supplied with provisions, for which I believe there is no more foundation than for these reports in general.

It may be advisable, therefore, that we should approach the place a little carlier than I at first intended; and with this view, and because the whole of Marmont's army have crossed the Tagus, I am sending more troops across, and I have it in contemplation to make a general movement to our left.

'Soult certainly intends to avail himself of the large force he now has in the south to make an effort against the position of the allies at Cadiz, or to obtain possession of Carthagena. I do not think it quite clear which plan he will follow. He has certainly sent to Granada the division of the 4th corps which was lately in Estremadura, and, it is said, some troops under La Tour Maubourg; but I believe these last are cavalry only, which would not be of much use in an attack upon the Isla de Leon. These reinforcements may have been sent to enable Laval (who I believe now commands the 4th corps) to keep Freire in check, as this last General had lately made some progress, and had got as far as Guadix.

I am inclined to believe he will attack Cadiz, as I have not heard that any of the heavy ordnance moved out of Badajoz has been sent from Seville towards Granada, and I suspect that it is going down the Guadalquivir unobserved by those who are employed to procure intelligence for the Spanish Government.

I have written to my brother about the state of the works on the Isla de Leon; but, from all I see and hear, I am very apprehensive that the affairs of Spain are nearly irretrievable. There is no money, and there are no means of getting any, and there are no disciplined troops. Even if we should strike a fortunate blow I fear that we should do them no good.

'Till Soult's design upon Carthagena is manifest nothing can be more absurd than to send Blake's corps into Murcia, where they have already 20,000 men opposed to 5000 French, which may have been increased to 12,000 by the

first reinforcement from Estremadura, and probably to 14,000 by the last. My opinion is, that Blake's corps should be employed either in the Sierra de Ronda or in the Condado de Niebla, as this may be depended upon (although the Spaniards will not admit it), that they may increase the corps in Murcia to any extent they please; but they will not be able to drive the French out of Granada. The strength of their corps in Murcia, therefore, ought to be fixed with a view to a defensive war in a very strong country, and should be increased in proportion as the enemy, by the increase of his force, and his other measures in that quarter, should manifest a design to attack Carthagena.

A force stationed in Niebla, or the Sierra de Ronda, would always have a secure retreat. From either situation they would threaten Seville, which is the foundation of the enemy's existence in the south of Spain. In Niebla they would be in direct communication with us, and they might be equipped in such a manner as to render it quite impossible for Soult to move all his troops, with impunity, upon us; and from Niebla or La Ronda the troops might be brought to Cadiz, with facility, if wanted. But this plan will not be adopted, because it does not afford ground for anybody to boast for a few days that the enemy will be overthrown, and that the southern provinces of Spain will be relieved.

The orders were sent from hence, I believe, two days ago, for you to march, not exactly with a view to a mere change of cantonments, but to a service which I think it probable you will be able to perform, which I will explain more fully when I shall see you, which will probably be in a day or two. The fact is, that I am about to move the whole army farther to the left, and I want to get your division in your old place at the head of our cantonments.

• Murray will send the orders by your aide de camp; and