From your letter, I understand that the whole have, or will have, bread to the 15th inclusive; 100,000 rations of bread have been ordered to Castello Branco, which it is apprehended may not arrive there. But there are 50,000 rations at Villa Velha, and the magazine is at Abrantes, about nine leagues from Niza.

'Lieut. General

Sir B. Spencer, K.B?

6

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

'MY DEAR SPENCER, 'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811. 'I received this morning your two letters of the 10th.

You had better send the sick you may have to Abrantes, but not by water from Villa Velha. The Portuguese should also go from Castello Branco to Lisbon by Abrantes.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.'

SIR,

To Colonel Austin.

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811. In consequence of the expected early collection of the enemy's whole force in Estremadura, I think it probable that General Blake's corps will return to the Condado de Niebla, and that they will pass through Portugal on their way thither. I have desired the Commissary General to prepare for their passage with provisions at Beja and at Villa Viçosa; and I request you to have from 12,000 to 15,000 rations of bread and meat, and 1500 rations of forage, prepared for them at Mertola, and boats collected at that place, in order to transport them across the Guadiana. I cannot say exactly when they will march, but it is desirable that all the preparations should be made immediately; and I will give you the earliest intimation of the movement.

I will pay any expense that may be incurred to collect

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

'Quinta de Granicha,

ce 12 Juin, 1811.

J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 11, et je conviens avec vous que vous ferez bien de porter les opérations du corps d'armée de votre Excellence dans le Condado de Niebla, en cas qu'il devienne nécessaire pour l'armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise de se porter sur la Caya.

'Je vous envois une route par laquelle seule votre artillerie pourrait marcher, et vous verrez à la note la provision qu'on aura faite pour votre marche. J'ai donné ordre qu'on fasse provision pour 12,000 hommes et 1500 chevaux, et je vous prie de me faire savoir s'il vous en faut plus.

Le siége de Badajoz sera entièrement levé cette nuit. 'Je n'ai pas encore de nouvelles du mouvement du Maréchal Soult; mais je crois qu'il aura été joint par le corps de Drouet aujourd'hui, et probablement qu'il se mettra en mouvement demain. Son premier mouvement sera, il y a apparence, vers Hornachos, ou même plus à sa droite, pour éviter toute affaire avec nous, jusqu'à l'arrivée de l'armée de Portugal. Je suppose que votre premier mouvement sera sur Valverde pour attendre celui de l'ennemi. Celui de nos troupes en avant sera sur Albuera.

Les 3me et 4me divisions de l'armée de Portugal, sous les ordres du Général Regnier, sont arrivées à Plasencia le 9 de ce mois. C'est un jour plus tard que je n'ai compté, mais elles pourront toujours arriver à Merida le 16; et si elles font la jonction par le pont de Medellin, elles la feront le 15.

'Je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, de donner ordre qu'on conserve la discipline en passant par le royaume de Portugal.

Je suis bien fâché que je n'ai pas eu le plaisir de faire la connaissance de votre Excellence; mais j'espère que l'occasion est seulement retardée pour le moment.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

MY DEAR SIR,

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

I was allowed by the Commander in Chief to recommend for brevet promotion a certain number of Officers; and I was under the necessity of course of taking them from all parts of the army. I was also obliged to attend to the claims of seniority in instances in which the senior Officer had besides the claim of merit. Under these circumstances, although the light regiments had their proportion of this promotion, I was not enabled to recommend your brother, Captain J. Stewart, although I certainly wished it.

General Craufurd has since proposed to me a plan, under which I could have got him the rank of Major, if that plan had been practicable; but the Spaniards were to be concerned; and if the plan was practicable, so much time must elapse before they can be brought to consent to it, that it is useless to undertake it.

I assure you that it will give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to forward the views of your brother in the service, not only for his advantage, but for that of the public.

'Major General

Believe me, &c.

⚫ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. W. Stewart.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 17th May, and I am much obliged to you for the desire you express to render your department useful to us in this country.

The Portuguese commissariat, and all the departments attached to that army, are in a miserably inefficient state from two causes: the want of authority to enforce obedience to order and regulation; the want of money to defray the

necessary expenses.

The departments attached to the army are not liable to the military law; we therefore have no power to punish those guilty of any offence; and, as for expecting punishment from complaint to the Government or to the civil tribunals, it

would be just as reasonable to expect the coming of the Messiah, or the return of King Sebastian.

These unfortunate Governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partizan. Those malversations in office; those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partizans, are passed unnoticed; and notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office.

The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the Government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes, of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this bubble the Government of Portugal, as well as the successive Governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all Governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The Government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favorites with the mob. They have a general income tax called ten per cent,, and in some cases twenty per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, from want of money, they can pay nobody, and of course have not even the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.

The hire of mules and carts, the food for the animals and drivers, are never paid; and of course the animals die, and the people desert the service.

The Commissaries have no money to purchase anything in the country. I will not allow the soldiers to pillage. The Government have no money to pay for the transport of provisions from the magazines on the coast to the army, and are bankrupt in credit, and are unwilling to execute their own law to force means of transport; and the result is that the troops get nothing, and every department and branch of the service is paralysed.

< The remedy which has been proposed from England has been that we should take the commissariat upon ourselves. I have already done as much as I could in this way; that is, under an arrangement which provides for the expense being subtracted from the subsidy. I have arranged that the Commissary General shall provide for those parts of the army serving with the British divisions. I know that we cannot do more without failure.

In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can get the better, even in individuals.

Our transport, which is the great lever of the commissariat, is done principally, if not entirely, by Spanish muleteers; and, to oblige Mr. Kennedy, they would probably once or twice carry provisions to a Portuguese regiment, but they would prefer to quit us, and attend the French, to being obliged to perform this duty constantly.

When a Portuguese brigade is in a British division the muleteers do not inquire, and do not know, for whom they carry the supplies; and the Commissary with the division issues to the Portuguese Commissary what is required for the Portuguese troops, taking his receipt for the quantities, and a charge is made against the subsidy for the actual cost, including a certain sum for transport from the magazines.

There are but few Portuguese troops not serving in our divisions; but there is the militia, there are the forts, and other establishments, to be provided for, into which we could