by electing them, no one being allowed to refuse.1 An objection is that probably the lords would seldom exercise this power. On the other hand, it would seem reasonable that the lower house, as most nearly representing the sovereignty of the nation, should have the right of raising its distinguished members into the nobility, thus getting rid of them and their descendants, and thrusting them into the upper house. Between these opinions it might be hard to decide; and perhaps they might both merit adoption together. But on these and other plans Adams has not a word. For the beginning of a peerage here in America, he shows his view to be that this ought to be left to the people. The Order of the Cincinnati he criticized, not so much for setting up a hereditary nobility, as for doing so without consulting the people, or waiting for their consent (ix. 524, viii. 192-3, v. 488-9). He expected, as we shall see hereafter, that at some future date the American people would, in another constitutional convention, set up a peerage. As a people never establishes, but only sanctions masters already selfappointed, he in this expectation somewhat resembled Horace's rustic on the river's bank. But, however this be, he left it to the people to settle the system, and hardly so much as gave a hint himself, either because of its not being a pressing problem, or because he was satisfied with the English model, with the king or first magistrate as the fountain of honor (cf. vi. 256), and

By this means "every turbulent leader in the House of Commons might be taken off, and connected by interest with House of Peers," Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.

2

A suggestion of this sort seems to have been made by Filangieri, La Scienza della Legislazione, 1780, I., xi. (ed. of 1826, vol. i., pp. 11920). But his words are obscure.

was confident of its being followed. In so doing he left a lacuna in his "science of government"; but, as we shall see, avoided a dilemma.

CHAPTER XI

TH

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HE undemocratic doctrine of the omnipotence of the people, including the power to divest themselves of their power, passes even beyond Adams's intention, in that he not only limits it by the right of resuming it by force when abused, but further restricts it to two of the three branches of the legislative, and always urges that the people must reserve the third to themselves. The members of this third branch, the people, to be free-and he wished them to be free,must hold elective, and, too, frequently elective. “There can be no free government," he says, "without a democratical branch in the constitution" (iv. 289). "Popular elections of one essential branch of the legislature, frequently repeated, are the only possible means of forming a free constitution"; "when popular elections are given up, liberty and free government must be given up" (466). Therefore a representative assembly must be "an integral," "an essential part of the sovereignty." Such, we may remember, was his definition of free or republican government,

IV., 456, 457; cf. iv., 448, vi., 67; similarly, later, 478. All this, of course, is true, as far as it goes, but is so only because a hereditary senate and a hereditary king are not representatives of the people.

where the people retain "an essential share in the sovereignty."

The people must retain such a share because they are "the best keepers of their own liberties, and the only keepers who can always be trusted," provided they be not the sole keepers (vi. 64, so 65, 66). Their representatives must form a distinct branch of the legislature, with a negative upon the others, “to be the guardians of the public purse, and to protect the people in their turn, against both kings and nobles" (118). For Adams, this is enough. He expresses contentment with "a constitution in which the people reserve to themselves the absolute control of their purses, one essential branch of the legislature, and the inquest of grievances and state crimes" (v. 290). "The people, he says, "have liberty to make use of that reason and understanding God hath given them, in choosing governors, and providing for their safety in government, where they annually choose all; nay, they have it even where the king and senate are hereditary, so long as they have the choice of an essential branch," since then "no law can be made, no money raised, not one step can be taken, without their concurrence, and not an act can be done by their ministers without liability to impeachment "if it is wrong. "2 "A representative assembly" is "the only instrument by which the body of the people can act" (v. 456, similarly 460). "The liberty of the people depends entirely on the constant and direct communication between them and the legis

I See above, p. 27.

2 VI., 119-20; similarly 67. He forgets pardons, treaties, and the excitation of war (for the purse-strings must be loosened if war be once brought upon the country); and he overlooks that impeachment would be futile, unless the lords convict.

lature, by means of their representatives" (iv. 468). No other instrument is necessary.'

But why this distinction? The question may be asked from the opposite sides. If hereditariness is good in two cases, why not also in the third? If election is good, and necessary, in the one case, why not also in the two others? Adams's answer is that election in one case is enough,-it is necessary in at least one branch, even though it be not good there; but it is not necessary further, if it is not good in the other branches; now, election is not good everywhere, it has its evils: it is subject to corruption, to turbulence; and these evils are the greater the more important the office, and especially in the executive are they great, because here foreign intrigue, he thought, would come in, as we shall later have occasion to note. "Elections to offices which are a great object of ambition," he wrote, "I look at with terror" (viii. 465). Therefore, in the higher offices the evils of election he believed would exceed the benefits of representation.3 Rather than have the senators chosen by the whole people, or by districts, he held "the chance of having wisdom and integrity in a senator by hereditary descent would be far better. "4 But

• Montesquieu learned his English lesson a little more fully, saying of the people, "Il ne doit entrer dans le gouvernement que pour choisir ses représentants," Esprit des Lois, XI., vi.

2 IV., 284, vi., 50-2. This was an early fear, ix., 435.

3 The higher functions of the executive, exercised by an assembly, would corrupt the assembly, iv., 290, vi., 64, cf. 172-3, ix., 302. Especially if this assembly be elective, the corrupting influence would descend to the people, cf. vi., 66.

4 VI., 249. He thus believed (even for state elections) in the shortest of "short ballots." He would have been horrified at our ballots with a score or so of offices to be filled and half a dozen candidates for each. Never contemplating the possibility of such monstrosities he said little about the objection to the elective system lying in the ignorance of the electors.

why the necessarily small number of senators should not be elected by the aristocracy all told-the natural, or the artificial and hereditary, he never considered. There is nothing in his principles opposing such election; in fact, his principles lead up to it. It is even partly sanctioned by his British model; for in the British House of Lords, when he wrote, the Scotch members were elective, and a little later also the Irish. It is sufficient that the hereditary principle (by primogeniture) should be in the aristocracy: it is not necessary that it should be in the members of the senate representing that aristocracy. It may be questioned, too, whether an assembly elected from the whole body of the aristocracy would not be stronger than one composed of a few great families, the individuals in which may be incompetents and idiots, and often are inexperienced youths.

As for the first magistrate, speaking of elective kings, that is, of such a magistrate with tenure for life, he said the experience of "Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, etc.," "after long miseries, wars, and carnage," has always proved "chance to be better than choice, and hereditary princes preferable to elective ones" (vi. 121). This, however, proves nothing against first magistrates elected for short terms; and the shorter the term, the further removed are they from those proved evils. Adams's advocacy of life and hereditary tenure will be examined later: here are to be examined his objections to elections, even for short terms, which, not being clearly separated from objections to elections for long terms, can be gathered only from his general positions. First comes his fear of corruption,' intrigue, foreign

"Disappointed candidates for popular elections are as often corrupted by their fall from power, as hereditary aristocracies by their continuance in it," vi., 75.