though the generals pretended to complain of these desertions, it was easy to see that they took no precautions to prevent them.

By the middle of March, the number of insurgents overrunning the Turkish provinces was estimated at six thousand; they had taken posBession of several villages, made the inhabitants prisoners, seized their property, money, and jewels, which they hastened to place in security by sending them to Greece, which country thus became their common exchequer, and a depository for their booty. It is needless to remark, that depredation was one of the great stimulants in this war, into which so many persons rushed with the name of religion on their lips, and a desire to appropriate the property of their neighbour in their hearts.

The Mussulmans, when compelled to retire from the villages which had fallen into the hands of the rebels, fell back on Dimoco, Tricala, Larissa, and Almiro, where the chief strength of the Turkish forces was concentrated, and they temporarily yielded the country a prey to the inroads of the insurgent bands that daily became more numerous. At the head of the Greeks were seen officers of high rank, who could, by their education and influence, have given the insurrection unity and stability, were it possible to direct movements of such a nature. It was even said that Soutzo, the minister of war, notorious for his intrigues and direct relations with the Russian Government, was prepared to resign his functions immediately, and take the supreme command of the armies of the insurrection.

Turkey, through the sudden outbreak of hostilities, was as yet unable to oppose any large force to the insurgents, for, as we all know, her troops were at that moment gloriously engaged elsewhere. Besides, through a very wise and politic precaution, the Turkish government had always avoided publishing the exact number of troops it sent into the insurgent provinces: it was sufficient for it to be known in Greece and elsewhere, that the Ottomans were in readiness, and determined to put down the movement at every point. It has been frequently made a cause of reproach to the Turks, that they waited too long before they opposed the Hellenic insurrection with the necessary energy, and that they allowed it to grow and gain consistence; but we do not think that the Turkish govern ment deserves the rebukes which have been administered to it, and it is not true that it displayed any indecision or weakness in the presence of the Hellenic insurrection. We should take nations and events as they are, and above all not regard-as is so frequently the case in England -Oriental affairs through European and constitutional spectacles. It must be remembered, once for all, that these Græco-Turkish provinces about which we are now writing, are really always in a state of effervescence and disturbance. Revolt, more or less declared, is ever breaking out there, and we might almost say that at any moment the horrors of the Sicilian Vespers might be repeated. It is not in vain that the Greeks have been called artistes en insurrection; it is certain that they always are prepared for any popular commotion which holds out a prospect of pillage. When the rising of the 5th February was announced, the government of the Sultan was bound, in the first instance, to discover whether it was a simple émeute or a serious insurrection. A certain time was therefore required in order that Turkey might appreciate in their true light the events in Epirus and Thessaly, and it then discovered that it must act with a vigour proportioned to the extent of the insurrection.

At the time when the Hellenic propaganda had made its greatest progress-when nothing was spoken of at Athens and elsewhere but of recruiting and enrolling volunteers, the Turkish government only had along the whole frontier line one battalion of infantry, six battalions of light troops, a squadron of cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. These troops formed an effective strength of from 4000 to 5000 men: adding the 6000 who were already in Thessaly and Epirus, we arrive at a total of 10,500 regular and irregular troops. This corps d'armée formed the principal centre, the nucleus of the troops opposed to the insurgents. The Ottoman government sent off all the troops that could be detached from the army commanded by Omar Pacha, and 10,000 Arabs were expected to arrive from Alexandria and stifle the insurrection in its defiles or its mountains.

To meet this concentration of the Turkish forces, and to sustain the enthusiasm of the insurrectionary army, the Greeks in Epirus did not cease to spread about news tending to conceal the real movements of the Ottoman army. One day it was stated that Janina had fallen into the hands of the insurrectionists; complete details were given, and all the operations of the siege, which were purely imaginary. At another time, a considerable corps was said to have arrived from Constantinople and landed at Prevesa, who had been utterly cut in pieces. The list of dead and wounded was added, and the names of the generals killed in action. But it was soon discovered that the battle of Prevesa was as false as the seige of Janina, and must equally be regarded as a production of the Hellenic imagination. Thus imposture and boasting played a great part in the ranks of the insurgent army. Repetition and invention multiplied the bulletins of imaginary successes and chimerical advantages, while waiting for real victories.

The news from the Turco-Greek frontier, which arrived at Constantinople by express, or that received via Salonichi, agreed in the statement that the armed bands which had invaded the Ottoman territory had been repelled at several points upon the Greek territory. A unanimous and complete insurrection of all the Christian populations of Epirus had been calculated on, and up to the present only an irregular agitation had been produced without any central support, or any direct communication between the different bodies. Russia, in spite of all her intrigues, all her efforts, and the gold which she incessantly and profusely scattered over Epirus, could not change the nature of the case, or arouse that enthusiasm and conviction which are produced by a sacred cause. The new Hetærists, collected beneath the old banner which recalled the organisation and movement of carbonarism, had not retained any of the qualities of devotion and faith possessed by the first founders.

Political associations cannot be restored; when they have once been extinguished, when time has destroyed their ardour and prestige, they cannot be summoned again into existence under the conditions of their original foundation. It requires another rallying word, a new banner, almost as much as other men and other events, to re-establish the ancient bonds and collect the combatants and apostles. In the midst of these incoherencies the Mussulman press most clearly proved the critical position into which King Otho was daily hurrying further and further. "When the frontier has been once pacified," the Turkish papers stated,

"the wandering and plundering bands taken prisoners or dispersed, the whole insurrection put down, what fate will be reserved for Greece? What posture will she assume in the eyes of intelligent and political Europe? Does she build upon the protectorate of Russia in order to carry on with impunity direct or indirect hostilities upon the territories ofa neighbouring state, and encourage revolt, brigandage, and rapine? Greece forgets that she has always owed great financial and commercial obligations to the Turkish empire, which has never hesitated to open its ports to her industry, to ensure her merchants every variety of guarantee, and even peculiar privileges, without any commercial treaty, or any expectation of reciprocity. Turkey, on the other hand, did not expect gratitude from the Greek government, but a regard of mutual rights and the maintenance of the regular relations which should exist between two conterminous nations. The destruction of the modern Greek race, and that which incessantly menaces her government and her nationality, is that immense presumption which devours her, that blind confidence in her strength and power. Greece too often forgets that she possesses no army. Does she call by that title the few soldiers who may be met in the streets of Athens, and who can only be used to mount guard at the palace gates? Can she say that she actually possesses a fleet? As for her finances, public shame compels us not to mention them. To do so would be creating a theme for criticism and recrimination. They form one of those ever bleeding wounds, which can only excite pity, if they cannot give rise to a more legitimate and truer sentiment."

Thus the Mussulman papers expressed themselves in the midst of the insurrectionary contests, and while the troops of the Sultan were employing their utmost exertions to scatter the enemy. Abstracting that spirit of acrimony which necessarily animates newspaper polemics, we cannot help recognising, in spite of certain exaggerations, a great deal of justice and truth in the language of the Ottoman journal.

Now that we have been able to form an idea of what was going on in the ranks of the insurgents, and the state of ignorance prevailing among the majority of these adventurers, whom the Muscovite propaganda tried in vain to exalt into heroes, we shall have less difficulty in understanding the facility with which the most mendacious and absurd reports were received and credited by them. The propagandists told them, in order to raise their courage, that France and England favoured the insurrection; and we can see, from this simple fact, what was the political bias of the insurrectionary movement. The men who were making war in its name did not even know whether two powers of such importance as England and France were for or against them. They all remembered that, during a war which was called the War of Independence, they had seen the French and English fleets take the part of Greece against the Ottoman empire-why should not this alliance remain for ever? Had not the Turk remained the eternal enemy of the Christian name, who should be combated upon every occasion that presented itself? Thus reasoned the majority of the insurgents, who expected at any moment to see the French and English battalions arrive, to offer them the fraternal support of their army, and aid them to throw off the Mussulman yoke. These hopes and illusions were proved by several curious documents seized on the person of some of the prisoners. They were published in the columns of the Ottoman papers.

Still, the representatives of France and England could no longer endure the strange abuse which was made of the name and intentions of their country; and since the unhappy people of Epirus and Thessaly were so blind and ignorant as to believe these clumsy falsehoods, it was necessary that they should be undeceived, and informed of the real state of the case by authentic and official documents. On the 29th of March, the English ambassador at Constantinople addressed to all the English consuls in the Levant a circular on this subject. His example was speedily followed by the French envoy; and after the publication of these two documents, it was noticed that there was a sudden check in the movements of the insurgents, especially of those who had chosen Epirus as the scene of their enterprise. But the implacable propaganda, which pursued its object with such incessant activity, was not disposed to lose all the fruits of its exertions. The effect produced by the two French and English circulars could not have escaped its notice, and it felt that the races, which had been so long fanaticised, would sooner or later escape from its influence. It, therefore, made a movement in the direction of Samos, the inhabitants of which island they fancied disposed to rise against the authority of the Sultan. Agents were sent over to distribute incendiary proclamations, money, and arms, and to declare that it was time to put an end to the Turkish rule; they also continued to propagate the falsehood, refuted everywhere already, of the British and French alliance being intended to promote the interests of the insurrection. The people of Samos remained impassible before all these provocations; neither the religious interest nor promises could act upon them, nor induce them to take part in a movement of which they comprehended the real meaning. The consequence was, that the Russian agents were entirely defeated in their object.

The insurrection now appeared to have changed its scene of action; suppressed in several important parts of Epirus, it broke out again in Thessaly with renewed fury. In the first days of April reports were spread of very frequent and smart actions which had taken place between the bands of Klephts and the irregular troops; some of these bands, bolder and better armed than the rest, had even advanced as far as Pharsalia. The panic was general. These combatants, dispersed in all directions, were not merely dangerous to those whom they regarded as their enemies; in their blind instincts for violence and pillage they attacked their co-religionists. Whole families of Greeks were seen to throw themselves at the feet of Turkish officers to supplicate them to protect them against the plunderers. At Larissa, the rumour was spread that 15,000 insurgents, forming three different corps d'armée, were going to surround the town and plunder it, and General Grivas, a man whose life resembles a romance, had succeeded in collecting under his orders 100 regulars and 500 irregular troops belonging to the Greek army. He had already passed Damoko, was marching upon Dabrita, and menaced to cut off the communication between Larissa and Bitolia. Another personage, not less extraordinary, and who represents one of the most marked features of the insurgent army, General Hadji Petros, had under him a corps of 3000 men, who were said to be entirely devoted to him, and in a tolerable state of discipline; he was said to be only two hours' distance from Trisala. Finally, it was said that General Papacosta maintained himself in a very strong defensive

position near Armiro, whence it did not appear likely that the Mussulman troops would be able to drive him out, or even venture to attack him. His corps amounted to not less than 4000 men. It will be seen from these details that the Thessalian revolt was at this time powerfully organised, and well supported by brave troops and skilful generals who had succeeded in putting a stop, temporarily at least, to their divisions and rivalry.

The Turkish government had been fortunately warned of the considerable development which the Thessalian insurrection had acquired. The troops hitherto sent against the Klephts had been considered insufficient, and in some of the engagements many of the Albanians had deserted to the enemy. Five hundred volunteers had been hastily enrolled, on whose courage and devotion the government could depend; but they were deficient in that military discipline for which zeal is but a poor substitute. These volunteers had been joined by 1800 redifs, who happened to be in barracks at Tirnova, by the irregulars of Dervant Aja, and by 800 Moreotes. Unfortunately, too, great dissensions existed among the irregulars, almost as dangerous in their effects as those found among the insurgents; but in spite of their numerical inferiority, this handful of men resolutely dared the engagement, for they were commanded by Abbas Laliote. It is impossible to write the name of this man, now so popular and celebrated throughout the whole of Turkey, without recalling the services he has rendered to the Mussulman cause by the severe and repeated lessons which he gave the insurgents whenever he met with them. Captain Abbas deserves the honour of a special biography. Albanian by nation, born and educated at Laka, in the Morea, he is the issue of one of those Albanian families who abandoned their homes in the seventeenth century, and established themselves in various parts of Greece. In the revolution of 1822, he had been distinguished among the most resolute and intelligent leaders, and was forced to expatriate himself. He became a farmer in Thessaly, and thus acquired a knowledge of the country upon which he was afterwards called to fight. It is well known what advantages such knowledge affords in partisan warfare. Abbas Laliote is considered one of the bravest men in Turkey; he has served with a great deal of distinction in Rumelia and Africa, and at the first news of the insurrection he hastened to offer his services in the defence of the country.

Soon after, news was received via Salonichi of the arrival at Volo of four Turkish frigates, who brought to the scene of war six battalions of Egyptian troops, and all the matériel which had been embarked requisite to act vigorously against the Hellenes scattered over Turkey. At the same time it was stated that a body of 500 Albanians was marching on Larissa, and would soon arrive to join the Egyptians. It was easy to foresee from this concentration of the Mussulman forces, and the movements in advance continually made by the insurgents, that a general and decisive action was about to take place. At Volo and Armiro the two most considerable engagements of the whole campaign took place, and which decided the fate of the Thessalian insurrection. The insurgents collected in considerable numbers on the mountains surrounding Volo, whence they descended into the plain, where the Mussulman troops awaited them with great firmness. It is impossible yet to give any detailed account of the battle of Volo-all that is known is the general result. Eye-witnesses agree in stating that the Hellenes commenced the action