In the first table, Individuality is pre-eminent; it is also among the larger organs in the second. Its use to the botanist is sufficiently obvious, the basis of the science being individual knowledge; and when we consider, that of plants upwards of 50,000 different species are described, without counting subordinate varieties produced by cultivation, climate, &c. the importance of this organ to the botanist will need no additional evidence. Eventuality ranks next among the genuine botanists, but lower in the others. Its general prevalence can scarcely be accidental; and yet its connection with botanical taste (for none of these are entitled to be called physiological botanists) is not quite apparent. Form occupies the same place in both lists as Eventuality. It is one of the most important organs in describing plants, the distinctive descriptions of species being very frequently derived from peculiarities of shape, and a large number of the technical terms relate thereto. Still, if we may generalize from these dozen examples, it is not so important as Locality. The latter organ ranks second in both lists. Constructiveness second in one, third in the other. The relative position of parts occupies a prominent place in botanical classifications and descriptions. In the classes of Linnæus, six out of twenty-four are founded almost solely on this, and it forms an item in the characteristics of half the others. In the modern systems it holds a still more important place. In addition, I believe, the spirit of system-making in Natural History to proceed in a great measure from Locality and Constructiveness. Linnæus contended, that natural-historical classifications should resemble maps, and that a linear series could never exhibit the true place of the different imaginary groups in respect to each other. Macleay represents them by circles composed of smaller circles, and these again of tertiary circles, and so on. Fleming adopts division and subdivision in a binary series, as it were branches from one common root or centre, dividing again and again into forks. Almost all naturalists agree, that straight simple lines do not represent the affinities of natural objects. Such system-making has been attributed to _Comparison; I think it far more likely to originate in the organs here named.

As all objects and individualized groups must be written and spoken of by name, the use of Language to a botanist is highly requisite. Less so, it would appear, than Individuality; nor is this surprising, since the first requisite for verbal memory is to be looked for in the clearness of our ideas, and the number of objects considerably exceeds that of the words used for names in botanical science; just as we see the number of human beings in a city exceeding the number of different names. In each case, the various combinations of the same words supply names for many more objects than there are words used. Size, though

frequently called into exercise, is only so in the perception of simple proportions. Absolute size and exactness in mensuration are rarely or never required. Though Number is much used in botanical descriptions, it is only in the plainest numerical relations. The four first rules of simple arithmetic amply suffice. Colour is quite a secondary matter, it being almost a botanical axiom, that hue is of no importance in distinguishing plants. Comparison is something above mediocrity in these averages; but it does not seem of much import till we ascend to the philosophy of the science. Time, Weight, Order, Tune, Causality and Wit have little or nothing to do with descriptive botany. Why should Ideality be so low? Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the exact function of this organ, it has unquestionably some connection with a taste for elegance and beauty, and none of the physical sciences is so di- · rectly concerned with objects of elegance and beauty as is that of botany.

The number of developments in the first table is inadequate to establish an exact average; yet, on the whole, the relative size of the organs agrees very well with what we might anticipate; though Eventuality and Ideality may be exceptions to this. The second is introduced merely as a contrast; the four persons only agreeing in their partial taste for botany. The two first may be looked upon as more inclined to philosophical contemplations; the third as a literary historian; the fourth is a medical man fond of his profession. The two latter are merely botanists of species; the two former interest themselves with the relations between botany and other sciences.

Persons deficient in the size of one or more of the organs prevailing in the average of the first table, may attain excellence in botanical science, but it will necessarily be partial. I know a botanist of deservedly high celebrity, in whom the organs marked 1, 2 and 3 in the first table appear to be all welldeveloped; the upper part of the forehead considerably less; the temperament nervous-bilious. His knowledge of specific forms is very extensive. His pencil depicts them to the life with great ease and rapidity. He gets through an immensity of work, both pictorial and descriptive, combining the two excellencies of great quantity and good quality in the execution of it. A second, in whom Constructiveness prevails, both the observing and reflecting organs (with one or two exceptions) well developed, combined also with large Ideality, is well known for the beauty and accuracy exhibited in his delineations of minute and microscopic objects; but he is not merely a botanist, being also a successful cultivator of polite literature and practical ethics. A third, in whom Language, Form and Individuality (I here speak from rather distant memory) de

cidedly prevail over the reflective intellect, is a mere botanist of words and forms. He has been in situations where others have

reaped high fame for their philosophical contemplation of nature, and the results of his opportunities, communicated to the public, are in great part composed of learned disquisitions regarding the names under which the plants he saw have been described by different authors, and on the particular variations of form to which the names were applied. A fourth, in whom Form and Language are not large, but Individuality and Eventuality well marked, with pretty full Comparison, evidently prefers the physiology of botany, the actions, functions and uses of plants, and their modifications by culture. A public

office obliges him to know and be able to name many plants, which he is exceedingly apt to forget; and when at a loss for a name, he presses his fore-finger between his eye-brows, to all appearance quite unconsciously; a gesture which the phrenologist will know how to interpret.

A naturalist in whom the reflective organs prevail, has written several botanical essays. They relate to the influence of soil, situation and climate over vegetation, and are occasionally blemished by inaccuracy of nomenclature, and the mistaking of one plant for another. Two naturalists with large anterior lobes, and well developed reflecting organs, are constantly throwing out censures against botanists for limiting their attention and exertions to the collecting, naming and describing of individual objects. The unacknowledged literary productions. of one of them may be affiliated from this circumstance, when in any way relating to botanical science.

Such individual examples might be given pretty numerously, but as they would merely form further illustrations of what has been already said, it is scarcely worth while to do so. Moreover, several of them being private individuals, whose developments are in the preceding tables, and given under the condition of their not being personally identified with them; it would be a breach of faith to notice any peculiarities that might lead to this. The few examples above cited are in some degree public characters, and (one excepted) not in the tables of development. Enough has been said to give a general idea of the relations between botanical science and particular forms of brain; and also to shew, that no one form of brain is so completely characteristic of botany, that we could decide on the taste merely by cranial inspection. But though this may not be accomplished, we can with tolerable certainty determine what department of the science will be preferred, if studied at all. I have, &c. HEWETT C. WATSON.

[Some of our readers may recollect that it was the intention of Dr Spurzheim to treat of the organs necessary for the display of particular talents, in the second part of his work on " Phrenology in connection with the study of Physiognomy." The first part of that work was published in 1826, and is occupied by a description of the different varieties of general character which are found in combination with certain forms of head. Along with many valuable observations on physiognomy, and practical directions for the ascertainment of cerebral development, it contains a number of biographical sketches of remarkable persons, illustrated by engravings of heads and skulls. Dr Spurzheim promised to communicate to the world in the second part of this work, besides his observations on talents, already mentioned, those which he had made on what is called Fathognomy or natural language. Unfortunately he has not lived to carry his design into execution; but we fondly hope that he has left behind him manuscripts, which, when published, may in some measure compensate for the loss thus sustained by Phrenology in consequence of his premature death.-EDITOR.]

ARTICLE II.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.

In our last number we presented an abstract of the facts contained in Archbishop Whately's "Thoughts on Secondary Punishments. and they appeared to us to amount to a demonstration that the Hulks and transportation to New South Wales not only are inefficient as secondary punishments, but operate as positive bounties inducing crime. We do not anticipate any serious argument against the abolition of both, if more efficacious punishments could be substituted in their place. But, what punishments can be substituted with advantage to the community, is a question attended with the greatest_difficulties, and to which we now solicit the attention of our readers. We regret that we cannot coincide with the views of Archbishop Whately on this subject, so implicitly as we do in his remarks on the evils of the existing system. As, however, he is a bold thinker, an intrepid advocate of truth, and never afraid of a conclusion which is satisfactorily proved to be sound, we believe that he will commend our independence, and listen to our remarks with candour and consideration.

The first point on which we differ is one of fundamental importance. The Archbishop states his views in the following

terms:

"It is said that those who train young dogs to attack foxes, badgers, and other such vermin, are anxious that they should not be severely bitten in their earliest attempts, which might have the effect of daunting their spirit for ever: they accordingly muzzle or otherwise disable the beast which the dogs are first

set at; and when they have acquired the habit of attacking it, without having formed an association of pain and danger, they will afterwards not be deterred by the wounds they may receive. Now, it appears to me that to hold out impunity to the young, and to first offenders, and thus, as it were, to muzzle the law, till they shall have acquired the habit of defying it, is precisely an analogous kind of training, and just what is best suited to breed up hardened criminals.

"I am inclined to think that in this, and in many other points, important practical errors may be traced to the very prevailing mistake of confounding together two perfectly distinct considerations; the moral guilt of an offender, and the propriety of punishing him for the sake of example. The theory of punishment, indeed, viz. that it is inflicted for prevention, and not for retribution, is, in the abstract, understood and admitted by almost every one; and is distinctly recognised in our legal enactments. But, in particular cases, there are notions and practices inconsistent with a doctrine so evident, which are by no means uncommon. Irrelevant considerations,-irrelevant I mean, on the supposition, whose truth almost every one admits, that man has no right to think of inflicting vengeance, are perpetually allowed to influence our judgment.

"And the leniency often injudiciously shewn towards youths, and towards any who are supposed to be the seduced, and the instruments of others, arises, I conceive, chiefly from the idea that their fault, in a moral point of view, is less. But if the temptation they are exposed to from the instigation of their elders is strong, it needs the more to be counterbalanced by the fear of punishment. Morally speaking, the strength of temptations from bad education and habits, bad associates, strong passions, ignorance, distressed circumstances, favourable opportunities for crime, &c. may be taken into account as palliations of an offence; but if we make allowance for them, politically, as palliatives in the eye of the law, we are encouraging crime by adding, to all these other incentives, the promise of impunity, and withdrawing the salutary check of fear precisely in the very cases where it is the most needed."

The general scope of this doctrine appears to us to imply that expediency and the dictates of our moral feelings do not always coincide; and that, in punishing criminals, it is beneficial to the community to disregard "the moral guilt of an offender," and to "punish him for the sake of example," in a different manner, or in a different degree, from that which we would adopt if the "moral guilt" were taken as the rule. It is a fundamental principle in our creed of morals and philosophy, that, in every instance, the dictates of the moral sentiments, when enlightened and expediency coincide; and hence, whenever we feel the mo